Essays on cultural and institutional dynamics in economic development using spatial analysis by Birabi, Timothy
 
 
 
 
Essays on Cultural and Institutional 
Dynamics in Economic Development 
Using Spatial Analysis 
 
by 
Timothy Birabi 
 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Adam Smith Business School  
College of Social Sciences  
University of Glasgow  
April 2016 
 
©Timothy Birabi 
 
 
  
i 
 
 i 
Abstract 
This thesis seeks to research patterns of economic growth and development 
from a number of perspectives often resonated in the growth literature. By 
addressing themes about history, geography, institutions and culture the thesis is 
able to bring to bear a wide range of inter-related literatures and methodologies 
within a single content. Additionally, by targeting different administrative levels 
in its research design and approach, this thesis is also able to provide a 
comprehensive treatment of the economic growth dilemma from both cross-
national and sub-national perspectives. 
The three chapters herein discuss economic development from two broad 
dimensions. The first of these chapters takes on the economic growth inquiry by 
attempting to incorporate cultural geography within a cross-country formal spatial 
econometric growth framework. By introducing the global cultural dynamics of 
languages and ethnic groups as spatial network mechanisms, this chapter is able 
to distinguish economic growth effects accruing from own-country productive 
efforts from those accruing from interconnections within a global productive 
network chain. From this, discussions and deductions about the implications for 
both developed and developing countries are made as regards potentials for gains 
and losses from such types and levels of productive integration. 
The second and third chapters take a different spin to the economic 
development inquiry. They both focus on economic activity in Africa, tackling the 
relevant issues from a geo-intersected dimension involving historic regional tribal 
homelands and modern national and subnational administrative territories. The 
second chapter specifically focuses on attempting to adopt historical channels to 
investigate the connection between national institutional quality and economic 
development in demarcated tribal homelands at the fringes of national African 
borders. The third chapter on the other hand focuses on looking closer at the 
effects of demarcations on economic activity. It particularly probes how different 
kinds of demarcation warranted by two different but very relevant classes of 
politico-economic players have affected economic activity quite distinguishably 
within the resulting subnational regions in Africa. 
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Introduction 
Economic development is a very broad multidimensional topic. The literature 
that attempts to understand the dynamics, patterns and sources of economic 
growth and development across the world is an almost saturated one with its 
inception dating as far back to works such as Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of 
Nations” in 1776. Following this extensively researched literature, we find that 
the themes of history, geography, culture and institutions continue to permeate 
and persist in various aspects of the discourse. Understanding the sources of 
economic growth has remained central to unravelling the global patterns of 
economic development. While we agree on what the proximate growth sources 
are (human and physical capital accumulation, convergence and technological 
progress), we are still unclear about what fundamental growth sources are most 
relevant.  
Rather than attempting to identify the most relevant deeper sources of 
economic development, it might be as fulfilling to understand economic growth 
dynamics by adopting frameworks that recognize specific fundamentals inherently 
operational to the localized patterns of development characteristic of one’s 
study. While, variations in patterns of economic development manifest globally to 
produce comparable dissimilarities in the growth experiences of countries in most 
of Sub-Saharan Africa apart from most countries in Western Europe, for instance. 
The dynamics driving and protracting these differences are oftentimes 
undoubtedly local. Experiential locality is a very interesting phenomenon that can 
contextualise our study and understanding of economic development across 
nations.  
Four prominent angles in the economic growth literature standout in this 
regard: institutions, culture, geography and history. These areas often provide 
economic growth analysts with a very practical and convenient mechanism for 
individualising and localising diverging growth experiences across nations while 
allowing us to still maintain our unwavering beliefs about the role of the proximate 
growth factors in the economic development of countries throughout the world. 
The most central and observable elements in these four areas are institutions and 
culture; and depending on how you perceive them they could easily be different 
representations of the same concept. The applied areas of history and geography 
on the other hand, provide economic growth analysts with very useful tools for 
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localising and contextualising divergent growth experiences across a very rich and 
wide global economic landscape. 
 
What Institutions and Culture are Within the Context of 
Economic Development 
It is not hard to see how the theoretical introduction and discussion of 
institutional and cultural dynamics in the economic growth of countries and 
regions cannot be easily separated. In the institutional change or evolution 
literature some authors such as Gérard Roland in his 2004 paper – ‘Understanding 
Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions’, identify culture 
as in fact a slow-changing type of institutional manifestation. In many instances, 
the study and analysis of institutions and institutional change in economic growth 
are often consistent with Douglass C. North’s definition of institutions as ‘the rules 
of the game… or… humanly devised constraints…’ which govern human interaction 
(North, 1990: 3; also see Hodgson, 2006 for more in this regard). The game as 
referred here involves both formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) forms of 
interaction between people(s) of society. Herein, our intention is not an attempt 
to redefine or reorganise the semantics about the definition and use of these 
easily ambiguous terminologies. It is not unconvincing to see how language can be 
considered as both an institution and a cultural element all at the same time. Or 
how the cultural identity of a group can at the same time represent and embody 
the political institutional administrative identity characterising that set of people. 
Such ambiguities can lead to nuances about definitional debates, which although 
very relevant, are not the objective of the exercise herein.  
Our interest is in trying to position the reader within the school of thought 
opining that this inherent ambiguity concerning how cultural and institutional 
dynamics are interchangeably treated reflects the deep connections between the 
manifestations of their presence in human interactions; especially those about 
economic growth and development. One thing is clear in this literature: 
institutions are distinguishable from organisations (North, 1990; Hodgson, 2006). 
However, what institutions are remain more open to context and application than 
to definition. In many respects, the growth fundamentals of history and geography 
as often adopted in the literature provide a very useful avenue for contextualising 
institutions as current, modern or more formal ‘de-jure’ constraints to human 
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behaviour while cultures are often perceived as more informal ‘de-facto’ 
constraints lingering from the past for any specific set of individuals.  
Regardless of the definition or perspective adopted, the fact is that 
institutional and cultural dynamics affect economic activity through a number of 
theorised conduits. A lot more of these theories have been analysed discursively 
compared to the volume of empirical work confirming them. This is very much 
expected that the theoretical framework most often precede the empirical feats 
within such a field of enquiry. As already highlighted in the preceding page, 
Douglas North – one of the pioneers of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) – gave 
one of the widely adopted working definitions of institutions. Continuing with his 
explanation, North (1990) opines that institutions as a result, are most effective 
through their ability to influence ‘incentives (political, social, and economic) in 
human exchange’.  
Irrespective of the perceived lack of consensus on a formal working definition 
for institutions, there is however a conceivable agreement on certain key 
components of the institutions concept. One of which is that institutions are man-
made rules that act as either constraints or provide incentives to human behaviour 
and interaction. Although Hodgson (2006) gives some critique to North’s 
perspective on institutions being ambiguous, he opines that this perspective 
predominantly assumes a conceptual similarity between the institutional concepts 
of constraints and rules. He adds that it is also more biased towards the frequent 
use of formal rules to the relative neglect of informal rules (Hodgson, 2006: 11). 
Authors such as Glaeser et al (2004) also fall into this critique of analytically over-
emphasizing the constraints element of institutions. This does not necessarily 
mean that they do not imply that institutions are in fact also able to encourage 
human behaviour; such discussions may just well be an analytical focus, reflective 
of the kind of institutions being discussed and not necessarily representative of 
all institutional types.  As already introduced, there is also an apparent consensus 
(at least by measure of content proliferation) that what constitutes rules can be 
decomposed into or viewed in de-jure and de-facto perspectives or as more 
regularly represented - formal and informal rules1. Consequentially, as an 
                                         
1 Boland (1992) refers to these in the form of concrete versus consensus institutions, where the former refer to 
more formal rules such as constitution and the other more informal rules such as unwritten laws and 
agreements (p.120). 
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analytical extension, the relevance of this rule decomposition especially features 
in the literature with applied institutional themes such as institutional change, 
enforcements and how different types of institutions inter-relate to effect desired 
developmental outcomes. 
On the institutions versus organizations distinction, authors’ perspectives 
appear to reflect the relationship between the social construct or structure 
(institutions) and the agents (individuals or social units) that make them up. North 
(1990) says that although both concepts provide an encasement or ‘structure to 
human interaction’ they are uniquely different as institutions set the rules of the 
game while organization set out the strategies through coordination by which 
interacting individuals achieve set out goals or objectives (pp. 4-5). In effect, a 
North’ view is that institutions are to the underlying rules for stable interaction 
as organizations are to the players of the game and their strategies for achieving 
a set purpose. The distinction thus sets political parties, households, trade unions, 
and schools, the state, etc. (which are organizations) apart from the actual sets 
of mechanism ensuring stability, compliance, acceptance and predictability in the 
coordination of the individuals involved such as constitutional law, contracts, 
property rights, etc. (which form the institutional bit of the framework). Khalil 
(1999) provides a more comprehensive review of this analytical dichotomy 
between institutions and organizations. He also proposes that they are in fact 
different: that ‘organizations adopt institutions ranging from simple routines to 
beliefs and cultural ideals2 to assist its members achieve stated and sometimes 
implicit goals’ (p.64). He goes on to simplify this distinction by saying that while 
organizations are defined by their goals or ends focus, institutions are the means 
employed (ibid). These two views are consistent and often shared by authors in 
the literature that agree on a conceptual distinction between both social 
structures even though there are slight differences on how these distinctions are 
made3. Some authors such as Aoki (2007) are not so clear on the distinction – 
referring to organizations as in fact a type of economic institution (p.1). While 
                                         
2 This phrase has been italicized to draw the reader’s attention to Khalil’s (1999) portrayal of institutions as 
incorporating elements of culture, which displays just how interrelated these themes are and why attempting 
a comprehensive view of the discussions can be quite herculean. 
3Khalil (1999) reviews some of these alternative views on the distinction between institutions and organizations 
a bit further in the same section following his definition of both concepts (see from pages 61-62). 
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others especially those influenced by writings for everyday usage (such as 
contemporary dictionary definitions) in fact use both concepts interchangeably4. 
Similarly, another point of definitional divergence in the institutions literature 
represents one embodying an issue of classification. It is clearly treated in the 
text by Acemoglu (2009), in his chapter on institutions, where he attempts to 
distinguish between four fundamentals of growth – ‘luck and multiple equilibria, 
geography, institutions, and culture’. He proposes an explanation for each growth 
fundamental as defining the path for the proximate growth factors crucial for 
economic performance and the causes of the divergence between the growth 
experiences of countries across the globe. He points out that ‘culture as viewed 
by some social scientists is a key determinant of the values, preferences, and 
beliefs of individuals and societies… they can be thought of as influencing 
equilibrium outcomes for a given set of institutions’ (p. 122). Acemoglu later 
points out that although it can be confusingly interpreted that culture is indeed 
the most crucial, its role in impacting economic performance ought to be 
relegated to a less potent one compared to institutions for two reasons.  
Firstly, because it is difficult to measure what constitutes good culture or 
social-capital. Secondly, because of the case with the Asian miracle evidencing an 
instance of diverging economic performances in the midst of a similar Asian 
cultural or social-capital system (ibid: 122-123). Authors such as Roland (2004) 
view institutions as a much grander socio-structural layout encompassing cultural 
elements. In fact he views culture as an embodiment of ‘social norms and 
underlying values’, a ‘slow-changing’ kind of institution which is distinguishable 
from ‘faster-changing’ institutional types such as political and legal institutions 
(p.117). This classification of institutional forms into fast and slow changing is also 
very much compliant with that of formal and informal rules, respectively. This 
idea mostly features in the discussions on institutional change (see Nye, 2008 for 
some discussions on the new institutional economics, NIE, in this regard). Greif 
(2006) proposes a definition broad enough to nest both debates as highlighted 
above. Hence making institutions appear as a ‘super structure’ under which such 
                                         
4 In this case, you often find the regular usage of institutions including universities when these are in the sense 
discussed herein referring to organization, while education itself is the institution or like the church and the 
actual religion conformed to. A similar example is applicable to the commonly assigned international 
financial institutions (the World Bank, the IMF, etc.), which are more or less big multinational organization 
(players as North, 1990 terms them) comprising of player countries as participants attempting to affect local 
institutional frameworks of finance, politics, etc. 
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social aggregates like organizations, culture, and other forms could be wholly 
classified and analysed. Greif’s proposed definition is that ‘institutions are ‘a 
system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a 
regularity of (social) behaviour’ (as cited in Voigt, 2012: 5). 
 
Introducing Some Ideological Perspectives 
A careful look at the central issues as discussed above, one can subtly sense 
that the source of the debate in the literature is the lingering influence of the 
earlier views on institutions, now referred to as old institutional economics (OIE), 
on the current views of institutional influences in the current writings of the new 
institutional economics (NIE). The earlier OIE view had a broader concept of 
institutions and as a result considered the relevance of a broader influence of 
factors from social, political and economic inter-relatedness. While the later view 
as contained in the NIE approach are narrower and often discuss issues regarding 
rationality and optimization behaviours of agents and as a result often emphasize 
a more economic-centric perspective. Resultantly, issues on economic institutions 
such as property rights, contracts, and other market-based policies pervade these 
NIE discourses.  
As an analytical consequence, we are not surprised that approaches oriented in 
the 1st category fall into the perspective of what Clark (1998) terms a ‘Structures-
based approach’, which gives analytical primacy to the relevance of structures 
over agents. While those in the second category, which he refers to as ‘Agency-
centred’ analytically assume primacy of the agents over the structure. As Khalil 
(1999) diagnostically puts this divide, they are not necessarily two different 
approaches to viewing institutions - they are ways of approaching two different 
types of institutions. Such categorization may not also reflect a case of differing 
substance per se but may be one of shifting paradigms in areas of focus 
characteristic of the era of the development discourse itself. Earlier proponents 
of institutional economists such as Veblen and Commons viewed institutions as an 
inter-relationship between social structures and agents (Hodgson, 2006: 2). They 
emphasized the aspect of the relationship relating the social structure’s influence 
on the agent: an approach that distinguishes the NIE approach from the OIE 
approach. This divide in perspective (OIE being collective oriented and NIE being 
individual oriented) comes through more emphatically in the analytical models 
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adopted and the policy implications sought after following findings from these 
respective researches. Hence, its theoretical relevance is most spelt out in the 
discussions about the potency of institutional based policy, institutional evolution, 
political institutional forms (democracy and autocracy), economic institutional 
forms (market-led and state-led systems) and how these affect economic 
performance than in the substance of the definitions of institutions itself.  
As Davis (2009) points out: ‘there is a broad consensus about what institutions 
are not’ even though its qualification remains elusive (pp. 2-3). Paldam and 
Gundlach (2007) refer to two perspectives of the institutions-growth literature: 
the ‘Grand Transition (GT)’ and the Primacy of Institutions (PoI) perspectives. 
Although the discussions under these differing perspectives are more on the 
relationship between economic performance and institutions, we bring it in here 
to buttress the point that what distinguish them is not what institutions in fact 
are but how they change, and how they affect economic growth. The former, GT, 
being more representative of the OIE perspective and looks at institutions from a 
broader narrative - more inclined to the notion of social structures, hence viewed 
as a consequence of economic improvements and not its inducer. While the latter, 
PoI, is more representative of the more recent NIE perspective which conceives 
institutions from a more specific oriented narrative - more inclined to the 
individuals and hence sees economic performance as a consequence of good 
institutional quality and inducements. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
What we have attempted to do so far is, provide some illustration of the lack 
of centrality in the literature on what institutions (or culture) are and how this 
translates to varying perspectives on theoretical orientations and analytical 
frameworks for studying its impact on economic development. Differing 
perceptions about institutions have reflected more the types and aspects of 
institutions being analysed rather than differences in the substance of the 
institutional concept itself. Our position in this thesis herein can be understood in 
a quote from Acemoglu & Robinson (2008: 2): ‘… ultimately, the aim of the 
research on institutions is to pinpoint specific institutional characteristics that are 
responsible for economic outcomes in specific situations (for example, the effect 
of legal institutions on the types of business contracts)’. We do not intend to 
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provide a re-fabrication of the theoretical framework for studying institutional 
dynamics on economic activity.  
That said we hope the reader is able to acquiesce with our perspective that 
culture and institutions are very much interconnected by the specific historical 
and geographical contexts under which they are adopted to analyse economic 
outcomes and development. Take the notion of the geographical territories and 
boundaries defining a nation-state or any recognized political administration, for 
instance. Such boundary outlines are defined not only by the physical markers 
used to identify and distinguish them, but also by the formal and informal rules 
used to establish and project their local and global recognition. Similarly, norms, 
values, and other unique elements of culture have been observed and theorised 
to embody certain collective behavioural codes, which allow consistent clustered 
patterns usually harnessed in the analysis of economic developmental outcomes - 
typical of studies such as Michalopoulos (2012). And not surprisingly many 
institutional and cultural appropriations or manifestations are by their nature 
contextualised historically and geographically. Resultantly, this makes it near-
inept to analyse the development impacts of either of these fundamental growth 
sources without an intersecting framework involving them all. We could fairly say 
that: institutions and cultures are human-designed constructs that enable (or 
disable) any designated group of people in their interaction with one another as 
part of a broader society or in their interaction with both the environment 
(geography) and time (history) in order to ensure regularity in the behavioural 
outcomes characterising each individual in any of such interactions. 
It is for such reasons that this thesis attempts to firstly, analyse economic 
development from a global culturally interconnected spatial approach; and 
secondly, attempts to analyse subnational economic development by drawing on 
local territorial characteristics of historical ethnic or tribal homelands within the 
nation-states now spanning the African region. 
 
Thesis Contribution 
These two broad focuses of analysis (cross-national and cross-subnational) are 
treated in three empirical papers or chapters herein; within which the themes of 
culture, institutions, history and geography permeate. All three chapters (essays 
or papers) are each comprised of four core sections: an Introduction section, a 
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Literature Review section, a Methodology and Data section and finally, a Results 
Interpretation, Conclusion and Weaknesses section.  
In chapter one we attempt to analyse economic growth across countries by 
adopting an augmented neoclassical framework, which incorporates both culture-
defined and geography-defined spatial networks. The global dispersion of 
languages and ethnic groups across the world are used to build these cultural 
spatial networks. We illustrate these in parallel with a conventional border-
neighbour contiguity spatial network model while controlling for arbitrary 
distance-based spatial clustering in all our models’ residuals. The rationale for 
setting up this analytical framework is to achieve a global integrative design that 
could allow us analyse economic growth variations across countries using a 
realistic channel of rooted connections between such countries. Given that group 
cultural dynamics underpin a considerable amount of interactive behaviour that 
could be linked to patterns of global productive resource diffusions we attempt to 
statistically explore the extent of such spatial connections within economic 
growth across geographic-space and time.  
Interestingly, we find after making these culture-defined spatial adjustments 
to the model that about a fifth of total economic growth accrues from productive-
factor effects necessitated by such spatial integrative networks and systems. By 
incorporating this adjustment to our model we are able to provide a disentangled 
narrative of economic growth accruals from direct, indirect and total marginal 
proximate growth factors. Something we could not have been able to neatly infer 
without a model framework as this. Implications about how such integrative 
dynamics affect factor accumulation decisions for both poor and rich countries 
within interacting networks are additionally discussed. It is not impossible to see 
how poorer countries could easily be out-accumulated for human capital in a 
globally integrative system for instance, when returns to investments in such 
productive inputs would unquestionably be more secure in a more developed and 
stable economy to where they would readily and preferably flow towards. 
In chapters two and three, our thesis focuses on analysing economic 
development within the African continent. Chapter two adopts a historical 
analytical context within which the effects of national institutions on the 
economic development of subnational tribal homelands demarcated at the 
periphery of nation-state boundaries are analysed. By narrowing our focus to the 
African economies of similar levels and experiences of economic activity, this 
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chapter minimises the empirical issues that characterise cross-continental and 
cross-country studies such as carried out in the chapter preceding it. The shared 
European historical experience, similar cultural dynamics and geographic 
attributes characterising these now amalgamated countries within this continent 
are exploited to provide a tangible identified impact of national institutional 
quality on economic development. This is especially achieved using novel 
alternatives for measuring economic activity at the subnational level that heavily 
rely on geographic information systems and the geographic spatial location of 
identified historic ethnic homelands and modern national territorial delimitations. 
The results from the exercise of this second empirical chapter demonstrate that 
depending on the measure of economic activity adopted, national institutions are 
consistently positive and statistically relevant for economic activity. Particularly, 
we find that when the literature’s previously used nighttime lights density proxy 
is adopted, the positive association is observed but the resulting coefficients are 
not statistically significant. While when our newly introduced average access 
roads length proxy is adopted, there remains the positive association and the 
coefficients are consistently and statistically significant. The former result is 
consistent with the literature adopting this data structure and design at the 
subnational level, while the latter result is consistent with the literature normally 
characteristic of the cross-sectional studies. These results do not necessarily 
contradict each other but demonstrate that both measures capture different 
aspects of economic development and of the socio-economic and political 
institutional functioning of these economies. 
In chapter three, we assess how different types of tribal demarcations actually 
affect economic development at the tribal homeland level quite differently. We 
further attempt to illustrate that these experiential differences are as much 
aggravated at a pro-European level, as they are reflective of inherent local 
dynamics characterising either of these demarcation types. Tribal demarcations 
and forced amalgamations have been a very richly debated issue in African 
economic research; especially research on the sources of the protracted 
unfavourable distribution of global economic development towards African 
countries compared to the rest of the world. Knowing that boundary demarcations 
and delimitations were not just an act of the initial European colonial history but 
was also an action of national governments to enable them govern their respective 
internal territories, this empirical chapter exploits such a design to investigate 
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the impact of these various demarcation types on subnational economic 
development. Still exploiting the geographic and cultural dynamics characteristic 
of the African continent, we adopt the same economic development proxies used 
in the preceding chapter. However, the economic units of analysis differ from the 
preceding chapter in that instead of being country-ethnic homeland splits this 
chapter adopts a provincial-ethnic split. By going down to the state or provincial 
level of analysis and where this interacts with the location dynamics of historic 
tribal homelands, this chapter is able to bring economic development analysis 
closer to where it really matters for the individual experiences of local Africans. 
In this final third empirical chapter, we find that tribal demarcations caused by 
national political actors (intra-national level) are consistently more negatively 
associated with underdevelopment compared to those affected solely by Euro-
colonial inter-national level tribal demarcations. This is contrary to the Euro-
colonialist sceptics’ narrative that often proposes that the European scramble for 
African territories and resources left in its wake many issues that would later 
affect and continue to affect economic developmental efforts in these resulting 
modern African countries. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that this is not 
entirely the case. Of course the European scramble and its related activities left 
a considerable amount of challenges to the development potential of economic 
activity. However, we illustrate that some of these challenges can also be traced 
back to some local ethnic related dynamics – such as those related to local trust 
and tribal favouritism dynamics embedded within the politico-economic structure 
of subnational and national exchanges. 
 
  
xxii 
 
 xxii 
References 
Acemoglu, D. (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton 
University Press. 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2008). The Role of Institutions in Growth and 
Development (Commission on Growth and Development No. 10). Commission 
on Growth and Development. 
Aoki, M. (2007). Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes. Journal of 
Institutional Economics, 3(01), 1. doi:10.1017/S1744137406000531 
Boland, L. A. (1992). Chapter 8: Knowledge and Institutions in Economic Theory. 
In Principles of Economics (p. 233). London: Routledge. 
Clark, W. R. (1998). Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences, Two 
Views of Institutions. International Studies Quarterly, 42(2), 245–270. 
doi:10.1111/1468-2478.00081 
Davis, K. E. (2009). Institutions and Economic Performance : An Introduction to 
the Literature (No. 09-51 - Law and Economics Research Paper Series). 
Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do 
Institutions Cause Growth? Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer * June 2004. Journal of Economic 
Growth, 9(June), 271–303. doi:10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed 
Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from 
Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press. 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006). What Are Institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, XL(1), 
1–25. 
Khalil, E. L. (1999). Institutions, Naturalism and Evolution. Review of Political 
Economy, 11(1), 37–41. 
Michalopoulos, S. (2012). The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity. American 
Economic Review, 18(9), 1508–1539. 
doi:10.1016/j.micinf.2011.07.011.Innate 
xxiii 
 
 xxiii 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge University Press. 
Nye, J. (2008). Institutions and the Institutional Environment. In É. Brosseau & 
J.-M. Glachant (Eds.), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (pp. 67–
80). Cambridge University Press. 
Paldam, M., & Gundlach, E. (2008). Two Views on Institutions and Development: 
The Grand Transition vs The Primacy of Institutions. Kyklos, 61(1), 65–100. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2008.00393.x 
Roland, G. (2004). Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-
Moving Institutions. Studies in Comparative International Development, 
38(4), 109–131. doi:10.1007/BF02686330 
Voigt, S. (2012). How (Not) to Measure Institutions. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 9(01), 1–26. doi:10.1017/S1744137412000148 
 
 
1 
 
 1 
Chapter One: 
Economic Growth in a Culturally Interconnected 
Global Economy 
Chapter Abstract 
Understanding how countries grow and why the gaps between rich and poor countries persist 
is an age-old area of enquiry in the growth literature. Even in the current era of increased 
economic, political and social global integration these gaps still persevere and the spatial patterns 
of this divide follow similar unchanging routes. In this chapter, we seek to reassess the relationship 
between economic growth and its proximate factors (convergence, physical and human capital per 
capita) while adjusting for a form of global integration through culture, which we uniquely design. 
We do this by adopting a spatial econometric methodology to analyse cultural patterns of global 
integration embedded in the process of economic growth across countries. To achieve this, two 
broad specifications of culturally defined spatial weights are designed and used as an alternative 
to the often-used geographically defined metrics. This method extends the applied spatial 
econometric growth literature beyond regional level studies (that is, continental and provincial 
levels) to include a more open and inclusive global model. 
Using a spatial autocorrelation panel growth model on a 122 countries spanning from 1990 – 
2010, we find that after controlling for global integration in this manner and any arbitrary spatial 
patterns potentially remaining in the models’ residuals: not only are the cross-sectional spatial 
coefficients (rho) statistically significant, there are also positive spatial correlations equally 
translate into statistically significant indirect spatial marginal growth effects. These indirect 
marginal effects range in magnitudes between 20% and 30% of the total marginal growth 
contributions depending on the cultural spatial weighting scheme adopted. As a result, these 
spatial effects equally affect the conditional convergence rate proportionate to the level of global 
integration. A number of important implications are deduced and discussed briefly from these 
findings. Among which is that these statistically substantial spatial effects might provide some 
illustrative initial evidence explaining why relatively poorer countries are on the average ‘out-
accumulated’ in terms of access to relevant proximate growth factors, such as human capital. And 
why global economic growth catch-up remains a challenge to developing countries whose rate of 
convergence are not fast enough to outstrip the resource crowding-out effect which global 
integration brings in its wake. 
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Section 1.1 – Introduction 
1.1.1 – Objectives 
This chapter aims to conduct an exploratory enquiry of economic growth across 
countries by adopting a framework that controls for the presence of spatial 
interaction among countries on a global front. Two streams of theory particularly 
motivate this integrative approach. The first, relates to the 
locational/geographical economics literature while the second relates with the 
cultural and institutional economics literature. Although institutions are not of 
immediate focus herein, their theoretical relevance in functionally linking country 
geography, spatial distribution of cultural features, and the behavioural 
expectations of socio-economic (and political) agents with economic outcomes 
remain remotely relevant (see North & Weingast, 1989; North, 1990 & 2005; Starr, 
1991; Beck et al, 2006). Also, depending on the definition and perspective 
considered, the approach and orientation herein can be of immediate relevance 
to the institutional framework. Within the institutions literature, economic 
growth is often linked to fundamental growth factors - geography, culture and 
institutions - via even deeper channels such as path dependence. However, path 
dependence remains an equilibrium concept that is mostly unknown and often 
relegated to the unobservable component of growth regression models (regression 
models’ residuals or the error component). Dismantling path dependence itself is 
also not the aim of this work. This work seeks to augment the neoclassical 
economic growth with a relatable global network interactions framework. The 
spatial global network model adopted in this thesis chapter provides an inclusive 
framework for revisiting the conditional convergence and resource accumulation 
arguments; albeit from an integrative economic perspective beyond regional 
(either continentally or provincially) economic horizons. Resultantly providing an 
analytical context for individually assessing and comparing traditional proximate 
growth sources (physical and human capital inputs) from both direct (own-
country) and indirect (cumulative cross-country) marginal effects perspectives. 
The argument sustained throughout this work is that countries attain a position 
in the global long-run growth spectrum by the choices they make relative to those 
made by countries in their respective productive networks. These productive 
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networks are an encoded embodiment of country-level values, principles, and 
arrangements, which are difficult to observe directly through any particular index 
or through geographical proximity alone. By considering countries’ slow-changing 
cultural characteristics while controlling for their fixed geographical attributes, it 
is possible to demonstrate this claim and further illustrate that country level 
interactions are increasingly transcending mere border proximity. This is 
empirically relevant because it is fathomable to imagine that the flows and 
patterns of productive resources between countries are indeed correlated with 
both observed forms of shared geographic boundaries and those consistent with 
cultural or ideological associations. Although it is equally necessary to understand 
why countries within same productive networks might exhibit similar or 
integrative global growth patterns, this paper does not yet examine this line of 
enquiry. This latter line of enquiry: controlling for, exploring, and dismantling the 
broader institutional and structural mechanisms is characteristic of the recent 
institutional growth literature. Our current study rather adopts a weak 
identification strategy using novel network designs adopted herein to provide an 
interesting means of assigning countries into integrative groups assuming 
integrative growth processes underpinned by geopolitical and cultural proximities, 
similarities and affiliations.  
Although we have not approached the ‘growth’ question by attempting to 
identify specific channels of causation, the spatial specification as analysed 
provides a methodological improvement to the conventional non-spatially 
adjusted linear models previously adopted in the empirical growth literature (as 
demonstrated in LeSage & Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2010). Our intention is to 
illustratively explore economic growth while assimilating geographic and cultural 
patterns of global interrelatedness or interconnections. These networks may 
certainly underpin or reveal other interesting growth processes, if and when 
unbundled deeper. As a result, further applications or interpretations of the 
results obtained herein are not ruled out even though they are not in themselves 
explored. Nonetheless, a number of variant network regimes are surveyed side-
by-side so that the reader can get a sense of a multifaceted richness, which non-
network adjusted models might not be able to reveal. The immediate objective 
herein is to assess economic growth across countries over reasonably short time 
intervals while controlling for similarities or structural proximities based on key 
cross-sectional growth fundamentals. This paper integrates time-invariant 
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elements of connectedness between countries on the basis of shared geographic 
contiguities, geopolitical and cultural resemblances or affiliations (using language 
and ethnic mapping schemes) while still maintaining the fixed-effects framework 
characteristic to cross country-time models. The notion of globalization becomes 
imminently relevant within this framework, as explored. Although looked at from 
differing perspectives before (see Dreher, 2006), globalisation remains a dimly 
explored subject in the spatial growth literature: especially not as treated in this 
thesis chapter. We propose herein that global cultural attributes are a crucial but 
weakly explored avenue of inter-national spatial relations in comparison to 
geographical proximity. Cultural characteristics had previously been adopted 
either locally to define spatial networks in the sociology literature or globally as 
additional index controls in the aspatial economic growth literature. Cultural 
elements are relatively time-invariant compared to other forms of global 
connections that may be observed5. As a result it can be adopted for specifying 
spatial networks in a similar manner as applied using geographical attributes or 
metrics. This is not to say that time-varying global integration specifications 
cannot be modelled; they are certainly feasible and are now being implemented 
using dynamic spatial model frameworks (see the literature reviewed by Elhorst, 
2014: Chapter 4). 
At this phase, this research seeks to answer the following research questions: 
i. To statistically summarize and estimate economic growth from a global integrative 
perspective. By exploiting the cross-national distribution of cultural attributes using 
a spatial country-unit network assignment mechanism via a database of languages 
and ethnic groups from around the world. 
ii. To specifically estimate a spatial panel growth regression model specified to 
accommodate a framework consistent with the concept of global integration. The 
intention is to disentangle own-country (direct) growth effects from those effects 
accruing from a ‘factor share’ of global inter-country integration. 
iii. Finally to ultimately extend the application of spatial growth models beyond regional 
(both at the provincial and continental levels) growth specifications unto an equally 
relevant global perspective. This is especially important in the face of the increasing 
relevance of globalization on economic, socio-cultural, and political fronts. Where 
                                         
5 Other forms of global connections may include avenues driven by political, economic factors or other varying 
aspects of countries’ social identities. 
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productive economic resources are increasingly permeating through country and 
continental regional boundaries and the notion of geographical proximities are 
becoming less significant. 
 
1.1.2 – Scope and Contribution 
By broadly focusing on disentangling direct and indirect global network effects 
in the economic growth framework, we attempt to apply the methodological 
contributions of Pace and LeSage (2009). So rather than extend the Solow-Swan 
economic growth framework to include the fundamental growth sources like Barro 
(1991) and his cohorts, we maintain the textbook Mankiw, Romer & Weil, (MRW, 
1992) neoclassical structural framework. However, it is extended to include a 
globally integrative framework. We maintain this structural model because the 
convergence parameter is central to our discussions as later observed in section 4 
of this work. A number of studies have attempted to assimilate cultural and 
geographic fundamentals into their specifications. However these have been 
applied using aspatial representations - either by controlling for these attributes 
as right-hand side indices or by using spatial techniques but limited to the 
adoption of geography-type network weighting configurations.  
The practice of how spatial weights are defined continues to constitute an area 
of further contribution in the applied spatial econometrics literature (Abreu, 
Groot & Florak (AGF), 2005). While this remains true, methodologies for 
estimating and selecting appropriate spatial weights most suited to empirical data 
remains unrealized in the spatial econometrics literature (Elhorst, 2014). As a 
result, the convention is to estimate the chosen model using a number of specified 
spatial weights and see if the estimated coefficients are robustly unchanged, and 
then choosing the model that most closely predicts the selected data. Hence, 
adopting a multidimensional approach to spatial weight specifications certainly 
provides a useful extension to not only the aspatial economic growth models that 
adopt relatively weaker mono-dimensional spatial controls; but also to the applied 
spatial econometrics literature, by providing alternative and complementary ways 
of handling spatial correlations. The empirical and theoretical advantage of 
spatial model extensions are that they provide a framework to accommodate for 
increasing interaction or integration opportunities, where countries can be 
modelled in simultaneous (multiple) relations within globally specified networks.  
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The premise for applied spatial growth econometrics can remotely be justified 
from a literature dating back to ‘Geographical economics’. Its underlying tenets 
have certainly evolved remarkably over the decades. Starting with the thoughts 
and writings on the matter by profound authors such as Montesquieu and Adam 
Smith, to those now embedded in more recent notions such as the ‘equatorial 
paradox’, for instance. A cursory look at the cross-country growth literature brings 
to the fore methodologies that endeavour to explain global growth divergence by 
specifying current growth experiences through an exogenous history of each 
country’s previous economic and social experiences. Such experiences are fairly 
time-invariant and oftentimes geographically confined. These types of discussions 
can be found in the growth model augmentation6 literature involving institutions, 
culture, and geography7. The methodologies adopted in these studies are however 
limited to non-systemic (non-integrative or aspatial) approaches. They also 
essentially assume countries grow in isolation of each other and are not part of an 
amalgamating whole or network process, where the progress or regress in a 
country can have implications for the other countries in interaction with them.  
The central theme motivating this work is that: growth is not merely a localized 
concept, as previously simplified by country-based and regional-based studies 
(Fingleton & Lopez-Bazo, 2006). Although there are productive elements that are 
indeed of local relevance such as, the very institutional and structural 
compositions that uniquely affect each country in the world. There remain 
significant aspects of growth strategizing and implementation that go beyond 
country borders and internal operational patterns (see Quah, 1996b8).  
                                         
6 The term augmentation has been used in this chapter to represent add-ons to the economic growth model 
specifications.  Specifically, such model extensions claim to improve on previous specifications by adding 
on additional variable(s) of interest to the right-hand of the standard growth equation. 
7 Some of the more influential papers within this literature are Bromley (1995) who suggests that studies of 
economic development theories tend to be biased resulting in empirical model misspecifications due to the 
'teleological' differences of the Sub-Saharan African region from the rest of the transitioning economies of 
the world; Bloom, Sachs, Collier, & Udry (1998) as per geography; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (AJR, 
2001) as regards geography, cultural, and institutional patterns but does this using an instrumental variable 
econometric procedure; Easterly & Levine (2003) as regards the direct impacts of geographical features on 
economic conditions and also indirect effects via institutions are equally explored; Olsson & Hibbs Jr. 
(2005) as regards geography and bio-geography – they claim this effect is strong directly and not 
necessarily via cross-sectional variations in institutions; among a host others in this huge literature. 
8 Although his discussions are centred in the European region, the rational can as well be extended unto a 
global horizon. 
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In this light, a model that focuses on either extreme of the cross-sectional or 
temporal spectra would insufficiently explain growth divergence intended for a 
globally interactive perspective. Particularly given that most countries’ political 
strategies and economic models mostly stem from fairly clustered or global 
(external) homogenous sources. There is a spatial growth learning process, which 
cannot be separated from the logical progression of time or history; in fact, they 
are certainly all intertwined. Therefore working on either dimension to the 
neglect of the other would likely result in a case of empirical oversimplification 
or deliberate analytical omission (Garretsen & Martin, 2010). In global politics, 
the policies recommended to developing countries are oftentimes propagated by 
development organizations with cross-national economic and political influences. 
The paradigms of prevailing growth theories, models, and policy actions persist 
(or retard) globally, based on their successes (or failures) from the experiences 
garnered from leading economies of the world. As a consequence it is a weak 
position to limit cross-country growth studies to methods that assume the 
unobservable growth experiences (latent factors) among countries are 
disconnected across time. Or to limit such interconnectedness (whenever 
considered) to smaller network frameworks, such as relegating them to only 
countries within specific regions like the EU (European Union) or to provinces 
within specific countries. It is equally meaningful to view growth as part of a more 
dynamic and permeating global process in which the decisions to accumulate 
capital (whether physical or human) are motivated by both individual local 
marginal factor returns and global cumulative marginal returns. 
This paper proposes an avenue through which interconnections or networks on 
a global front could be considered. The degree of country interconnectedness 
within our proposed framework can provide insight into the extent of global 
integration effects on economic development possibilities. By looking once more 
to the tenets of the location hypothesis and the spatial patterns of specifically 
defined global cultural elements, this paper seeks to empirically decompose the 
proximate growth factors into local and inter-national components. The link 
between institutional evolution, culture and geographic patterns provide the 
theoretical background for the choice of such a design or framework. In the past, 
fundamental growth factors were used as variables for localizing causality (as 
instrumental variables). We herein propose that these fundamentals could equally 
be used to illustrate how countries are spatially connected - as in an integrative 
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network.  Thus providing growth analysts with additional empirical information 
contained in latent or unobservable growth sources embedded in these deeper 
growth factors. Just as highlighted earlier, the immediate focus of this exercise is 
not the identification or disentangling of the links between these fundamental 
growth factors and economic performance. This empirical study intends to directly 
observe the global nature and patterns of economic performances across countries 
based on a number of spatial networks specified using similar conditions pre-set 
by geographic and cultural allocations. 
There are two broad categories of network designs used in defining the spatial 
connection between the countries sampled in this paper. The first follows the 
conventional geography-based distance and contiguity based spatial weight 
specifications. This is done mostly for the purpose of comparison or for reference. 
The second design, a key contribution of this study, seeks to pair countries based 
on similarities with respect to key globally distributed attributes of culture such 
as languages and ethnic groups. While the notion of neighbourhood is often viewed 
in a singular dimension - as geographical proximity - in practice, it is much more 
multidimensional. There is no reason to believe that spatial interaction at the 
country level is in practice solely restricted to geographical proximity. The notion 
of inter-country neighbourhood as defined by both locational nearness and 
attribute(s) similarity, can be found in studies as early as “Social Contagion and 
Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence”, by Burt (1987). Although a 
micro-level study from the medical sociology literature, this study nonetheless 
identified the distinction between the notions of cohesion and structural 
equivalence. The notion of cohesion defines the interaction between spatial units 
(in this case, individuals that are medical practitioners) in close geographical 
proximity. While, structural equivalence on the other hand, describes the kind of 
spatial interaction between paired units based on similarity in circumstances or 
qualifying attributes that may not necessarily be associated with geographic 
proximity. Combining9 or complementing both network specifications provides us 
with a useful and relatively more informative avenue for handling relationships 
that may exist between countries either in or not in close geographical proximity 
of each other. Sub-Saharan African countries for instance, do not have the same 
                                         
9 In this case, interaction has been used in a numerical sense to imply case-to-case (matching) multiplication 
of network (spatial connection) specifications. 
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level of economic, political interaction or degree of integration with each other, 
as do countries within the European Union, where there is a lot more economic 
integration and there is free movement of productive resources. By inclining 
towards this analogy we demonstrate that geography is not the sole route via 
which inter-country integration can be measured and viewed from. Especially 
given that language and ethnic heritage could provide crucial tools for promoting 
behavioural and cooperative convergences and collaboration bridging from 
individual to global spheres of social, political and economic activities. Also with 
the advancement of technology and development, geographical space and 
distance is increasingly shrinking with reducing international travel times and 
improvements in real-time communication channels. 
The key avenues of contribution for this thesis chapter can hence be 
summarised as follows: 
i. We introduce and illustrate an empirical avenue through which the global geographic 
dispersion (positioning) of cultural attributes can affect the economic growth 
process. This avenue empirically puts to test the hypothesis that the global economic 
community is connected beyond direct economic channels such as trade openness or 
through political channels such as bilateral, multilateral, or other dyadic 
arrangements, which dominate the political economy literatures. We suggest that 
global cultural mappings can provide us with an interesting mechanism for 
understanding how economic performance is internationally distributed. Contrary to 
the belief that cacophonous splits between cultural (ethnic or language) and country 
nationalism could provide the catalyst for civil wars based on ‘irredentist demands’ 
(see Horowitz, 1985 and Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011), it is possible that 
such international dispersion of identities could act as avenues for promoting 
economic integration and further global economic development in the long term. 
Exploring such narratives can be very informative for understanding how developed 
and developing countries would fair in such a globalised (or globalising) economic 
landscape. 
ii. Specifically, we introduce two intriguing alternative spatial weighting schemes to 
the spatial growth literature. These help our research analyse how key factors in the 
neoclassical growth process behaves when countries are allowed to align or integrate 
globally with other countries based on shared ethnic groups or spoken languages. 
These cultural based networks are compared with conventional network designs 
based on geographic contiguity while controlling for arbitrary residual cross-
10 
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sectional dependence using a geographic inverse distance metric. This provides an 
analytical framework for testing the statistical relevance of globalization from a 
number of closely related perspectives consistent with the openness and political 
economy discourses. Globalization has remained mostly an economic (or politico-
economic) phenomenon and by attempting to define it from differing perspectives, 
it gives the reader a multifaceted fresh experience of an already overly theorized 
phenomenon.  
iii. We also attempt to empirically apply the interpretative contribution of LeSage & 
Pace (2009). Following their impact, we introduce the interpretation of spatial 
regression outputs by separating the main, direct, indirect and total marginal effects 
of the proximate growth factors. This approach is more informative as it does not 
look solely at the significance of the spatially interacted coefficients10, which could 
be misleading in some cases. By following this approach our research is able to 
discuss the growth process involving topics such as convergence from a spatial 
perspective. Thus providing further empirical contribution to methodological 
discourses in the literature such as Fingleton & López-Bazo (2006). 
 
1.1.3 – Overview of Chapter’s Remaining Sections 
In this chapter, three sections immediately follow this Introduction section: the 
first of them, section 2, briefly looks at a review of the literature on how space 
has featured in the economic growth discourse so far. The second, section 3, lays 
out the model specification and the variables involved in the central analysis. 
While finally, section 4 provides an initial summary of the data and reports of the 
results discussing the key findings in line with closely related aspects of the 
literature. 
  
                                         
10 This is oftentimes the estimated coefficient obtained from the spatial lag of the dependent variable in the 
spatial autocorrelation (SAC) model, for instance. 
11 
 
 11 
Section 1.2 – Literature Review 
1.2.1 – Overview of Some Current Methodological Developments 
in the Economic Growth Literature 
The panel economic growth literature has become increasingly popular over its 
cross-sectional counterpart since the dawn of the 21st century. This is particularly 
because it possesses an advantage of being able to control for unobservable 
country specific attributes. Its relevance and application has grown with the 
increasing availability of temporal dataset repositories from the 1960s such as the 
Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2013); the Maddison project on 
historical world GDP figures; the World Bank databank; human capital and 
education data from the UN (United Nations) databases and the educational 
attainment dataset by Barro & Lee (2010)11. Such data availability has deepened 
empirical research at both country-specific (time-series) and panel (cross-
country-time) horizons. One recurring theoretical premise that brings together 
these two perspectives of enquiry – long run cross-country studies and time-series 
or panel studies – is how the notion of convergence is treated. Durlauf, Johnson, 
& Temple (2005) in chapter 8 of the Handbook of Economic Growth (Volume 1A: 
p.599) point out that the time-series approach to the implied convergence 
concept, as embedded in the neoclassical growth framework, is predominantly 
'statistical in nature’. They suggest that the methodology therein offers the 
empiricist the advantage of defining and testing more precisely a wider range of 
convergence hypotheses. Such 'statistical flexibility' provides the necessary 
framework for exploiting and exploring a methodological fusion of both cross-
country and time-series approaches to the age-old theoretical discussions on 
global growth divergences or convergences across or between countries. Carlino 
& Mills (1993) – in which they distinguish between cross-country (β-convergence) 
and time-series stochastic convergences – provide some useful insight into some 
expositions on the convoluted treatment of convergence in the growth literature. 
There are fundamentally two (broadly nested) core types of convergence typically 
discussed: β-convergence and σ-convergence. Where the former relates to a 
                                         
11 Although the Barro-Lee educational attainment dataset is populated for 5-year intervals, it is often used in 
some annual time series studies where the years between each interval are filled using statistical imputation 
methods. 
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country's reversion to a hypothesized steady-state level of income, the latter 
relates to a narrowing of the income spread across countries through time 
(Durlauf, Johnson, & Temple, 2005). It is often the notion of β-convergence that 
predominantly nests the closely related notions of stochastic-, deterministic-, 
club-, conditional-, and absolute- convergences12. 
In many respects, the methodological tenets of the panel growth modelling 
procedure are still quite nascent, nevertheless quickly growing. It is also a 
methodological procedure that still tails behind its relatively older time-series 
counterpart13. Although there have been some significant advancements in the 
panel data modelling literature - considering unit-root tests that control for cross-
sectional dependence14, for instance. There still remain a number of 
methodological complexities compared to time-series models that have the 
algebraic convenience of the construction of a single cross-sectional unit. In their 
discussion on the advancements made in panel unit-root and cointegration 
treatments, for instance, Breitung & Pesaran (2008) point out that panel 
cointegration is still at its infancy and is still at a 'residual-based’ focus (p.280). 
These sort of methodological bottlenecks continue to pose challenges to the cross-
sectional temporal discourse especially in applied empirical areas such as in the 
economic growth literature and in spatial models where the cross-sectional 
dimension is the focus and not its temporal equivalent. This also explains why 
temporal averaging (three-, five-, and ten- year) has become a rather popular 
convenience in the empirical panel literature and atemporal spatial weights are a 
welcomed alternative or empirical simplification.  
More recent methodological developments in the empirical growth literature 
are increasingly providing tools for tackling the issue of cross-sectional 
dependence (Anselin, 2001; Pesaran, 2004). In this light, common factor models 
                                         
12 For readers particularly curious about the nuances of definitions and methodological interpretations on 
convergence, please see Islam (2003) – for a relatively more holistically informed review on the subject 
and Bernard & Durlauf (1995) – for a time series application to the concepts of stochastic and deterministic 
convergences. 
13 Take for instance, the manner in which error correction models are handled in the time-series framework 
versus how they are handled in the panel framework. The panel models are still at the stage reliant on a 
single equation Engle-Granger approach consistent with the Granger Representation Theorem, while that 
of time-series has advanced to the point of assuming a more general framework as proposed by the 
Johansen’s Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) (Verbeek, 2004; Breitung & Peseran, 2008). 
14 This advancement has come to be generically referred to as 'second generation panel unit-root tests' by 
popular authors within the literature (see Breitung & Pesaran, 2008). 
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(following Bai, 2003), spatial models (following Anselin, 1988) and generally panel 
data models have increasingly been applied to the economic growth enquiry. Also 
to mention that, panel data models with adjustments for persistent dependent 
variables raise even more concerns when cross-sectional dependence is present or 
in suspicion (see Phillips & Sul, 2003). Economic growth researchers are now more 
alert to such empirical concerns and challenges. Hence adjusting growth models 
for both temporal convergence and cross-sectional interactions (or integration) is 
becoming commonplace in the empirical literature and in most teaching texts. 
Particularly when economic performance embodies both local and global 
perspectives, as is increasingly likely with the overwhelming manifestations in 
technological progress and inter-country connections over time. In this paper we 
believe that spatial models provide a useful framework not only suited to 
addressing the empirical issue of cross-sectional dependence, but also for 
surveying varying forms of such interactions or integration.  
The roles of geography, history, culture and institutions in the growth discourse 
are also undoubtedly important and profoundly interwoven. A careful 
consideration of the approach and manner in which these individual areas of 
enquiry fit into the literature can very well inform and re-inform future 
contributions into the broader discourse. With the growing influence of spatial 
econometric methodologies and its increasing application in the re-investigation 
of the age-old growth hypotheses, there is increasing hope that these four very 
interrelated angles of enquiry can be more finely fused thus providing clearer 
understandings of growth patterns, its sources, including its implications for 
policy. While the roles of these growth fundamentals - geography, history, culture, 
and institutions - are pervasively unquestionable, their implication for policy and 
for accurately informing strategic economic growth planning remains a puzzle for 
developing countries. As a result, the literature on disentangling growth exploded 
quite remarkably in the 1990s and early 2000s. Initially, there was relatively more 
focus on the omitted variable dilemma with the Barro-type informal growth 
models (Barro, 1991) and later the attention shifted back to the formal growth 
models but with adjustments for elements such as human capital, social capital, 
regional spillover channels and etc. following extensions to the neoclassical 
framework as popularized by AJR (2001) and Glaeser et al (2004). 
Researching the channels through which these deeper factors affect growth is 
a challenging venture and this has received its own share of significant enquiries. 
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For instance, geographical factors have been argued to be of diminished relevance 
in explaining economic wellbeing when institutions or policy efficiencies are 
accounted for (see the findings of Hall & Jones, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 2003, as 
examples). While in other instances, these same geographical attributes have 
been found as useful channels: for explaining and validating the geography-trade 
narrative (Redding & Venables, 2004); for explaining the geography- or climate-
endowments-growth hypotheses through angles such as the disease exposure 
argument (Gallup & Sachs, 2001), its impact on agricultural productivity or on the 
quality of human capital (Bloom et al, 1998). All of these branches of enquiry 
share the position that fundamental growth sources are certainly quite important 
in understanding the path dependences that have defined and continue to define 
the converging and diverging growth experiences of countries in the global 
economic landscape. 
Space is certainly a crucial element in these discussions and can provide a 
clearer understanding of the distribution of economic activities around the world. 
The notion of how space is defined, conceived and accounted for can certainly 
help shed light on how countries integrate and get confined into particular growth 
trajectories. It is in this light, that briefly exploring the manner in which spatial 
econometrics has evolved and has become integrated into the economic growth 
literature becomes unequivocally relevant. 
 
1.2.2 – Economic Growth and Spatial Econometrics 
Empirical variations with geography and space as earlier adopted in the 
economic growth literature relied mostly on models including such features as 
exogenous right-hand side controls (Frankel & Romer, 1999; McArthur & Sachs, 
2001). These geography-type specifications controlled for spatial heterogeneity 
from a fainter perspective (one-dimensional conceptualization of space). It is in 
this light that they significantly deviate from the mainstream spatial econometric 
models, which are more multidimensional with their approach of coping with the 
spatial heterogeneity huddle. Typical spatial econometric models represent 
individual spatial units as a network or web of inter-relationships between 
sampled units. The resulting estimated spatial coefficients attempt to statistically 
ascertain the extent of these interactions, on the average. 
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The adoption of spatial econometrics in the growth literature has mostly been 
limited to explaining the regional diffusion of technological progress or 
innovation. These models attempt to assess spillover or indirect (interaction) 
effects from associated spatial units through the procedural advantage of 
geography-specific networks. Most likely, its application to the field of growth 
econometrics lends immediate relevance to the theoretical tenets of the 
endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossman & Helpman, 1991) and 
the Schumpeterian lines of reasoning15. Following earlier efforts to accommodate 
geographical dynamics into economic geography by influential authors such as 
Paul Krugman (1991), Fujita, Krugman, & Venables (1999) and the seminal 
contributions to the methodological application and interpretation of spatial 
models by Anselin (1988) and LeSage & Pace (2009), there has been a recent 
expansion in the literature attempting to augment existing theoretical models 
with geographically motivated spatial processes.  
It is important to note at this juncture, that the term region (regional) as 
referred to herein represent spatial units defined either within country or 
between countries, but restricted to those in some form of economic union such 
as the European Union (EU) or within the same continent (such as Africa or South 
America). Initial papers in the applied space-growth discourse mostly focused on 
re-evaluating the endogenous growth models by endogenizing innovation for 
manufacturing output using a spatially specified network of producing units or 
countries. Anselin Varga, & Acs (AVA, 1997), for instance, re-evaluated and found 
evidence of both 'direct' and 'indirect' impacts (through private research and 
development) between university research and technology innovation for a 
geography-based knowledge production function for small businesses in the United 
States Market in 1982. While, Fingleton (2001a & 2001b) re-assessed regional 
productivity growth, finding that there is evidence of increasing returns which 
also 'varies indirectly via the rate of technical progress and labour efficiency 
variations', while his other work focuses on an increasing returns simulation model 
in the same region (EU countries) with some specific theoretical applications to 
the 'Verdoon's hypothesis'. Even with further insights into spatial methodologies 
                                         
15 These essentially involve discourses on the notion of spillover economics (knowledge spillover). See Quah 
(1996b) for discussions about some substantive relevance for considering geography based spillover effects 
when observing regional income dynamics. See also Martin & Sunley (1998) for a review and some key 
empirical issues as relevant to applied regional endogenous growth theory. 
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and the considerable improvements made in computational capabilities post 
Anselin (1988) and LeSage & Pace (2009), there have surprisingly been meagre 
adaptations to the neoclassical growth framework, of a comparable scale. This is 
probably due to a perceived lack of substantive interpretational relevance or 
theoretical justification for spatially adjusted models from a global cross-country 
neoclassical context. That is, a context beyond applications to regional and 
provincial (intra-country) growth exploratory frameworks, which are by their 
design easy to justify spatially given that the sampled units characteristically 
share common administrative boundaries or policy environments.  
Abreu et al (2005) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on ‘Space 
and Growth’. They illustrate how the growth literature has evolved from a spatial 
methodological concept of ‘absolute location’ (right-hand side adjusted and 
instrumental variable type models) based growth model approaches to one of 
‘relative location’ (spatial econometrics) in the last few decades. However, they 
emphasize that both perspectives, though complementary, can learn from each 
other - ‘absolute location’ models can learn to be more methodologically rigorous 
when considering spatial dependence, while ‘relative location’ models could learn 
to be more theoretically motivated in how they specify their aspatial econometric 
models (ibid: 35; see also Corrado & Fingleton, 2012). Additionally, most of the 
spatial econometric adaptations analysing growth-led factors mostly adopt the 
spatial error models (SEM)16 and spatial autoregressive model (SAR) specifications. 
In the broader applied spatial econometrics literature, a more general-to-specific 
approach is gaining appeal as Spatial Durbin models (SDM) and Manski type model 
specifications are becoming increasingly popular (see LeSage & Pace, 2009; 
Elhorst, 2010 & 2014). These spatial specifications are more general and as result 
analytically nest the parametrically smaller SEM, SAR and SAC (spatial 
autocorrelation) models. They provide the researcher a relatively more flexible 
opportunity for testing downwards to more parsimonious spatial frameworks  
(Elhorst, 2010: 13) and reducing the econometric likelihood of specification bias 
or variable omission that plague typically adopted aspatial models (LeSage & Pace, 
2009; Autant-Benard & LeSage, 2011). It is not surprising these general 
specifications are also most suited to the empirical scope of regional based 
                                         
16 The SEMs are an analytical extension of the ‘Moran’s I’ procedure that is motivated through the regression’s 
residual component. 
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studies, where spatial units share or belong to one form of common international 
political administration or the other. Intriguingly, the SAR model specification 
remains most appropriate to neoclassical economic growth specifications because 
of the underlying assumptions of the model (Fingleton & López-Bazo, 2006). 
Despite the remarkable insight from contributions made in the spatial growth 
literature, there are still areas with considerable scope for further contributions. 
When it comes to determining and hypothesising realistic spatial networks for 
cross-sectional interconnections, a lot more can still be done to provide analytical 
and discursive clarity. Although Lesage & Pace (2010) suggest that it is a ‘myth’ 
to suspect there is some bias culminating from model sensitivity to the 
specification of spatial weight matrices, it is foolhardy to think proper thought 
should not be given to how realistic these spatial weights are and how they affect 
result interpretations. The truth is, specifying the nature, type and patterns of 
spatial connectivity (contained in the spatial weight matrices) are as relevant as 
estimating, testing and interpreting such model outcomes. As pointed out by 
Elhorst (2003): that it is important to distinguish between spatial dependence 
within and between groups. He opines that within group spatial dependence seek 
to capture spatial associations based on spatial units as geographic neighbours, 
while between groups spatial dependence may be most suited to capturing spatial 
interconnections based on comparable characteristics.  
As already highlighted above, spatial weight specification and construction 
remains an avenue for making useful contributions to the literature (Abreu et al, 
2005). This is even more so in a global economic landscape, where the relevance 
of geographical distance between countries is continually shrinking in significance. 
Apart from the conventional geography based (contiguity and distance) spatial 
weighting schemes there are fewer applications of practical alternative spatial 
network specifications in the spatial growth literature. And in terms of 
application, spatially adjusted models remain mostly either residual-based 
technology models focusing on knowledge spillover applications (such as, Lopez-
Bazo et al, 2004); or they are international trade transmission models in which 
distance decaying (gravity equations) applications matter (such as Moreno & 
Trehan, 1997; Fujita et al, 1999). The uses of alternative definitions of proximity 
such as those with cultural dimensions are often relegated to studies at the micro-
type individual and firm level network models. Even as Haynes & Fotheringham 
(1984:12) point out that the effect of distance may be rightly minimized by the 
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[unifying] presence of a shared culture, language or information; little has been 
done to include such significant dimensions to cross-country growth studies. A 
number of works have identified with this lack such as cited in Moreno & Trehan 
(1997: 401), where Goodfriend & McDermott (1994) consider technological 
spillover effects in their model that compositely considers geographical proximity 
with proximities based on commonalities in language, culture and the presence of 
commercial relations between country pairs. There are also a lot more 
applications of this kind in the political economy discourse that not only attempt 
to use more complex spatial weighting schemes to capture multidimensional 
interdependencies (such as Beck et al, 2006 following Lacombe, 2004), but also 
consider non-geographic cultural spatial weight designs to accommodate for 
alternative forms of interconnections (see Starr, 199117; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). 
 
 
Section 1.3 – Methodology 
1.3.1 – Model Specification 
Starting from a standard 3 inputs Cobb-Douglas income production function 
with the assumptions of constant returns to scale and human capital 
augmented labour18 - a vectorized form can be specified as: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 +∈𝒊𝒕         … eqn.(1) 
where, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 usually 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠  
𝛽 =  𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
∈𝑖𝑡  =  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 
                                         
17 It is worth noting that although Starr (1991) controls for spatial interdependence(s), he does not particularly 
use a spatial econometric model. 
18 The assumption of constant returns to scale is adopted for its algebraic convenience and interpretational 
advantage – providing an algebraically feasible model with variables in per-labour terms. Such a model 
also accords the advantage of yielding fewer estimates to be computed especially relevant as we project 
this unto a space-time dimension. Although, this is a recognized weakness and has been criticized in the 
literature (see Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and McQuinn & Whelan (2007)), relaxing this 
assumption does not necessarily map unto significant analytical improvements. Constant returns to scale is 
also most feasible in a closed economy archetype compared to an open economy where increasing returns 
are more likely as a result of the integrative mechanism consistent with positive productive network effects 
(see Fingleton & López-Bazo, 2006). 
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The model is augmented for spatial heterogeneity and the parameters 
estimated are in terms of per-labour units. The conventional approach (see 
Mankiw, Romer & Weil (MRW), 1992 and Islam, 1995 for instance) to solve for 
the reduced form steady-state parameters of the Investment-to-income ratio 
via the capital accumulation equation is avoided in this paper. One advantage 
of modelling the capital variables as stocks is that it obviates the need to solve 
the model for the steady state levels with respect to their corresponding 
investment ratios in order to estimate their marginal products. However, the 
practice of including a convergence coefficient consistent with the neoclassical 
growth literature is maintained. This is conventionally obtained by a Taylor 
series approximation around a hypothesized steady state income level 
consistent with the equilibrium specification (see MRW, 1992: 422-3).  
Incorporating this convergence approximation allows one to accommodate 
the assumption that current observed income is a continuous function of a 
‘steady state’ income level: equation (1) can hence be written as: 
𝒚𝒊,𝒕 = (𝟏 − 𝒆
−𝝀𝝉)(𝑿𝒊,𝒕𝜷 +∈𝒊,𝒕) + 𝒆
−𝝀𝝉𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝝉     … eqn.(2) 
where, 
𝜆 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛: − (
𝒍 𝒏(𝟏 + 𝜷)
𝜄𝝉
) ; 
𝜏 = 3: 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙e𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝜄 = 6: 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 
Since income (the dependent variable) is usually modelled in per-labour 
growth units, equation (1) can be transformed into a growth expression by 
algebraically subtracting the level of Income-per-Labour, lagged one period, 
from both sides of equation (1). 
𝒚𝒊,𝒕 − 𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝝉 = 𝒈𝒚𝒊,𝒕 = (𝟏 − 𝒆
−𝝀𝝉𝜾)(𝑿𝒊,𝒕𝜷 +∈𝒊,𝑡) − (𝟏 − 𝒆
−𝝀𝝉𝜾)𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝝉 = 𝑿
𝑰
𝒊𝒕𝜷
𝑰 + 𝜠𝒊𝒕 … eqn.(3) 
 
Here, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕
𝑰 , represents a vector containing the independent variables in 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 
and the temporal lag of the dependent variable, 𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝝉; and 𝜷
𝑰 is simply the 
matrix, (𝟏 − 𝒆−𝝀𝝉𝜾)𝜷. All the variables remain in their log-linear forms; so any 
first-difference corresponds to the variables in their growth rates. 
Following concerns from the literature (Phillips and Moon, 2000) that time 
series datasets (especially the Penn World Table data) are likely to be non-
stationary due to seasonality a 3-year averaging procedure is adopted. This 
allows for a better exploration of both time and cross-sectional dimensions in 
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the data. The model is then projected unto a spatial econometric framework 
by interacting the variable (income growth) and the residual with relevantly 
specified spatial weight matrices - specifying the nature of the connections 
between the countries in our sample. Specifically, the residual is repeatedly 
(for each estimated model) spatially adjusted adopting an inverse-distance 
matrix design. This allows our framework to consistently explore the spatial 
patterns (mostly cultural) in the global economic development process that are 
robust to any arbitrary spatial patterns in the model’s residuals. 
Given that our spatial assumption is that inter-country associations directly 
affect income growth, which then translates to systemic decaying influences 
on the way in which neighbouring productive inputs then affect growth, a 
spatially augmented model using a spatial autoregressive (SAR) specification is 
hence most appropriate. However, since we want our estimates to be robust 
to any arbitrary spatial patterns in the Solow-residual, we adopt a spatial 
autocorrelation (SAC) model instead. The spatially augmented version19 of the 
model in equation (3) can be estimated using the reduced form transformation 
as shown in equation (5) below: 
𝒈𝒚𝒊,𝒕 = 𝝆𝑾𝒈𝒚𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑿𝒊,𝒕
𝑰 𝜷𝑰 +  ∋𝒊,𝒕      … eqn.(4) 
The spatially adjusted residual can be seen in equation (4b) immediately 
below. 𝝔, is the estimated spatial coefficient using the inverse squared 
distance specification as contained in the spatial weight matrix, 𝑾𝒊𝒏𝒗. 
 ∋𝒊,𝒕=  𝝔𝑾
𝒊𝒏𝒗𝝃𝒊,𝒕 + 𝓔𝒊,𝒕       … eqn.(4b) 
𝒈𝒚𝒕 = (𝑰𝑵 − 𝝆𝑾)
−𝟏(𝑿𝒊𝒕
𝑰 𝜷𝑰 + ∋𝒊𝒕)      … eqn.(5) 
The assumptions here are that the capital factors (physical and human) of 
production are accumulated internally but are however affected by a global 
interactive component, which fades away (decays) according to the extent of 
a country’s contact, distance, or connectivity with the other countries in its 
shared productive network. Our specification allows us to capture this much 
better as it provides the component, (𝑰𝑵 − 𝝆𝑾)
−𝟏, which serves as the trickle 
(fading or ripple) impact mechanism through which growth of interconnected 
                                         
19 It is possible to structurally derive and incorporate a spatial dimension into the Solow model directly. 
However, this paper chooses to adopt a narrative based justification for why cross-sectional 
dependence is likely present in the empirical distribution of income globally. For examples of papers 
that provide formal spatial augmentations to the textbook Solow model please refer to Ramirez & 
Loboguerrero (2002), Fingleton & López-Bazo (2006) and Huggins & Thompson (2014). 
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countries affect any particular reference economy in the framework. The SAC 
model, very similar to its SAR counterpart, also provides a more suitable 
spatially augmented framework for handling an equilibrium income design 
(Solow-MRW specification) for which the data is measured in units at the 
country-level (see Elhorst 2014: 7). The model in equation (5) attempts to 
explain average economic performance (growth in income per capita) based on 
covariates directly observed in each country and indirectly from closely 
connected countries accruing from a collective productive process. If country 
units were under a common geopolitical administration as often characterizing 
regional (either provincial or continental) spatial growth studies, then an SDM 
model (which additionally includes the direct impacts of the covariates from 
neighbouring countries) would have been a more applicable functional form. 
Equation (5), above, represents the reduced form version of equation (4). 
The spatial ‘multiplier’ or inverse transformation matrix is given as:  
(𝑰𝑵 − 𝝆𝑾)
−𝟏, which helps us identify the total average direct, indirect and 
feedback effects resulting from the hypothesized spatial process as proposed 
by this chapter as laid out in the definition of 𝑾 = 𝒔𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙. 
This 𝑾 matrix is quite informative when viewed in this infinite series 
expansion expression below: 
(𝑰𝑵 − 𝝆𝑾)
−𝟏 = 𝑰𝑵 + 𝝆𝑾 + 𝝆
𝟐𝑾𝟐 + 𝝆𝟑𝑾𝟑 + ⋯  
where,  
𝑰𝑵: an N x N (number of spatial units) identity matrix that helps to identify 
from the 𝜷𝑰 matrix, the main marginal effects accruing to countries from their 
own productive activities, not induced by the system or network;  
𝝆𝑾 : defines the cumulative indirect or spillover effects resulting from first-
order spatial neighbours; 
𝝆𝟐𝑾𝟐 + 𝝆𝟑𝑾𝟑 + ⋯ : defines the total induced (feedback) effects arising from 
higher-order direct and indirect neighbouring network relationships (effects) 
for all the respective interacted variables in the reduced form regression in 
equation (5). The total feedback effect (𝝆𝟐𝑾𝟐 + 𝝆𝟑𝑾𝟑 + ⋯) represents the 
total impacts on country 𝒊 resulting from only those effects ‘passing through’ 
all neighbouring countries and back to itself, where it originated. It is more 
like a knock-on or shadow effect incited passively from the more dominant 
main and indirect effects. This is why the overall direct effect is in fact greater 
than the actual main effect, 𝜷𝑰, obtainable from the typical FE-OLS (Fixed-
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Effects Ordinary Least Squares) form of the same estimate that normally 
ignores systemic effects underpinned by processes of spatial integration not 
accounted for. A summary table of these direct and ancillary effects have been 
provided in Table A - 1.3.1 below 
 
Effects Type Description 
Equivalent expression (matrix) from 
Equation (5) 
Main Effect 
Overall Own-country effects excluding 
any spatially induced (feedback or 
battery) effects 
 𝑰𝑵 ∗  𝜷
𝑰 =  𝜷𝑰 
Direct Effect 
Main Effect + Overall Higher-order direct 
and indirect (feedback or battery) 
Effects 
 (𝑰𝑵 + 𝝆
𝟐𝑾𝟐 + 𝝆𝟑𝑾𝟑 + ⋯ ) ∗  𝜷𝑰 
Indirect 
Effect 
Overall First-order indirect effects  𝝆𝑾 ∗  𝜷𝑰 
Total Effect Direct effect + Indirect Effect (𝑰𝑵 + 𝝆𝑾 + 𝝆
𝟐𝑾𝟐 + 𝝆𝟑𝑾𝟑 + ⋯ ) ∗ 𝜷𝑰 
Table A – 1.3.1: A tabular summary of the spatial and non-spatial coefficients of 
equation (5) above 
 
1.3.2 – Spatial Weight Matrix Specifications 
The core hypothesis in the methodology of this thesis chapter is that the 
underlying spatial process of the world’s economic performance is 
multidimensional. This process is not limited to the traditional approaches of 
geographical definitions. The world economies have evolved dramatically 
affecting productive integration in patterns equally consistent with alternative 
channels of interconnections. These patterns are more reflective of similarities 
in fundamentals such as integration on the basis of global cultures, political 
outlook, their origins, and the likes. While geographic space would have 
mattered in the past, it is not as relevant in present times, especially not when 
trying to understand the patterns of integrative productive capacities at the 
macro-level.  
Two broad dimensions (angles) of spatial weight specifications are used in 
this research exercise. The first, for comparative purposes, is based on the 
classical geographic approach while the other is based on cultural similarities 
– those particularly focused on the global spatial distribution of ethnic and 
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languages groups. This provides an avenue for comparing the integrative 
components of economic activity at the core of the neoclassical framework 
when exposed to the mechanism of network interactions at an inter-country 
level. This comparison is made by looking at economic growth in a world in the 
presence of geographical integration with one in the presence of cultural 
integration. It is a comparative exercise illustrating the importance of a 
potentially ignored angle of country-level interconnections and the resulting 
implications for developed and developing countries, alike. 
 
1.3.2.1 – Specifications for the Geographically Defined Spatial Weights 
In general, our 𝑾 − 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙 is an n x n symmetric matrix in the following 
form: 
𝑾𝒊 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ;  
where, 𝑾 is specified as a global array of countries represented both 
contiguously and in a squared inverse-distance form. For the actual model 
estimation, the matrices are further spectral-normalized, such that each 
element in 𝑾 are divided by a common uniquely acquired scalar (acquired as 
the largest eigenvalue of the corresponding matrix). This normalization 
procedure is useful because it allows the (𝑰 − 𝝆𝑾) to be nonsingular and 
invertible for all 𝝆 within its parameter space (see Kelejian & Prucha, 2010 for 
more technical discussions on the subject). 
 
1.3.2.1a – The Contiguous Weight Matrix Formulation:  
𝑾𝟏 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ; 
where, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = {
𝟏,        𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢s 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
  𝟎, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
  
 
1.3.2.1b – The squared Inverse-distance Weight Matrix formulation: 
We adopt an unbounded inverse-distance specification with the attempt to 
capture any arbitrary spatial effect that could inadvertently still be present in 
the models’ residuals, where a far-reaching global horizon in the error-term is 
adopted. This is especially useful as it ensures our estimated spatial 
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autoregressive process in the dependent variable is robust to the presence of 
any potential unaccounted spatial process in our residuals20. The approach 
would have been distinctly different if the intended study was more localized 
to a region of countries. In such an instance, using a cut-off radius or adopting 
a stricter distance regime would have been more ideal. Our specification is 
relatively stricter than the average inverse-distance specification as our 
friction parameter is set to 2 (or simply squaring the inverse-distance matrix, 
element by element). Our approach to adopt an unbounded spatial weight 
regime here is consistent with Cliff & Ord (1973, 1981). 
𝑾𝟐 = 𝑾
𝒊𝒏𝒗  = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ; 
where, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = 𝒅𝒊𝒋
−𝒃  ; 
𝒅𝒊𝒋 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦,
′ 𝑖′, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, ′𝑗′. It is calculated using 
the haversine distance measure which takes into consideration the spherical 
nature of the earth’s surface and as a result incorporates this ‘great-circle’ 
property into the distance measure, such that: 
𝒅 = 𝒓(𝟐 𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒔𝒊𝒏 (𝒎𝒊𝒏(𝟏, √𝒂))  
𝒓 = 𝟔, 𝟑𝟕𝟏. 𝟎𝟎𝟗𝒌𝒎 𝒐𝒓 𝟑, 𝟗𝟓𝟖. 𝟕𝟔𝟏𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔: This is the mean radius of the earth 
used in the measure 
𝒂 = 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝟐𝝓 + 𝒄𝒐𝒔(𝝓𝟏) 𝒄𝒐𝒔(𝝓𝟐) 𝒔𝒊𝒏
𝟐𝝂 
where, 
𝜙 =
1
2
(𝜙2 − 𝜙1) =
1
2
(𝑥2[𝑗] − 𝑥2[𝑖])  
𝜈 =
1
2
(𝜈2 − 𝜈1) =
1
2
(𝑥1[𝑗] − 𝑥1[𝑖])  
𝑥1[𝑗] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥1[𝑖] = 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦  
𝑥2[𝑗] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2[𝑖] = 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦  
𝑏 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟: 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 2, in our specification in 𝑊2  
 
                                         
20 See Chen, 2012, for a number of widely used spatial weights specifications based on distance. These 
weighting types, for instance, show how varying the power of the distance measure (the friction 
threshold) affects the nature of interactions between the intended spatial units in a model. 
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1.3.2.2 – Specifications for the Culturally Defined Spatial Weights 
Here, our objective is to attempt to capture spatial interaction using spatial 
weight matrices specified to link countries through global observed patterns of 
shared ethnic or language groups. We achieve this by pairing countries based 
on whether there are shared ethnic groups (ethnic neighbours) between them, 
or whether they have common spoken languages (language neighbours) 
between them. While the relative population concentration of these cultural 
elements (languages and ethnic groups) may be relevant in studies interested 
in distinguishing between varying degrees of global cultural penetration within 
local populations, our focus herein is on the global distribution of these cultural 
elements. As a result, we focus on the worldwide spatial dispersion of world 
languages and ethnic groups rather than the individual proportion of specific 
ethnic identities or languages within each comprising population of each 
country. This focus is relevant in two ways: firstly for conducting a research 
relevant to the empirical reality of increasing (widening) global links between 
countries (as with globalization, for instance); and secondly, it is technically 
relevant as our spatial weights are designed to be consistent with the 
assumption (or condition) that attributes used for specifying them ought to be 
relatively time invariant such as geographical attributes often are. It is easy to 
see that the percentage of a country’s population speaking a particular 
language or belonging to a specific ethnic group will more likely change much 
faster over time compared to its mere occurrence or presence in the said 
country. Hence, the global spread or dispersion of these cultural elements and 
not their locational concentration within each country is the dimension from 
which the cultural spatial weights (links) herein are designed. 
 
1.3.2.2a – Ethnic Neighbours: 
𝑾𝑬𝟏 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ; 
where in this specific case, 
 𝒘𝒊𝒋 = {
𝟏, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
𝟎,             𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 g𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
  
We also provide a composite weight specification involving an element-wise 
multiplication of this weight matrix with the contiguous spatial weight, 𝑾𝟏 
(specified above), and obtain: 𝑾𝑬𝟏𝐰𝟏 = 𝑾𝑬𝟏 .∗  𝑾𝟏. This latter composite 
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variant-specification indicates that country pairs are spatial neighbours when 
they not only have at least one ethnic group in common but also are contiguous 
neighbours. This allows us to test interaction effects in our spatial weight 
models in order to confirm whether both patterns are mutually exclusive or if 
these cultural spatial effects are reinforced by geographic proximity. 
𝑾𝑬𝟐 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ; 
where in this specific case, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = {
𝟏,    𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 3 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
𝟎, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 g𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
 
This is a relatively stricter specification than 𝑾𝑬𝟏. It allows us allay doubts 
about the generosity and feebleness of the association effects permissible with 
the 𝑾𝑬𝟏 specification. The relevant composite weight specification-variant is 
an element-wise multiplication of this weight matrix with the contiguous 
spatial weight, 𝑾𝟏, obtaining: 𝑾𝑬𝟐𝐰𝟏 = 𝑾𝑬𝟐 .∗  𝑾𝟏. 
𝑾𝑬𝟑 = [
𝒘𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
] ; 
where in this specific case, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = ∑ 𝒆𝒔; 
∑ 𝒆𝒔 is the sum of all shared ethnic groups between spatial pairs. This matrix 
is a more generic one but remains relatively quite as strict a specification as 
the preceding specification, 𝑾𝑬𝟐 above. This is because it provides a 
mechanism for measuring varying relative intensities of associations between 
country pairs while still maintaining the symmetric quality similar to the 
preceding specifications. The composite variant specification of this weight 
matrix is the element-wise multiplication of this weight matrix with the 
contiguous spatial weight, 𝑾𝟏, obtaining: 𝑾𝑬𝟑𝐰𝟏 = 𝑾𝑬𝟑 .∗  𝑾𝟏. 
 
1.3.2.2b – Language Neighbours: 
𝑾𝑳 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
]  ; 
where in this specific case, 
 𝒘𝒊𝒋 = {
𝟏, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
𝟎,            𝑖𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
 
We equally provide a composite weight specification involving an element-
wise multiplication of this weight matrix with the contiguous spatial weight, 
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𝑾𝟏, as done with the ethnic groups metric variants above obtaining: 𝑾𝑳𝟏𝐰𝟏 =
𝑾𝑳𝟏 .∗  𝑾𝟏.  
𝑾𝑳𝟐 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
]  ; 
where in this specific case, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = {
𝟏,   𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒r𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 3 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
𝟎, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠
 
The composite weight variant of this specification involving the element-
wise multiplication of this weight matrix with the contiguous spatial weight, 
𝑾𝟏, is: 𝑾𝑳𝟐𝐰𝟏 = 𝑾𝑳𝟐 .∗  𝑾𝟏. 
𝑾𝑳𝟑 = [
𝒘𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝒏
]  ; 
where in this specific case, 
𝒘𝒊𝒋 = ∑ 𝒍𝒔; 
∑ 𝒍𝒔 is the sum of all spoken languages common to corresponding spatial pairs 
and defined in the same fashion as 𝑾𝑬𝟑, above. The concomitant composite 
variant-specification is the element-wise multiplication of this weight matrix 
with the contiguous spatial weight, 𝑾𝟏, obtaining: 𝑾𝑳𝟑𝐰𝟏 = 𝑾𝑳𝟑 .∗  𝑾𝟏. 
It is important to note that the decision to use either 1 or 3 ethnic groups or 
languages as a criterion for designing the spatial networks herein is very similar 
in nature to the decision to work with a distance friction parameter of 2 as in 
our inverse distance specification above. The 1 or 3 criteria acts as a kind of 
friction parameter as well. Where the higher the benchmark, the tighter the 
network or the fewer the avenues for spatial interconnections. Hence, a choice 
of at least 3 languages or ethnic groups between country-pairs would result in 
a sparser network design compared to that inherent in the choice of at least 1 
cultural (ethnic or language) group in common. We choose to start from the 
slackest option and proceeding to one that is marginally stricter. The choice of 
3 is arbitrary and any other friction criteria could have also been likely 
adopted. The only additional condition is that we allow for a global far-
reaching network design; where the use of alternative specifications are for 
comparison or robustness purposes rather than for the purpose of model 
selection. It is primarily for this reason, that the unrestricted version of these 
cultural spatial networks as seen in the 𝑾𝑳𝟑 and 𝑾𝑬𝟑 specifications are 
additionally adopted. These 𝑾𝑳𝟑 and 𝑾𝑬𝟑 specifications provide a framework 
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that harness the full range of shared ethnic and language groups between each 
country pair using it as a grid intensity index, rather than as an exclusion 
(inclusion) mechanism. Adopting a good range of choices mitigates concerns 
about weight selection biases. 
Additionally, the spatial weights adopted herein are all spectral normalized 
representations of the queen contiguity21, squared inverse-distance (measured 
in miles), cultural matrices, and their corresponding interacted (or composite) 
variants, respectively. The distance matrix, as earlier highlighted, is adopted 
with no particular distance limit or bound. This is so, given that our models are 
intended to spatially represent integration at a fully extended inter-country 
level. The empirical relevance of this preference is discussed further in the 
results and model interpretations section - in section 4 below. 
 
1.3.2.3 – Spectral- normalization: Specification and Justification 
Normalizing spatial weight matrices is common practice in the literature 
particularly because it helps remove any measure-unit effect that may result 
from the computation of the spatial coefficients. Most papers in the literature 
adopt row-normalized matrices probably because estimations from such 
models allow for an algebraic representation of a weighted average of the 
collective spatial connections thus enabling convenient model prediction and 
interpretation (Lesage & Pace, 2009). Kelejian & Prucha (2010: 56) critique 
this position by suggesting that the adoption of row-stochastic spatial weight 
matrices should be guided by well-considered theory. This is because models 
based on row-normalized spatial weights may most often result in model 
misspecification. Their reason being that the normalization technique involves 
                                         
21 The queen contiguity matrix specification is less strict than the rook contiguity as it treats spatial units 
as neighbours either whether they share a common border or a single point rather than the latter, which 
requires that both conditions be satisfied jointly. A less strict weight definition would naturally provide 
a better approximation of global inter-country network-growth compared to a stricter one, which would 
be more appropriate for regional based or intra-country (within country) studies. These studies are often 
characterized by denser network interactions between the defined spatial units because there are 
typically more avenues for spatial interactions at lower administrative levels compared to a more global 
inter-country level focus. This is also the reason why adopting unbounded inverse distance weights do 
not necessarily pose an empirical challenge as the number of spatial units at the inter-country level is 
less densely connected compared to sub-administrative level studies at regional intra-country (such as 
studies for the United States) or intra-regional studies (such as among EU countries). See Chen, 2012, 
for more discussions on varying the specification of spatial weight and their respective theoretical and 
empirical implications. 
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the use of a vector of row-sums based on the number of connections per 
network rather one based on a scalar which is more suitable for a model with 
an autoregressive parameter dependent on the total number of cross-sectional 
units  (such as with the spectral radius and min-max normalizations). The 
difference being the former (row-normalization) often produces an asymmetric 
matrix resulting in a non-scalar re-scale factor of the auto-regressive 
parameter, as the normalized matrix is not structurally equivalent to the 
originally defined weight matrix. The latter normalizations (spectral radius and 
min-max) however, adopt a uniform normalizing factor (a scalar). This 
maintains the initial spatial weight’s underlying structure; hence is very useful 
for modelling equations specified as equilibrium relationships or when 
estimating models based on the classic decaying weight distance hypothesis. 
In short, row normalizing may be convenient and popular but the asymmetry it 
produces in the weighting structure implies that the spatial impact of unit 𝒊 on 
unit 𝒋 may not be equivalent to that of unit 𝒋 on unit 𝒊 thus obscuring 
interpretational relevancies tied to specific theories (see Anselin, 1988: 23-24; 
Elhorst, 2014: 13-14).   As a consequence, this paper adopts a spectral 
normalization weight in its approach as this is a more general and structurally 
consistent functional form compared to the row-normalization representation. 
In the specification of spectral normalized spatial weights, each element of 
the relevant matrix is normalized using a scalar: 
𝒗∗ = is usually the largest moduli from the eigenvalues of the correspondingly 
defined spatial weight matrix 
So that the consequential operational matrix, 𝑾, is obtained by: 
 𝑾∗
𝒗∗ =
𝒘𝒊𝒋
𝒗∗
 
Given that the spatially interacted right-hand side variables are expected to 
be substantially correlated with their non-spatially transformed versions, the 
paper adopts a Spatial Autocorrelation (SAC) specification: where both the 
dependent variable (income per capita growth) and the models’ residuals are 
spatially lagged. The rationale for this can be motivated from a number of 
positions. Most apparent is the argument that increasing economic activity 
from income growth may readily spillover to neighbouring countries generating 
convergences via channels such as transfers in economic productive capacity 
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and political systems or policy choices (see22 Starr, 1991; Simmons & Elkins, 
2004). Also more economically, trade, technological (and skills) transfer, and 
through increased factor mobility made possible by the integration of countries 
within regional and global economic and geopolitical organizations, could help 
us rationalize just why countries may be spatially connected (also see Moreno 
& Trehan, 1997 for some discussions on similar matters). It is equally not 
farfetched, for instance, to conceive the rationale that richer countries with 
relatively more vibrant economies are generally more likely to attract better 
(in quantity and quality) capital (human and physical). This could be achieved 
either by actively exporting educational services or by enabling favourable 
immigration policy choices targeted at accruing and retaining high quality 
human capital, for instance. Factor mobility, especially as embedded in 
migratory patterns, provide some observable evidence of how labour and their 
accompanying human capital have been found to flank to more developed 
countries from relatively lesser developed ones in search of better socio-
economic opportunities (such as higher returns to their labour services). This 
could certainly generate spatially persistent global growth patterns where 
relatively more developed economies, possessing higher productive capacities, 
are able to attract and retain more capital resources at any one time, 
compared to their less vibrant developing country counterparts. As a result, 
space – both geographical and otherwise defined could provide a useful 
mechanism for feasibly exploring the network distribution of such productive 
capacities. Ideally geographically closer countries would be the initial 
beneficiaries of any available productive capacity and input spillovers 
compared to more distant countries. Also, countries that share similar or 
common historical experiences and heritages, cultural identities or 
characteristics, and institutional compositions would equally fit this sort of 
spatial dynamic. A number of papers have attempted to explicitly model 
capital accumulation as a spatial process within an endogenous growth 
framework. Huggins & Thompson (2014), for instance, refer to their 
conceptualization of this as a composite form of capital. This includes a 
                                         
22 See these papers for an example of some of these channels discussions that link the political economy 
literature with the spatial econometrics literature. 
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constituent network capital, which is quite consistent with our narrated view 
of paired-sourcing from a global capital pool23, as highlighted above. 
The models herein are estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator. A 
user-written command, ‘xsmle’ available via STATA24, is used to estimate the 
models with a fixed-effects (FE) specification. The constant term is restricted 
to capture just individual atemporal effects, which is particularly justifiable as 
our chosen temporal frequency is at the 3-year averaged dimension. Some of 
the justifications for choosing spatially augmented models in order to 
reinvestigate the dynamics of growth divergence across the world have already 
been discussed in preceding sections. For a methodological justification 
however, the literature on panel studies identifies overwhelmingly the crucial 
implications of not accommodating for cross-sectional interdependence across 
countries in regional (either provincially or continentally) and global empirical 
estimations (Breitung & Pesaran, 2008). Also there is an additional advantage 
that spatially augmented models are more robust to omitted variable biases 
and model misspecifications compared to their aspatial counterparts (Franzese 
& Hays, 2007; LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
 
1.3.3 – Data and Sample 
The conventional economic growth model variables (GDP, labour, physical 
capital stock and human capital index) have all been sourced from the latest 
range of the Penn World Table datasets (version 8.0 - Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer, 2013). The physical capital stock and income variables are measured 
in real terms, constant at 2005 national prices and in 2005 US dollars. The 
labour variable is measured as the ‘number of engaged persons’. While the 
human capital variable has been outputted as an index in this dataset series 
where the average years of secondary schooling attained has been adjusted for 
returns to education following Psacharopoulos (1994). 
The required cross-sectional data for locating the countries (the longitudes 
and latitudes) is obtained from the Diva-GIS website25. The data resource is 
                                         
23 This should be finite for any given time and global technological level. 
24 See Elhorst, 2010, for some technical discussions on specifications and alternative estimations of panel 
models following spatial augmentation. 
25 http://www.diva-gis.org/Data 
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developed and maintained by a number of geospatial researchers - Robert 
Hijmans, Edwin Rojas, Mariana Cruz, Rachel O’Brien, and Israel Barrantes, 
whose objective is to provide free and accessible geospatial data. 
Also at the cross-sectional dimension, there are 2 main culturally defined 
weight matrices. The first is based on the spatial distribution and presence of 
ethnic groups between and across countries while the second is very similar 
but uses the presence of language within countries as its reference for 
designing the spatial network matrices. The variable used for designing the 
first class of culturally defined spatial weight matrix is obtained from the GREG 
project (Weidmann, Ketil & Cederman, 2010). It is a dataset that geo-
references the ethnic groups drawn from the classical Soviet Atlas Narodov 
Mira, by employing geographic information systems for each of the ethnic group 
territories using geographical spatial polygons. From this dataset, we are able 
to identify major ethnic groups across the world and cluster countries into 
neighbourhood networks based on the spatial distribution pattern of these 
ethnic groups. If the countries have a specified number of ethnic group(s) in 
common, then they are considered ethnic neighbours and hence connected to 
the same cultural network, if not they are tagged as non-neighbours and 
unconnected culturally. There are thirteen countries26 not represented by the 
GREG dataset but which are presented in the 122-country sample used in this 
paper. In this case, the GREG ethnic groups’ database is cross-referenced with 
the databases on the websites of the Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. (2014) and 
CIA’s World Factbook (2014). It is updated where the dataset does not include 
the countries used in our sample. A similar approach is alternatively adopted 
for exploring a second dimension of cultural networks based on the spatial 
distribution pattern of globally spoken languages. From this dimension, this 
paper relies on the Ethnologue dataset (Ethnologue 17th edition, Lewis et al, 
2014). The Ethnologue dataset uniquely identifies major languages spoken in 
countries across the world. The study herein clusters countries together, if 
they share at least a specified number of language(s) in common. 
 
                                         
26 These countries are: Armenia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. 
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1.3.3.1 – Time Period 
There are a total of 122 countries in sample spanning from 1990 to 2010 (21 
years). The time depth has been selected so as to sufficiently maximize the 
cross-sectional dimension (the number of countries) as much as possible. This 
is especially useful because the model is focused on exploring the global cross-
sectional interconnections between countries and a substantial number of 
countries in the former Soviet bloc became independent in the early 1990s. 
Our three-year averaged sample spans the intervals: 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 
1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, 2005-2007 and 2008-2010. After losing the 
first period interval due to lagging the level of income per labour, the total 
number of observations is 732 (122x6). We do not use an annual sample so as 
to mitigate the econometric issues surrounding business cycle effects (such as 
yearly serial autocorrelation) and non-stationarity associated with persistent 
macro-variables such as income, capital and labour (for instance see, Temple, 
1999:131-132). Although the five-year non-overlapping alternative is pervasive 
in the literature (for instance, Islam, 1995; Caselli et al.,1996; Bond et al., 
2001; Ding and Knight, 2008), we opt for the three-year option. This choice is 
midway between the annual representation and the widely favoured five-year 
option. Our choice gives us more observations and variations to work with while 
avoiding the problems associated with using an annual based sample27. 
The regional composition of the dataset can be viewed from the table (Table 
B - 1.3.2) below and it does show a good global representation of countries 
across the globe. 
 
Regions Frequency Percentage Cum. 
Africa 35 28.69 28.69 
Americas 21 17.21 45.9 
Asia 32 26.23 72.13 
Europe 31 25.41 97.54 
Oceania 3 2.46 100 
Total:  122 
Table B – 1.3.2: Tabular Summary of the Countries in our Sample 
 
 
                                         
27 Also our results are very similar to those obtained using a 5-year average sample as well; even though 
these have not been reported herein. 
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Section 1.4 – Data Summary, Results and Interpretation 
1.4.1 – Data Summary 
Table C - 1.4.1 below provides a simple summary description of the variables 
used in the estimations of our model over the entire period considered. Two 
additional indices (the language penetration index and the ethnic penetrations 
index) have been introduced to allow a quick visual inspection of their more 
detailed spatial weight matrix specifications. These indices are computed from 
the cultural weight matrices earlier specified in section 1.3.2.2 above. Both 
variables range between zero and 1; where zero implies that no local languages 
or ethnic groups in a country can be found elsewhere in the world, while 1 
implies that all the languages or ethnic groups in a reference country can be 
found in at least one other country in the world. It provides us with a kind of 
global cultural assimilation index for both languages and ethnic groups; where 
the most culturally assimilated countries (value close to 1) are the most 
culturally progressive beyond their respective country boundaries. Giving us 
with an adequate country-level summary of our respective (languages and 
ethnic groups) cultural spatial weight matrices which observes the number(s) 
of shared groups between individual country pairs.  
With these indices, we can compare what we observe spatially with other 
common measures of economic openness such as inward FDI (foreign direct 
investment) and total trade volumes28. We know for instance that measures of 
economic openness are individually strongly correlated to economic outcomes. 
As is apparent from Table D - 1.4.2 and Figure A - 1.4.1 below, these cultural 
indices are quite substantially and consistently positively associated with the 
FDI-Income ratio and Trade-Income ratio29. This is quite interesting as both 
measures of cultural penetration (assimilation) appear to be consistently 
positively correlated with both measures of economic openness even though 
they are not respectively consistently positively correlated with income growth 
or with our key productive inputs (physical and human capital). This suggests 
                                         
28 These two variables are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators website (version 2015) 
spanning 1990 to 2010 – same period span as the variables in our sample. 
29 Please refer to the greyed figures in table for specific correlation coefficients, respectively. 
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that the positive network (spatial) effects, which we later observe from the 
estimation output below using our cultural spatial weights, might be operating 
through related mechanisms coherent with economic openness or other similar 
forms global integration. Also as expected our language penetration index 
appears to demonstrate twice as much association with the selected measures 
of economic openness (FDI-Income and Trade-Income ratios) compared to our 
ethnic penetration index. This could be an indication that language is a more 
likely mechanism for globally connecting or integrating countries compared to 
ethnic groups. This is not so surprising, as we would expect following the 
literature: that ethnic groups are more likely something inherited or attached 
to their ancestral homelands unlike languages, which could be learned and 
shared much more easily. This pattern of association with the economic 
openness measures is also consistent with the 50% (approximately) absolute 
linear association between both penetration indices. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Growth in Income per capita 732 0.0477222 0.1156184 -0.9326577 0.5026374 
Lag of logged Income per 
capita 732 9.442572 1.258493 6.141289 11.65386 
Income per capita 732 25326.13 25251.64 505.2304 115040.4 
Logged Capital per Labour 732 10.56877 1.355012 7.192822 12.65332 
Capital-Labour ratio 732 77721.88 77995.17 1329.851 312800.3 
Logged Human Capital Index 732 0.8549338 0.2594019 0.1258426 1.283687 
Human Capital index 732 2.426677 0.5780397 1.134104 3.609925 
Trade-Income ratio (average 
from 1990-2010) 121 80.57029 43.04763 21.52435 363.961 
FDI-Income ratio (average 
from 1990-2010) 121 3.536354 3.160522 -0.0218894 19.02137 
Language Penetration index 122 0.5381923 0.2521558 0.0102564 1 
Ethnic Penetration index 122 0.7435854 0.2925556 0 1 
Table C – 1.4.1: Data summary statistics 
Where: the income and physical capital variables are real value constant at 2005 prices measured in 2005 USD. 
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Variables gypl laglnypl lnkpl lnhc 
lang_pentr
_index 
ethn_pentr
_index 
fdi_
gdp 
trade
_gdp 
Growth in 
Income per 
labour 
1        
Lagged Income 
per labour 
-0.0641 1       
Capital-Labour 
ratio 
0.1003 0.9325 1      
Human capital 
index 
0.132 0.786 0.7864 1     
Language 
Penetration 
index 
-0.0131 0.1475 0.1427 0.1696 1    
Ethnic 
Penetration 
index 
-0.0242 -0.0965 -0.0708 -0.0878 0.5126 1   
FDI to Income 
ratio 
0.0795 0.1322 0.1568 0.227 0.2578 0.1035 1  
Trade to Income 
ratio 
0.016 0.2062 0.2364 0.2608 0.4178 0.2042 0.64 1 
Table D – 1.4.2: Correlation matrix of relevant variables 
Please note that all other variables are averaged over the period from 1990 to 2010. 
 
From Table C - 1.4.1 above, we also find that although the average global 
income per labour is between 1990 and 2010 is 24,722.05, the cross-sectional 
mean-range between the least observation (757.0756) and the maximum 
observation (102056.5) is very wide. A look at the spatial map of income per 
labour at selected years (1990 and 2010) and a summary measure of one of our 
adopted cultural metrics provides an indication of spatial clustering observable 
through time thus providing some visual case for a spatial panel model. One 
would expect, following the conditional convergence hypothesis, some cluster-
catch-up effect between the poorer and richer regions over time. This should 
have been even more feasible if the classic pro-globalization narrative of 
poorer regions catching up to the richer ones were true. If it were true, then 
the gains accruing to relatively poorer regions from increased global 
integration, technological accessibility and having knowledge of a sense of 
what works from natural experiments in the leading economies ought to 
provide such a catch-up channel. However, this is not the case: poorer regions 
in the 1990s remain those that are poorest 20 years later in 2010. This pattern 
happens to be consistent with areas that have lower ratios of global language 
influence or projection as found in our language penetration index in Figure D 
- 1.4.4 below. The ‘blue’ (range) shaded polygons of Figure B - 1.4.2 and Figure 
C - 1.4.3 correspond to higher income per labour values while those shaded 
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with the ‘yellow’ to ‘red’ correspond to the lower variable values. The reverse 
(in terms of colour regimes) is however the case for our language penetration 
index portrayed in Figure D - 1.4.4 below. The Sub-Saharan African region 
particularly stands out as a spatio-temporally persistently under-performing 
region with a relatively lower language penetration index (mostly ‘blues’) and 
a low-income per labour value region (mostly all ‘yellow’ to ‘red’). 
 
 
Figure A – 1.4.1: Scatter-plot of our Language penetration index and average 
Income per labour 
 
 
Figure B – 1.4.2: Geographical spatial map of Income-Labour ratio in 1990 
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Figure C – 1.4.3: Geographical spatial map of Income-Labour ratio in 2010 
 
Apart from some countries in the Americas regions (South and North 
America), the spatial distribution of the language penetration index almost 
certainly approximates the nature of the geographic allocation of income per 
labour across the world. Although, there is evidence of spatial clustering as 
portrayed by similar colour-shades found together, this alone does not seem to 
tell the whole story. As a result, complementing (by adopting composite weight 
specifications) multiple spatial dimensions of spatial clustering would certainly 
provide a more informative framework for capturing such multidimensionality 
that could equally cater for interactions beyond the scope of geographical 
borders. 
 
 
Figure D – 1.4.4: Geographical spatial map of our language penetration index 
 
From Table D - 1.4.2, above, we find that there is in fact a negative 
relationship between per capita income growth and the lagged level of income 
per capita, as expected by theory. This suggests some initial evidence for 
convergence even though this is an absolute correlation coefficient. The size 
of this coefficient certainly provides some initial factual grounds to suggest 
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that the possibility of absolute or global convergence may not entirely be as 
absent as most proponents of the conditional convergence discourse opine. 
With a meagre absolute correlation coefficient of -0.0641, it indicates an 
annual average convergence rate of approximately 6.4% over the entire 1990-
2010 period. From this Table D - 1.4.2, it can also be seen that all the 
traditional Solow-variables involved in our model seem to be of the expected 
signs with regards to their respective correlation coefficients. 
 
1.4.2 – Estimations and their Interpretation 
In this section, two classes of cultural spatial weights are adopted to model 
the spatial interactions (interrelationships) between the countries in our 
sample. They are compared with 2 base models estimated in A and B in Table 
E - 1.4.3 below. 
 
1.4.2.1 – Some Discussions on the Base Models 
The estimation result in column A provides a base estimation of our 
modelled variables’ relationship using a fixed-effects ordinary least squares 
(FEOLS) specification. While the estimation output in column B provides a base 
spatial autocorrelation specification using the conventional geographic spatial 
weight matrices30. From estimations A and B in Table E - 1.4.3 (below) we find 
that the spatial coefficients are statistically significant for both the spatial-lag 
of the dependent variable (rho) and the error process (rho_2). This indicates 
that not controlling for spatial dependence could most likely result in a 
misspecification of the actual relationship between the variables. In particular 
it shows that ignoring an avenue for spatial integration between country units 
may result in a misspecification bias manifested as an upward bias in the 
estimated direct (and main) marginal effect coefficients or provide an 
incomplete story of the global growth process intended for an interconnected 
socio-economic landscape. It can additionally be observed that the statistical 
relevance of the spatial-lag coefficients also translates into indirect spatial 
                                         
30 In this particular specification, the queen contiguity spatial weight specification is used to spatially 
augment the dependent variable while the squared inverse-distance spatial weight specification is used 
to repeatedly spatially augment this model’s and the other spatial models’ residuals. 
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marginal effects stemming from the spatial-lag process (refer to Table A - 1.3.1 
above for how the process is numerically inferred).  
From estimations A and B in Table E - 1.4.3, it can be observed that all three 
proximate growth factors (lagged income level, physical capital and human 
capital31) from the classic MRW (1992) variant of the Solow model are 
statistically significant and substantially associated with the growth of global 
income per labour. Quite informatively, we are able to infer the marginal 
impact of these individual proximate growth factors as shares relative to their 
own-country and indirect (inter-country) global integration effects. It can be 
inferred from the total marginal coefficient of the physical capital-labour ratio 
from estimation B that increasing it by two-folds (that is doubling it or a 100% 
increase) is on the average associated with an approximately 0.33 unit increase 
in the growth rate of income per labour, when the other covariates are left 
unchanged. Controlling for the equilibrium adjustment mechanism (or the 
convergence effect) makes the physical capital per labour coefficient 
equivalent to the marginal product of capital (MPK) from the base Solow (Cobb-
Douglas) production function in equation 1 specified in section 1.3.1 above. 
The MPK could be obtained by dividing the capital-labour coefficient by the 
lagged income per labour coefficient (0.33/0.66 = 0.5)32. This implied average 
value of approximately 0.5 for the MPK is robust to the three classes of weight 
specifications and with respect to both direct and total marginal effects. This 
value is also consistent with the MPK coefficient implied by the MRW’s (1992) 
base model (0.5). It is nonetheless, slightly bigger than that which they (MRW, 
1992) find after controlling for human capital and is much bigger than the 
empirical prediction (estimate) of the theoretical Solow model of one-third 
(1/3).  By adopting the queen-contiguity spatial weight in equation B, we also 
find that the indirect marginal effect for this capital-labour ratio is only 
approximately 15%33 of the total effects, which we have just interpreted above. 
                                         
31 All measured in per labour terms. 
32 These have been obtained by rounding-up (in decimal terms) the absolute coefficients of the physical 
capital and convergence variables in the total effects part of the estimations above. The corresponding 
formula can be rightly deduced by dividing through the relevant estimated coefficients from the 
estimating equation with the absolute value of the convergence coefficient: 
β (log of defined Capital variable)
|1−e−λτ𝜾|
. 
33 This is obtained by dividing the indirect marginal effect coefficient for the log (capital-labour ratio) by 
the corresponding coefficient for the total marginal effects for the same variable. 
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What this implies is that if a country were mostly in interaction with its border-
touching geographic neighbours, there would be a positive network physical 
capital accumulation effects accruing from interacting within such occurring 
networks. While the total marginal effect of human capital in model B shows 
that an increase in this index by two-folds is associated with an approximately 
0.55 points increase in the income per labour growth rate, holding the other 
covariates constant. Within this queen-contiguity spatial regime (or 
specification), it can be inferred that the indirect marginal effect is about 13% 
of the total marginal effects for the human capital index. While the total 
marginal convergence effect conditional on the other covariates in this 
specified model shows that relatively poorer countries catch-up to the richer 
economies (or retard relative to better previous performances) at the rate of 
approximately 5.1%34. This is approximately two and a half times as much as 
the 2% hypothesised by the textbook Solow model. Compared to the fixed-
effects estimates in estimation A, where spatial agglomeration is not 
considered, we find that the convergence rate is marginally faster by 
approximately 1.1 percentage unit (with approximately 4.1% as its rate of 
convergence). The coefficients from the non-spatially adjusted model A appear 
not so different from the main marginal effects in the queen-contiguity 
spatially adjusted model in estimation B. However, it is clear that adjusting 
for any inherent spatial dimension provides us with a clearer picture of just 
how important cross-country interdependence is even at a contiguous cross-
country neighbourhood level. All the marginal effects for estimations A and B 
appear statistically significant at a minimum statistical level of 5%. This is even 
after controlling for any arbitrary spatial agglomeration process that may be 
present in the error process using a squared inverse-distance spatial matrix in 
estimation B. 
 
                                         
34 We obtain this by using the convergence conversion formula, −(
𝒍 𝒏(𝟏+𝜷)
𝜄𝝉
), introduced in section 1.3.2 
above. 
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Table E – 1.4.3: Economic Growth augmented to show the Estimations with the 
base-models (A and B) and a Language-type Spatial Agglomeration process 
 
 
1.4.2.2 – Interpreting the Language based Cultural Network Models 
This set of results from estimations 1 through 6 in Table E - 1.4.3 above 
essentially adopts 3 sub-classes of languages based cultural spatial weights to 
model the hypothesised spatial dependence inherent in the growth rate of income 
per labour while still controlling for arbitrary interdependence in the error 
process. The first subclass of language neighbour matrices (in estimations 1 and 2 
with the WL1 and its contiguity interacted variant WL1_Wc, respectively) pair 
countries as neighbours if they share at least one common language. The second 
subclass of language neighbour matrix (in estimations 3 and 4 with the WL2 and 
(A) (B) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 / Wc/Wi2 WL1/Wi2 WL1_Wc/Wi2 WL2/Wi2 WL2_Wc/Wi2 WL3/Wi2 WL3_Wc/Wi2
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.5760*** -0.5653*** -0.5598*** -0.5699*** -0.5638*** -0.5720*** -0.5622*** -0.5713***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.3050*** 0.2806*** 0.2823*** 0.2837*** 0.2840*** 0.2845*** 0.2847*** 0.2841***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.5767*** 0.4786*** 0.4424** 0.4800*** 0.4701*** 0.4837*** 0.4419** 0.4981***
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.5699*** -0.5657*** -0.5745*** -0.5691*** -0.5760*** -0.5689*** -0.5741***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.2867*** 0.2891*** 0.2897*** 0.2904*** 0.2902*** 0.2919*** 0.2894***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.4817*** 0.4462*** 0.4831*** 0.4738*** 0.4865*** 0.4463** 0.5000***
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.0892** -0.2078*** -0.0822** -0.1345*** -0.0687* -0.2555*** -0.0406
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.0457** 0.1086** 0.0420** 0.0692** 0.0349* 0.1339** 0.021
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.0723** 0.1560** 0.0661** 0.1077** 0.0547* 0.1896** 0.033
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.6591*** -0.7736*** -0.6567*** -0.7036*** -0.6446*** -0.8244*** -0.6148***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.3324*** 0.3977*** 0.3317*** 0.3597*** 0.3251*** 0.4259*** 0.3104***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.5541*** 0.6021*** 0.5492*** 0.5815*** 0.5411*** 0.6360*** 0.5330***
rho (Coefficient on 
the spatial lagged 
dependent)
0.2206*** 0.4291*** 0.2199** 0.3870*** 0.2049** 0.4095*** 0.203
rho_2 (Coefficient on 
the spatial lagged 
residual)
0.3302** 0.2815* 0.3727** 0.3163* 0.3970** 0.2931* 0.4311***
Average Fixed Effects
2.004 1.959 2.014 1.958 2.024 1.955 2.01
No. of Time Intervals 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
No. of Countries 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Total No. of Obs. 732 732 732 732 732 732 732 732
Model Degree of 
Freedom 2 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
No. of Ancillary 
Parameters 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Within R-Square 0.4659943 0.4585582 0.4462433 0.4601094 0.4498521 0.4593622 0.4541153 0.4632114
AIC -1722.447 -1732.658 -1741.179 -1732.482 -1737.056 -1729.253 -1737.261 -1723.457
BIC -1708.66 -1663.721 -1672.242 -1663.545 -1668.119 -1660.317 -1668.324 -1654.52
standard deviation of 
idiosyncratic errors
0.0063*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 0.0063***
The dependent variale for all the regressions is the Growth rate of GDP per Labour; ***stands for  p<0.001; **stands for p<0.05; *stands for  
p<0.10; Please take note that the composite weights on the even-numbered estimations above (estimations 2, 4, and 6)  have already been 
defined in Section 3.2.2 of this thesis chapter, while the odd-numbered estimations (1, 3 and 5) represents the uninteracted weights; Also the 
first of the spatial weights (Wc - queen contiguity; or WL - language networks) represents the one used to lag the dependent variable, while the 
latter following the backslash ( / ) represents the squared inverse-distance spatial weight used to lag the error process (Wi2) 
Main
Direct
Indirect
Total
Spatial
Some 
Statistics
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its contiguity interacted variant WL2_Wc, respectively) adopts a relatively stricter 
threshold by pairing countries as neighbours if they share at least three common 
languages. The third subclass in this subsection (in estimations 5 and 6 with the 
WL3 and its contiguity interacted variant WL3_Wc, respectively) quite differently, 
records the total number of languages each pair of countries share in common; 
thus adopting an intensity-type approach to its specification. 
A quick glance at the results from estimations 1 through 6 shows that the non-
interacted spatial weight models (1, 3 and 5) appear to have stronger and more 
statistically significant spatial coefficients compared to the interacted spatial 
weight specifications (2, 4 and 6). The direct marginal effects however show a 
reversal of this observation: estimations 2, 4 and 6 seem to have larger 
coefficients compared to estimations 1, 3 and 5. This is expected - mostly because 
there are fewer channels for interconnections when the basis for cross-sectional 
interaction is more restrictive - additionally complicated by the condition that 
each language pair must also be contiguous neighbours. Bearing this in mind, we 
have chosen to include this composite specification so that we can examine the 
hypothesis that countries are more spatially connected when they are both 
culturally similar and within contiguous proximity. As it appears in this set of 
estimation results, they are not. It appears that countries are interacting on either 
fronts (culturally or geographically), but not necessarily jointly on both fronts. 
This provides some statistical affirmation of our earlier position that countries are 
increasingly interacting beyond their immediate geographical horizons with 
increasing advancements in technological knowhow and other avenues that have 
been facilitating both political and socioeconomic integration such as 
modernisation, cross-country productive-resource mobility and communication. 
From estimation 1 we find that the total marginal contribution of physical 
capital (capital per labour) is approximately 0.3977. This can be translated as: a 
10% increase in the level of capital per labour is on the average associated with 
an increase in the income per capita growth rate by approximately 0.0398 units, 
all other factors held constant. The ratio share of own-country (direct marginal 
effects) to inter-country (indirect marginal effects) share in the total marginal 
effects is approximately 73% to 27%, respectively. The total marginal effect of 
human capital (as measured by the human capital index) on the other hand, 
suggests that an increase in the human capital index of a country by two-folds (or 
100%), on the average, is accompanied by an increase in the income per capita 
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growth rate of about 0.602 units. The total marginal effect of the previous period 
of income per capita remains the biggest individual growth source, which is 
consistent throughout this work regardless of the spatial network weight adopted. 
It can be observed that, all things being equal, a two-fold increase in the previous 
level of income per labour in a country is on the average accompanied by a 
decrease in the contemporaneous growth rate of income per capita by about 0.774 
units. The total income convergence rate implied by this coefficient is 
approximately 7.1%. It can also be inferred from this that there is significant 
equilibrium adjustment pressure from external cross-country interaction 
influences that most likely could be underestimated if global integration is not 
adequately controlled for. From a cross-sectional perspective, the implication of 
an indirect convergence coefficient is that richer countries are slowing down on 
the average relative to their poorer country counterparts, within each specified 
network. Even though this convergence is of a lesser magnitude compared to that 
accruing to countries on the average as a result of their own-country (direct) 
conditional convergence effects. Apart from the indirect marginal effects in 
estimations 4 and 6, we find that all the direct, indirect and total marginal effects 
are statistically significant at a minimum statistical level of 5%. 
 
1.4.2.3 – Interpreting the Ethnic based Cultural Network Models 
In similar fashion to the language based spatial networks discussed section 
1.4.2.2 above, there are essentially three sub-classes of ethnicity based spatial 
weights in this sub-section. Designed in exactly the same way: our first subclass 
of ethnic neighbour matrices (in estimations 7 and 8 with the WE1 and its 
contiguity interacted variant WE1_Wc, respectively) pair countries as neighbours 
if they share at least one common ethnic group; the second subclass (in 
estimations 9 and 10 with the WE2 and its contiguity interacted variant WE2_Wc, 
respectively) adopts a relatively stricter threshold by pairing countries as 
neighbours if they share at least three common ethnic groups; finally the third 
subclass in this subsection (in estimations 11 and 12 with the WE3 and its 
contiguity interacted variant WE3_Wc, respectively) counts the total number of 
ethnic groups shared between country pairs, thus advocating an intensity-type 
approach in its specification as well. 
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 Looking at the estimation results in Table F - 1.4.4 below, we find that the 
story is very much similar to the discussions already made for the language based 
cultural matrix on the non-composite geography based network estimations in the 
previous table (Table E - 1.4.3). As previously emphasized, the more packed the 
spatial relationship portrayed or hypothesised by the spatial weight specification 
(network), the more emphatic the cumulative indirect spatial effect as estimated 
in the corresponding coefficients of the respective proximate growth factors. Also 
because the patterns and coefficients are very similar across the three subclasses 
of spatial weights here as was the case with the languages case in Table E - 1.4.3, 
we focus on interpreting the first of them, estimation 7. From this subclass of 
estimations, we also find that the coefficients are generally bigger and that the 
spatial coefficients (rho) on the lag the dependent variable (income per labour 
growth) is generally larger and consistently statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance excluding the rho coefficient for estimation 10, which is significant 
at 5%. From estimation 7 (for reference purposes) we find that the inferred 
convergence rate is approximately 5.9% holding the other model’s covariates 
constants. In marginal terms, the indirect marginal effect is about 28.35% 
(−0.2012 −0.7096⁄ ) of the total marginal effect for the convergence coefficient 
used in obtaining the rate35. The total marginal contribution of the capital-labour 
ratio to the income per worker growth rate also shows that a two-fold increase in 
the capital-labour ratio is associated with about 0.35 percentage point increase 
in the income per worker growth rate. The indirect marginal effects appear to 
contribute about 28.74% to this total marginal effect. The inferred marginal 
product of capital from the total marginal effects is about 0.495, which is still 
approximately the same as that inferred from estimation A in Table E - 1.4.3 
above. While the total marginal effects coefficient associated with the human 
capital index shows that an increase in the human capital index by 10% is 
associated with about 0.0544 percentage point increase in the income per labour 
growth rate, other covariates held constant. The ratio of the indirect marginal 
effects to total accrual effects from neighbouring networks is about 27.29%.  
Taking a look at the entire set of results, from both Table E - 1.4.3 and Table 
F - 1.4.4, we find that the ethnic based spatial model specifications appear to 
                                         
35 This is not to say that this ratio applies to the convergence rate itself, as both terms are not deduced using 
the same formulas. 
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have evidence of stronger global spatial correlations in the income per labour 
growth rate. This is not surprising, as ethnic groups tend to be a more stable 
localised medium of identifying groups within country boundaries. As earlier 
highlighted in section 1.4.1 above, ethnic groups identify themselves mostly 
ancestrally and by homelands giving them a sense of locality, territoriality and 
stability. As a result, they would make for deeper but fewer spatial links between 
spatial units (in this case: countries) compared to languages, which would make 
for more but shallower connections between country units. This is why even after 
using an alternative double-criteria approach (cultural and contiguity – 
estimations 2, 4, 6 and 8, 10, 12), we find that the latter (the ethnic groups 
subclass) appears consistently statistically significant with respect to the spatial 
components compared to the languages subclass. We also find that the ethnic 
groups subclass of estimations provide the best model-set with the AIC (Akaike 
Information Criteria) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) generally having 
lower information criteria coefficients in comparison to both the languages 
subclass and the base models. 
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Table F – 1.4.4: Economic Growth augmented to show the Estimations with the Ethnic-
type Spatial Agglomeration process 
 
  
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WE1/Wi2 WE1_Wc/Wi2 WE2/Wi2 WE2_Wc/Wi2 WE3/Wi2 WE3_Wc/Wi2
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.5000*** -0.5611*** -0.5185*** -0.5619*** -0.5087*** -0.5549***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.2431*** 0.2802*** 0.2610*** 0.2835*** 0.2554*** 0.2769***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.3913** 0.4663*** 0.4234** 0.4691*** 0.3763** 0.4599***
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.5083*** -0.5664*** -0.5258*** -0.5665*** -0.5181*** -0.5614***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.2502*** 0.2866*** 0.2681*** 0.2898*** 0.2635*** 0.2841***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.3961** 0.4699*** 0.4278*** 0.4721*** 0.3816** 0.4644***
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.2012*** -0.0823*** -0.1314*** -0.0639** -0.2536*** -0.0891***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.1009** 0.0421** 0.0682*** 0.0336* 0.1320** 0.0457** 
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.1479** 0.0655** 0.1021*** 0.0494* 0.1743** 0.0704** 
Lag Log of GDP per 
Labour
-0.7096*** -0.6487*** -0.6573*** -0.6304*** -0.7717*** -0.6505***
Log of Capital-
Labour ratio
0.3511*** 0.3287*** 0.3362*** 0.3233*** 0.3954*** 0.3297***
Log of Human 
Capital Index
0.5440*** 0.5354*** 0.5300*** 0.5216*** 0.5559** 0.5348***
rho (Coefficient on 
the spatial lagged 
dependent)
0.5785*** 0.2428*** 0.4945*** 0.2159** 0.5912*** 0.3362***
rho_2 (Coefficient on 
the spatial lagged 
residual)
0.0407 0.3105* 0.0863 0.3527** 0.066 0.3051*  
Average Fixed Effects
1.855 1.981 1.816 1.951 1.817 1.96
No. of Time Intervals 6 6 6 6 6 6
No. of Countries 122 122 122 122 122 122
Total No. of Obs. 732 732 732 732 732 732
Model Degree of 
Freedom 125 125 125 125 125 125
No. of Ancillary 
Parameters 3 3 3 3 3 3
Within R-Square 0.401866 0.4577431 0.431393 0.462198 0.3948877 0.4558194
AIC -1806.558 -1737.474 -1787.063 -1732.612 -1801.512 -1741.87
BIC -1737.621 -1668.537 -1718.126 -1663.675 -1732.575 -1672.934
standard deviation of 
idiosyncratic errors
0.0056*** 0.0062*** 0.0058*** 0.0062*** 0.0057*** 0.0062***
The dependent variale for all the regressions is the Growth rate of GDP per Labour; ***stands for  p<0.001; **stands for 
p<0.05; *stands for  p<0.10; Please take note that the composite weights on the even-numbered estimations above 
(estimations 8, 10, and 12)  have already been defined in Section 3.2.2 of this thesis chapter, while the odd-numbered 
estimations (7, 9 and 11) represents the uninteracted weights; Also the first of the spatial weights (Wc - queen 
contiguity; or WL - language networks) represents the one used to lag the dependent variable, while the latter following 
the backslash ( / ) represents the squared inverse-distance spatial weight used to lag the error process (Wi2) 
Some 
Statistics
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1.4.3 – General Implications of the Findings 
This paper arrives at a number of estimations following the presentation 
tradition of the mainstream applied spatial econometrics literature, which 
normally compare results from differing (or contending) spatial weighting schemes 
(see Leenders, 2002). As a result, a general summary of the findings highlighting 
some relevant implications as deducible with respect to the methodology adopted 
herein. The relevance of operationalizing spatial agglomeration into present-day 
growth modelling cannot be overstated. Not only do spatially augmented models 
provide the statistical benefit of handling methodological bottlenecks such as 
omitted variable bias (arising from desirable but difficult to measure clustering 
phenomena), model misspecification, and etc. They also provide growth models 
with avenues for approximating and observing the nature of spatial connectivity 
between countries in an ever-increasing globally connected world economy. 
Firstly, we generally find that the more spatial units per spatial network, on 
the average and all things being equal, the more substantial (in magnitude) the 
indirect marginal effects or spatial spillovers would be. This is especially useful 
for understanding the nature of the spatial distribution of growth in a world 
economy with increasing avenues for significant interaction between countries. 
Specifically, it can be observed that when the extent of spatial agglomeration is 
minimal as demonstrated using the queen contiguity matrix, the total marginal 
effect of the capital accumulation variables (physical and human) are relatively 
smaller compared to when the extent of spatial agglomeration is more, as defined 
using our cultural network design. The reason why geography and cultural 
elements may provide statistically significant measures for defining global spatial 
inter-country connectivity might be because they both underlie many other 
conventional means via which countries interrelate in the world today. Whether 
these range from macro-level politico-economic interrelationships and 
associations to micro-level private ideological mediums of interconnections, we 
find that they can be traced back to basic connections based on geographical 
proximities, cultural similarities or a combination (or interaction) of both. This is 
particularly crucial even as the global connections between countries in a 21st 
century are non-decreasing in intensity with recent leaps in technological 
advancements and the continued integration of global policy making (and 
implementation) processes. Countries today seem ever closer and the concept of 
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global space is geometrically shrinking even though the geographical metric of 
distance itself has actually remained unchanged. An alternative way of conceiving 
these spatial connections especially those based on our culturally defined metrics 
is to consider the estimated (rho) coefficients as varying degrees of fundamental 
similarities (although, not structurally identified). Considering them this way puts 
into perspective the argument that these countries, stemming from differing 
geopolitical institutions, may not necessarily be in direct interaction. However, 
they may represent an estimation of the measure of institutional (or structural) 
coordination. This form of interpretation can be duly extended to the concept of 
geographic nearness at the national level. These cultural and geographic spatial 
metrics are by their very nature institutionally defined and recognisable – as a 
result the statistically significant spatial cluster coefficients shown by the 
respective rhos could be capturing global coordination effects at the cross-county 
level. Interacting these rhos with the relevant right-hand side coefficients to 
obtain the indirect effects helps one understand the extent and direction of the 
corresponding coordination effects with respect to the type, form, or dimension 
of spatial interaction being captured. From the results reported above, it can be 
observed that the spatial patterns in the economic growth process explained by 
the geographical spatial weights are quite different from the variations in the 
growth process explained by the culturally defined spatial weights. This is 
deducible by considering the estimation results from the geography-culture 
interacted spatial weight models (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12). We find that the spatial 
effects from both the spatial rho coefficient and the indirect marginal effects 
tend to decline in both magnitude and statistical significance when these 
interacted spatial weight specifications are adopted. If it were the case that they 
were explaining similar dimensions of variations in the economic growth rate 
variable, then we would expect reinforcing effects, where the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the spatial rho coefficient and the indirect marginal 
effects were increasing. Our results indicate that countries appear more similar 
from a cultural level through the spatial distributive patterns of ethnic groupings 
and languages than they are via patterns of geographic clusters, as shown by the 
size of the spatial rho coefficients. 
Secondly, the relevance of the indirect marginal effects in contribution to the 
estimated total marginal effects for the proximate growth factors (human capital, 
physical capital, and growth convergence) tends to range roughly between about 
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20% to as much as 30%. This suggests that even when the global cross-sectional 
interconnections between countries are not as strong, there remains about a fifth 
of the growth process accruing from the summation of global indirect spatial 
synergic effects. This is why ignoring this potential or possibility for inter-country 
connections in a panel growth analysis could not only lead to substantial 
misspecification and bias, but the consequent results might equally be misleading 
(both to policy and observing analysts) as it would likely under-inform the factors 
driving the process of economic growth. 
Thirdly and closely concerned with the preceding paragraph, a framework 
ignoring such increasing country level interconnections would fail to fully 
understand why poor countries get poorer while the richer ones get even richer. 
It is most likely the case that relatively richer countries in specific spatial 
networks on the average internalize a lot more returns to their productive 
resources (such as human capital and physical capital) compared to their relatively 
poorer counterparts. These relatively richer countries also have the enabling 
economic environment that attracts global productive resources thus taking 
advantage of the increased access to resources warranted by an increasingly open 
and interconnected global economic frontier. This is irrespective of the position 
that countries might in fact remain separate geographic entities and their 
corresponding political administrations may have distinctly composed institutional 
fabrications. Such an open and expansive global economic landscape relatively 
favours more advanced economies compared to the less developed ones. As a 
result the convergence phenomenon does not guarantee that poorer economies 
will catch up to the richer ones as these richer economies are better placed to 
galvanise competitive productive resources away from these developing countries 
to theirs. 
Fourthly, it is interesting to see how the points raised so far affect the potential 
of poorer countries to adjust to their respective steady state income levels as 
embedded in the conditional convergence hypothesis? Although the model 
estimated herein has not included an average network income level to which each 
country is adjusting towards. There remains a convergence adjustment pressure 
at an inter-country level, which may cause countries to adjust much faster than 
they would have in a hypothetically closed economic setup.  Hence, it comes as 
no surprise that the degree of cross-sectional connectedness is directly 
proportional to the size and sometimes-evident steady state over-adjustments 
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that countries face especially in the presence of current increasing globalization 
trends. This implies that increasing globalization has an un-ignorable part to play 
in explaining why countries in general take a considerably longer time to recover 
from global shocks to their economic performances. 
Fifthly, the debate on diverging rates of convergence compared to what is 
theoretically hypothesized by the traditional Solow model remains an empirical 
quandary36. Although the rates obtained herein are on the average faster than 
those observed in the theoretical and cross-sectional literature (a rate of 2% - see 
Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1991; MRW, 1992), they are however comparably slower 
than those often found in the panel growth literature that record faster 
convergence rates of up to 20% (see Islam, 1995; de la Fuente, 2002, for instance). 
On the average, the results herein point to a total convergence rate ranging 
between approximately 0.04 and 0.09 (4% to 9%). These rates seem within the 
range of those obtained in Islam (1995) who also finds convergence rates 
approximately between 4% and 11% for a panel re-estimation of MRW’s (1992) 
study; and Badinger et al (2004) who find a rate of 7% (0.07) for a panel of a 196 
EU regions. From the convergence coefficients we also inferred that although 
conditional convergence is statistically significant to economic growth, its effect 
could be traced to a combination of own-country and inter-country network 
convergence components. 
 
1.4.4 – Concluding Remarks 
To recap, the results from this study provide indications that the marginal 
contributions of physical and human capital may be underestimated at the global 
level or overestimated at the own-country level when spatial dependence or other 
forms of spatial interactions are not accounted for beyond mere country-specific 
effects. We find that the global integrative contributions to both physical and 
human capital are corroboratory to the direct own-country effects of these growth 
factors. Notwithstanding, there are some concerns that because richer countries 
are more likely enabled to accumulate capital and other key productive resources, 
they may quite easily crowd-out these essential productive resources by 
competitively implementing favourable growth enhancing policies geared at 
                                         
36 See Quah, 1996a, for some related technical discussions on the subject. 
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attracting such resources away from relatively poorer source-countries. The 
implication of this for a globally relevant resource such as human capital may be 
undervalued and under-discussed especially when spatial connectivity is not 
adequately controlled for. Our findings also point to statistically substantial 
spatially integrative effects with respect to the level of human capital. It is quite 
a profound growth factor (depending on the extent of inter-country connectivity) 
and may explain why development recovery remains a challenge for protractedly 
backward economies such as those in the Sub-Saharan African region. 
As a whole, this study has also been able to extend the applied spatial growth 
literature by considering alternative forms and measures of spatial agglomeration 
that are consistent with the increasing degree of inter-country integration 
oftentimes relegated to the globalization and trade discourses. Although focused 
on a cultural dimension, we find that global spatial diffusion patterns of ethnic 
groups and languages provide statistically significant explanations for why growth 
divergences may continue to persist between the developed and developing 
economies of the world. 
 
1.4.5 – Some Weaknesses 
There are a number of weaknesses in this research but two main empirical 
weaknesses are worth mentioning, as addressing them would certainly improve 
the quality of a research as ours. 
Firstly, the paper does not explicitly address the issue of reverse causality. As 
a standard empirical economic growth concern, productive capital (physical and 
human) resources have the potential to affect and be affected by the level or 
scale of economic activity (see the King & Levine, 1994 ‘Capital fundamentalism’ 
critique). As a consequence, we cannot conclude that the results obtained and 
discussed herein are causal. However, as earlier highlighted in the Introduction 
section of this chapter, this exercise is mostly illustrative (or exploratory). We are 
mostly seeking to assess (from a systemic approach) the spatial patterns of growth 
from a perspective of increasing cultural globalization or country level 
interconnections. In such a globally integrated framework, the spatial 
econometric methodology is quite relevant at it would reduce the rather likely 
omitted variable problem inherent in non-spatially adjusted models (see Pace & 
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LeSage, 2010). Thus it is contextually an improvement to a standard non-spatially 
adjusted linear model.  
One way to address the causality issue in this context, would be to explore 
possible pathways via which the cultural dynamics exploited in the cultural spatial 
networks adopted herein could sensibly affect economic activity directly and 
indirectly through the endogenous proximate growth determiners. A plausible 
conduit, could be through global policy interactions or global policy sharing, global 
migration flows and trade at the macro level or through specific FDI channels in a 
firm-level type study. A major source of challenge in exploring this angle would 
be trying to obtain such data especially for developing countries (such as in the 
Sub-Sahara African – SSA – region) where data paucity is a major concern. Equally 
obvious and difficult, would be the challenge of measuring policy type variables 
which are not readily available for quantitative-style analysis. Pairing countries 
based on similarity in policy orientation and implementation would resultantly be 
subjective. This could pose even further challenges given that policy phenomena 
are not that temporally (time) varying, as well; thus calling to question its 
functional relevance in an analytical panel (country-time) framework. An 
alternative proposal could be to motivate and write an estimation routine for a 
spatial system GMM model that can provide coefficients for all three spatial 
effects desired in this chapter herein (direct, indirect and total effects). Such a 
model would be able to harness the temporal and spatial moment conditions 
inherent in spatio-temporal frameworks that can efficiently tackle endogeneity 
while still providing the kind of results sought after in our work herein. It would 
essentially be a methodological spatial adaptation of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond estimator (see Kukenova & Neuchatel, 2008, for some technical notes on 
current advancements on a very similar subject matter). 
Secondly, providing a framework for assessing and controlling for the pattern 
of global spatial clustering does not necessarily provide any particular information 
on the actual path through which statistically significant spatial patterns translate 
unto or help identify underlying (fundamental) factors of the global growth 
process. In essence, it would be more desirable to have a more structurally 
specified framework that can help to identify paths or mechanisms explaining the 
actual link between estimated global spatial cluster patterns and the patterns of 
economic growth itself. However, because the focus of our study rests mostly on 
attempting to identify global shares of the proximate growth factors while 
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controlling for spatial global integration. It was not necessarily aimed at 
attempting to identity these spatial connections with growth via fundamental 
growth factors such as institutional mechanisms and quality. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1.1 – Definition of Regression Variables 
 
Table G – Appendix-Table 1.1: Definition of Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
 
 
Appendix 1.2 – List of Countries Contained in the Analyses’ 
Sample 
Sample of Countries Involved in this Chapter's Analyses 
Albania El Salvador Lithuania Slovenia 
Argentina Estonia Malawi South Africa 
Armenia Fiji Malaysia Spain 
Australia Finland Mali Sri Lanka 
Austria France Mauritania Sudan 
Bahrain Gabon Mauritius Swaziland 
Bangladesh Gambia, The Mexico Sweden 
Belgium Germany Moldova Switzerland 
Benin Ghana Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic 
Bolivia Greece Morocco Taiwan 
Botswana Guatemala Mozambique Tajikistan 
Brazil Honduras Namibia Tanzania 
Bulgaria Hungary Nepal Thailand 
Burundi India Netherlands Togo 
Cambodia Indonesia New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Cameroon Iran, Islamic Rep. Niger Tunisia 
Canada Iraq Norway Turkey 
Central African Republic Ireland Pakistan Uganda 
Chile Israel Panama Ukraine 
China Italy Paraguay United Kingdom 
Colombia Jamaica Peru United States 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Japan Philippines Uruguay 
Congo, Rep. Jordan Poland Venezuela, RB 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Portugal Vietnam 
Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Romania Zambia 
Croatia Korea, Rep. Russian Federation Zimbabwe 
Cyprus Kuwait Rwanda  
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia  
Denmark Lao PDR Senegal  
Dominican Republic Latvia Sierra Leone  
Ecuador Lesotho Singapore  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Liberia Slovak Republic   
Table H – Appendix-Table 1.2: List of Countries Contained in the Regression Analyses 
Variable Units of Measure
Variable(s) Used 
from Original 
Dataset
Source
Lag of logged Income per 
capita
Log of ratio units (rgdpna)/(emp)
Penn World Table version 8.0: 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
Logged Capital per 
Labour
Log of ratio units (rkna)/(emp)
Penn World Table version 8.0: 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
Growth in Income per 
capita
Growth rate units (rgdpna)/(emp)
Penn World Table version 8.0: 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
Logged Human Capital 
Index
Log of index units 
bound above zero
hc
Penn World Table version 8.0: 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
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Appendix 1.3 – List of Ethnic Groups adopted in the Regression 
Analyses 
List of Ethnic Groups Used in Cultural Spatial Regressions 
Achuale Bechuanas Flemings Kirghis 
Muisca, Paese, 
Cofan, etc. 
Swazi 
Afghans Beja French Kisi 
Muruts and 
Kelabits 
Swedes 
Afrikaners Belarusians French Canadians Klemantans Nanaians Syria Arabs 
Akan Bemba Frisians Kohistanis Nandi Tajiks 
Alacaluf Bengalis Fulbe Koreans Nepalese Talyshes 
Albanians Bhotias Gagauz Masai Ngiri Tama 
Aleuts Biharis Georgians Mashona Norwegians 
Tamangs 
(Murmis) 
Andoa Bisaya Gere Mayorunas Nubians Tamils 
Angoni Bo and So Germans Mbum Oases Berbers Tatars 
Arabs of Yemen 
Bobangi and 
Bangala 
Gola Mende Ojibway Tats 
Arapahos Boloven Greeks Lacandons Paiconecas Tay 
Araucanians Bora Grusi Lahu Pamir Tajiks Tem 
Argentinians Bororo Guana Lao Panare Terraba 
Armenians Bosnians Guarañoco                                          Latvians Panjabis Teso 
Aromani Brahui 
Guayupe and 
Marawa 
Lenca Papago 
Thai (incl. 
Thai Nea, 
Thai Pho) 
Ashluslay, Choroti, 
Mataco, Maca 
Estonians Gurma Libya Arabs Sudan Arabs Toba 
Assyrians 
Evenks (incl. 
Hamnigans) 
Hani Limbus Sui Togo tribes 
Athapaskans Ewe Hausa Lithuanians Sulu-Samal Tojolabali 
Austrians Fang 
Hindi-speaking 
peoples of 
Northern India 
Loba Susu Tonga 
Aymara Finns Hondurans Lobi Swahili Tsimshian 
Azande Buryats Hottentots Lu Punans, Beketans Tsonga 
Azerbaijanians Busa Hui Lur Quechua Tuaregs 
Bagirmi Bushmen 
Hungarians or 
Magyars 
Ma Rajasthanis Turkmens 
Bakele Byelorussians Ibans 
Maba (incl. 
Masalit) 
Rhaetoromanians Turks 
Bakomo Caingua Iloko Macedonians Riau, Palembang Tuvinians 
Bakongo Catalans Kui Macu Romas Vankieu 
Bakonjo Cham Kulango Maka Rumanians Venezuelans 
Bakota Chamba 
Kumaonis, 
Garhwalis 
Makonde Russians Vietnamese 
Baloch Chane Kurds Makua Saami Wa 
Balozi Chileans Kyrgyz Malavi Salish Wachokwe 
Baluhya Chinese (Han) Jamaicans 
Malays of 
Malaya 
Sea Nomads or 
Sea Gipsies 
(Orang-Laut) 
Wadjagga 
Balunda Chuang Japanese Mame Sedang Wafipa 
Banda Chuj Jarai Mandingo Semangs Wai 
Baniwe Circassians Jews Maniteneris Senufo Wakinga 
Bantu-speaking 
Pygmy tribes 
Cocamas Jhats, Awans Mano Serbs Wanyika 
Brazilians 
Coreguaje, 
Sioni, etc. 
Joluo Pase Sere-Mundu Wayao 
Bribri Croats 
Jordan and 
Palestine Arabs 
Pedi Siamese Wayeye 
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Buginese Cueretu Kajars Persians Slavs 
West Sahara 
Arabs 
Bulgarians Czechs Kanuri Pima Slovaks Wolof 
Burmese Danes Karamojo Poles Slovenes Yamana 
Banyaruanda Diola Karapapakh Mexicans 
Somba (incl. 
Berba, Bilapila) 
Yao 
Banyoro Ecuadorians Kayans Miao Songai Yaruro 
Barba 
English 
Canadians 
Kazakhs 
Mnong and 
Brao 
Soninke Yi 
Bari Englishmen Kehlao Moldovans Southern Lwo Yoruba 
Barundi Eskimos Kenyahs More (Itene) Stieng Yukuna 
Basques 
Indians of 
India and 
Pakistan 
Khasis 
Morocco 
Arabs 
US Americans Yure 
Basubia Irishmen Khmers 
Moru-
Mangbetu 
Uighurs Zulus 
Basuto Iroquois Khmu Mossi Ukrainians  
Bateke Italians Kho Motilones Ukranians  
Bawenda Jalaltecs Kiratis Mpongwe Uzbeks   
Table I – Appendix-Table 1.3: List of Ethnic Groups used to Design one of the Cultural 
Spatial  
Source: Weidmann, Ketil & Cederman, 2010, 2010 – http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/other/greg 
 
 
Appendix 1.4 – List of Language Groups adopted in the 
Regression Analyses 
List of Languages in Cultural Spatial Regressions 
!Xóõ Chakma Herero Limburgish Okolod Talian 
A'tong Cham, Western Hindi 
Limón Creole 
English 
Olusamia Talinga-Bwisi 
Abaza Chamling 
Hmong 
Daw 
Lingala Omagua Tamajaq 
Abenaki, 
Western 
Chechen 
Hmong 
Njua 
Lisu Ombamba 
Tamajaq, 
Tawallammat 
Abron Chichewa 
Huitoto, 
Murui 
Livvi Oneida 
Tamang, 
Eastern 
Achuar-Shiwiar Chicomuceltec Hung Livvi-Karelian Onondaga Tamil 
Adangbe Chidigo Hungarian Logooli 
Orang 
Seletar 
Tanana, Upper 
Adele Chin, Bawm Hupdë Lomavren Ottawa Tapieté 
Adi Chin, Khumi Hutterisch Lombard Pa Di Tariana 
Adyghe Chinese, Hakka Iban Lozi Pa-Hng Tat, Muslim 
Afrikaans 
Chinese, 
Mandarin 
Idu-Mishmi Lugbara Pacoh Tatar 
Afro-Seminole 
Creole 
Chinese, Min 
Bei 
Ifè Lukpa 
Palaung, 
Pale 
Tausug 
Aguna 
Chinese, Min 
Dong 
Ikposo Lulogooli 
Palaung, 
Ruching 
Tectitec 
Aheu 
Chinese, Min 
Nan 
Ili Turki Lumbu Pana Teke, Eboo 
Aja 
Chinese, Pu-
Xian 
Indian Sign 
Language 
Lun Bawang 
Panamanian 
Creole 
English 
Teke, Ibali 
Aka Chinese, Yue 
Indo-
Portuguese 
Lunda Pangasinan Teke-Eboo 
Akateko Chinook Wawa Ingarikó Luo Pangkhua Teke-Ibali 
Akawaio Chiquitano Ingush Luoba, Boga'er 
Panjabi, 
Eastern 
Teke-Tege 
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Akeu Chiripá 
Inuktitut, 
North 
Alaskan 
Luoba, Yidu 
Panjabi, 
Western 
Tektiteko 
Akha Chokwe 
Inupiatun, 
North 
Alaskan 
Luxembourgeois Pankhu Telugu 
Akposo 
Chorote, 
Iyo'wujwa 
Iranun Lyngngam 
Pashto, 
Southern 
Tem 
Albanian, Gheg Chuj Irish Lü Patamona Teribe 
Albanian, Tosk Chut Italian Maasai Pemon Teso 
Alemannic 
Cocama-
Cocamilla 
Itene Macedonian 
Persian, 
Iranian 
Thai 
Aleut Cocopa Iu Mien Machinere Phu Thai Thai, Northern 
Alsatian Cofán Jadgali Macuna Phuan Thangmi 
Alur Corsican Jakalteko Macushi Phukha 
Tharu, 
Chitwania 
Amahuaca Cree, Plains Jalunga Madura Phula 
Tharu, 
Dangaura 
Amba Crimean Tatar 
Jamaican 
Creole 
English 
Magar, Eastern Phunoi 
Tharu, 
Kathariya 
American Sign 
Language 
Croatian Japanese Maithili Phuthi Tharu, Kochila 
Angika Cubeo Jarai Majhi Piapoco Tharu, Rana 
Angloromani Cuiba Javanese 
Makhuwa-
Meetto 
Piaroa Thulung 
Anii Culina Jeh Makonde Picard Tibetan 
Anufo Curripaco Jehai Makwe 
Pidgin 
Bantu 
Tibetan, 
Central 
Anyin Czech Jola-Fonyi Mal Piratapuyo Ticuna 
Arabic, Eastern 
Egyptian 
Bedawi Spoken 
Dakota 
Judeo-
Italian 
Malay 
Pitcairn-
Norfolk 
Tidong 
Arabic, Gulf 
Spoken 
Dan Judeo-Tat Malay, Baba Plautdietsch Tinani 
Arabic, Hasanya Danish Jula 
Malay, Cocos 
Islands 
Playero Tlingit 
Arabic, 
Hassaniyya 
Darang Deng Ju'hoan Malay, Kedah Pnar To 
Arabic, Judeo-
Iraqi 
Daur Kabardian Malay, Satun Pol Toba 
Arabic, Judeo-
Moroccan 
Deg Kabiyè Malay, Standard Polish Toba Qom 
Arabic, Judeo-
Tunisian 
Delo Kachchi Malayalam Pomo Tonga 
Arabic, 
Levantine 
Bedawi Spoken 
Desano Kaduo 
Malecite-
Passamaquoddy 
Pontic Totela 
Arabic, Libyan 
Spoken 
Dhatki Kako Maleng Portuguese Tsaangi 
Arabic, 
Mesopotamian 
Spoken 
Dhimal Kakwa Mam Potawatomi Tshangla 
Arabic, Najdi 
Spoken 
Dholuo Kalanga Mambwe-Lungu Prai Tsimshian 
Arabic, North 
Mesopotamian 
Spoken 
Digaro-Mishmi 
Kalmyk-
Oirat 
Mandaic Puinave Tsoa 
Arabic, Omani 
Spoken 
Digo Kamta Mandinka Pulaar Tsonga 
Arabic, Shuwa Diriku Kang Mandjak Pular Tswa 
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Arabic, South 
Levantine 
Spoken 
Ditammari 
Kanjobal, 
Western 
Mang Punu Tswana 
Arabic, 
Standard 
Domari 
Kanuri, 
Central 
Maninkakan, 
Eastern 
Puoc Tucano 
Arabic, Western 
Egyptian 
Bedawi Spoken 
Dotyali Kaonde 
Maninkakan, 
Western 
Purepecha Tumbuka 
Arem Duano Karaim Manjui Pökoot 
Tunebo, 
Central 
Armenian Dungan Karapanã Manyika Q'eqchi' Turkish 
Aromanian Duoluo Kare Mapudungun Qabiao Turkmen 
Arpitan Dutch Karelian Mapun 
Quechua, 
Napo 
Lowland 
Turoyo 
Arutani Dzhidi Karon Maquiritari 
Quechua, 
South 
Bolivian 
Tuscarora 
Ashéninka, 
Ucayali-Yurúa 
Ekegusii Kashinawa Maraba 
Quichua, 
Napo 
Lowland 
Tuva 
Assiniboine 
Emberá, 
Northern 
Kashmiri Marma 
Quichua, 
Northern 
Pastaza 
Tuyuca 
Assyrian Neo-
Aramaic 
Emberá-Catío Kazakh Marwari Rangpuri Ukrainian 
Asturian English Kekchí Mashi Riang Uma' Lasan 
Aushi Epena Kelabit Matsés 
Romani, 
Balkan 
Urdu 
Avadhi Erromintxela Kendayan Mbama 
Romani, 
Baltic 
Uyghur 
Awa-Cuaiquer Erzya Kensiu Mbandja 
Romani, 
Carpathian 
Uzbek, 
Northern 
Awadhi Ese Ejja 
Kenyah, 
Mainstream 
Mbangwe 
Romani, 
Kalo 
Finnish 
Vai 
Aymara, Central 
Estonian, 
Standard 
Kenyah, 
Wahau 
Mbere 
Romani, 
Sinte 
Venda 
Ayoreo Evenki Khakas Mbukushu 
Romani, 
Vlax 
Venetian 
Azerbaijani, 
North 
Extremaduran Khaling Mbum Romanian Vietnamese 
Azerbaijani, 
South 
Fang Kharia Meche Ronga Vili 
Bagheli Finnish Khasi Meitei Russian Vlaams 
Bagri 
Finnish, 
Tornedalen 
Khmer, 
Central 
Mende 
Russian 
Sign 
Language 
Wa, Parauk 
Baka Flemish Khmu Michif Rusyn Waimaha 
Bakati', Rara Fon Khowar Micmac Rwanda Wajiara 
Balkan Gagauz 
Turkish 
French Khua Miju-Mishmi Sa'ban Wakhi 
Balochi, Eastern 
Fulfulde, 
Adamawa 
Khuen Miranha Saami, Lule Walser 
Balochi, 
Southern 
Fulfulde, Borgu Khwe Miyobe 
Saami, 
North 
War-Jaintia 
Balochi, 
Western 
Fulfulde, 
Gorgal 
Khün Mizo Saami, Pite Wayuu 
Balti 
Fulfulde, 
Maasina 
Kickapoo Mlabri 
Saami, 
Skolt 
Welsh 
Bamanankan 
Fulfulde, 
Western Niger 
Kim Mun Mnong, Central 
Saami, 
South 
Wichí Lhamtés 
Nocten 
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Bambara Fumbira Kintaq Mohawk Saamia Wolio 
Banda, Mid-
Southern 
Furu Kisan Molbog Sadri Wolof 
Banda, South 
Central 
Gagauz 
Kisi, 
Southern 
Moldovan Saek Woun Meu 
Banda, Togbo-
Vara 
Galibi Kiswahili Monba, Cuona Salako Wumbvu 
Bandial Galician Klao 
Mongolian, 
Halh 
Salang Wyandot 
Bangandu Garifuna Koch 
Mongolian, 
Peripheral 
Salish, 
Straits 
Xaasongaxango 
Bangi Garo Koda Monpa, Tawang 
Sama, 
Balangingih 
Xasonga 
Baniwa 
Gascon, 
Aranese 
Kok Borok Monzombo 
Sama, 
Southern 
Xhosa 
Banjar Gbanziri Kokola Mpiemo Samtao Yaka 
Bantawa Gbaya Koli, Kachi Mpyemo Sangir Yakan 
Barranquian 
Gbaya, 
Northwest 
Koli, 
Wadiyara 
Mru Sango Yakkha 
Baré Gbe, Maxi 
Konkani, 
Goan 
Mugom Sansi Yakoma 
Barí Gbe, Waci Konkomba Mundari Sanskrit Yalunka 
Bashkort 
Gbe, Western 
Xwla 
Konzo Mòoré Santhali Yaminahua 
Basque Gciriku Koongo N'ko Sanumá Yanomamö 
Bassa Gelao, Green Korean Nago, Northern 
Sauria 
Paharia 
Yao 
Bateri Gelao, Red Kota Nama Scots Yaqui 
Bavarian Gelao, White 
Krahn, 
Eastern 
Nambya Secoya Yasa 
Bedawiyet Geman Deng 
Krahn, 
Western 
Nanai 
Selungai 
Murut 
Yeyi 
Bekwel Gen 
Krumen, 
Tepo 
Naro 
Sembakung 
Murut 
Yiddish, 
Eastern 
Belarusan Georgian Kucong Nawdm Serahule Yombe 
Bemba 
German, 
Hutterite 
Kuhane Ndali Seraiki Yoy 
Bembe 
German, 
Pennsylvania 
Kulango, 
Bondoukou 
Ndasa Serbian Yukpa 
Bengali 
German, 
Standard 
Kulango, 
Bouna 
Ndau Serer-Sine Yulu 
Bhojpuri German, Swiss Kulina Ndebele Shan 
Yupik, Central 
Siberian 
Bidayuh, Biatah Giáy Kulung Ndo Sharanahua Yámana 
Bidayuh, Bukar-
Sadong 
Glio-Oubi Kumiai Ndrulo Sherpa Zakhring 
Bihari Gobu Kumyk Nengatu Shina Zande 
Birifor, 
Southern 
Gola 
Kuna, 
Border 
Nepali Shona Zarma 
Birwa Gourmanchéma Kunda Newar Sila Zarmaci 
Bisa 
Grebo, 
Southern 
Kurdish, 
Central 
Ngangam 
Silesian, 
Lower 
Zezuru 
Bishnupriya Greek 
Kurdish, 
Northern 
Ngbaka Sindhi Zhuang, Dai 
Bissa Groma 
Kurdish, 
Southern 
Ngbaka Ma'bo Sinhala Zhuang, Yang 
Bisu Guahibo Kuria Ngom 
Sinicized 
Miao 
Zhuang, 
Yongnan 
Bit Guanano Kurux Ngoni Siona 
Zhuang, 
Zuojiang 
Blackfoot Guaraní, Ava Kutenai Ngäbere Siriano Zulu 
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Blang 
Guaraní, 
Eastern 
Bolivian 
Kuy Nhengatu Slavic Éwé 
Bobangi Guaraní, Mbyá Kyerung Ninam Slovak Ñandeva 
Bodo 
Guaraní, 
Western 
Argentine 
Kyirong Nivaclé Slovene ‡Kx'au'ein 
Bomwali Guarayo Kyrgyz Njebi Soninke  
Bora Guarequena Lachi Njyem 
Sotho, 
Southern  
Borôro Gubu Ladakhi Nobiin Spanish  
Bouyei Gujarati Ladino Nonuya 
Stieng, 
Bulo  
Brahui Gujari Lahu Nsenga Sui  
Brao Gula Lahu Shi Ntcham Swahili  
Bru, Eastern Gurani Lakota Nubi 
Swahili, 
Congo  
Bugis 
Gurung, 
Western 
Lala-Bisa Nung Swati 
 
Bukitan Gusii Lama 
Nyakyusa-
Ngonde 
Swedish 
 
Bulgarian Gwich'in Lamba Nyamwanga Sylheti  
Buraka Hagei Lambya Nyanja Sáliba  
Buxinhua 
Haida, 
Northern 
Lamet Nyiha 
Sénoufo, 
Shempire  
Bwile Hajong Langbashe Nyiha, Tanzania Sô  
Bwisi Halang Lao Nyika 
Ta'oih, 
Upper  
Byangsi Halang Doan Lapcha Nzakara Taabwa  
Caló Halkomelem Lave Nzema 
Tagal 
Murut  
Carapana Han Lendu O'du Tai Daeng  
Carib Hani Lepcha Ocaina Tai Dam  
Cashinahua Hassaniyya Lhomi Occitan Tai Dón  
Catalán Hausa Ligbi Oirat Tai Nüa  
Cayuga Hawrami Ligurian Okanagan Tai Ya  
Ch'orti' Hazaragi Limbu Okiek Tajiki   
Table J – Appendix-Table 1.4: List of Language Groups used to Design one of the 
Cultural Spatial Weights 
Source: Lewis et al, 2014 – http://www.ethnologue.com/17/ 
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Chapter Two: 
Institutions and Economic Development in Africa: 
A History-Guided Nexus 
Chapter Abstract 
In this chapter we attempt to evaluate the impact of national institutional quality on economic 
development in Africa at the subnational level. We assess this age-old research question by 
adopting a dual-pronged research design motivated by two very influential studies from the 
literature by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (M&P, 2014) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(AJR, 2001). Firstly, by considering the variations in national institutional development explained 
by key historical exposures to particular aspects of European influences on the African continent, 
crucial links between past European contact and institutional development are unearthed and or 
reinforced. Secondly, we proceed to attempt to reveal how these history-predicted measures of 
institutional development help us understand current cross-sectional differences in economic 
development on the African continent at the ethnic homeland echelons. 
We adopt an alternative measure of subnational economic development to the recently 
popularised nighttime lights density measure using the spatial distribution of the access roads 
networks available in each subnational region. Our findings suggest that the nature of European 
contact experienced by most African countries and their corresponding ethnic homelands provide 
some insight into the varying patterns of national institutional quality. It is further revealed that 
these history-treated measures of institutional development obtained herein, in some cases 
provide statistically significant treatments for economic development in these African territories. 
Particularly, we find that when the access roads proxy is adopted the institutional quality at the 
national level is statistically relevant for economic development at the subnational level while 
when the nighttime lights measure is adopted national institutions appear statistically irrelevant. 
These findings are not only in agreement with M&P’s, 2014 key finding using the nighttime lights 
density proxy, but also corroborate most of the country level studies that attempt to highlight the 
importance of national institutional quality for economic development such as AJR, 2001 using the 
alternative access roads proxy. 
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Section 2.1 – Introduction 
Diagnostically alluding to history and the intuitive use of geographical 
attributes, have become rather commonplace in attempts at understanding the 
fundamental sources of the protracted income divides across countries. Although 
their relevance appears unanimously agreed on (Nunn, 2009), the manner and 
empirical approach in which both these fundamentals are employed in the growth 
literature remains the point of departure and a lucrative avenue for insightful 
research contributions. 
The African context provides an interesting regional (continental) case study in 
the research for understanding persisting underdevelopment for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, a significant percentage of the continent, particularly in the Sub-
Sahara African (SSA) region, is plagued with lingering unresolved political and 
socioeconomic challenges. The SSA region has one of the gloomiest figures for 
institutional quality and economic wellbeing in the global economic landscape37. 
Secondly, it is amongst the most ethnically diverse and natural resource rich 
continents in the world thus continuing to attract varied interests far and wide. 
Thirdly, the current geopolitical identities and immediate history of the countries 
within the continent are in fact still within the last two centuries compared to 
countries such as India and China whose composing geopolitical identities date 
back more than a millennia. These non-exclusive reasons position the African 
region as an ideal and relevant research focus for studying the impact of proximate 
historical, geographical and cultural (ethnic) experiences on current challenges, 
which affected and continue to affect the institutional and socioeconomic 
development of most of the countries now spanning the region. 
 
2.1.1 – Objectives 
The political demarcation of the continent at the wake of European colonisation 
provided a break from the past ethnically based geopolitical institutions that 
characterised the then indigenous societies of Africa (see Asiwaju, 1985; Herbst, 
1996). This break also gave birth to the form of modernization and ensuing 
globalization now shaping the contemporary economic and geopolitical entities 
                                         
37  See Bates & Collier, 1995; Easterly, 2001; Collier, 2007; etc. for related discussions on the subject. 
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presently referred to as nation states or countries within the region (Táíwò, 2010). 
In light of this institutional and structural evolution, this research seeks to achieve 
the following: 
- Chiefly, our research seeks to link relevant and discernible pre-colonial 
configurations characterising the bygone existing geopolitical boundaries with 
current observable differences in levels of national institutional quality. 
- The study then goes on to assess how these predicted variations in cross-national 
institutional quality, warranted by the subsequent modern geopolitical nation states, 
affect current observable measures of economic wellbeing. 
- This duo-pronged design is estimated using a two-step LIML (limited information 
maximum likelihood) instrumental variable estimator; with the sole purpose of 
reconsidering the impact of the levels of national institutional quality on subnational 
economic activity in demarcated pre-colonial ethnic states at the periphery of 
modern-defined national boundaries. 
 
2.1.2 – Scope and Contribution 
The core of the research design adopted in this thesis chapter is not novel but 
was previously harvested in a recent study by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (M&P, 
2014).  In their paper, M&P, 2014 adopt a regression discontinuity approach 
intended to exploit the exogenous demarcation of the pre-colonial ethnic 
homelands into different modern national geopolitical institutional boundaries 
recognised at the dawn of colonization in the 1800s. Their obvious but novel 
argument (M&P, 2014) being that these unsolicited splits afforded a natural 
experimental framework for investigating the exogenous connection between the 
current economic wellbeing of these pre-colonial geopolitical homelands and the 
modern national institutional quality found in the corresponding halves of their 
respective present-day countries.  
Our research in this chapter uses an ethnic homeland polygonal dataset based 
on the work of Murdock (1959) and designed in a similar fashion as M&P (2013; 
2014): with institutional quality measured at the national level and economic 
activity at the subnational tribal homelands level. The homeland polygons of 
demarcated groups are identified by exploiting dynamics available to the 
geographic intersection of the tribal homeland territories with modern national 
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boundaries, which then allows us further, examine whether variations in the 
national institutional quality of these overarching nation-states had any effect on 
the development of the earlier existing demarcated local groups. Following 
studies such as Nunn (2008), who adopt a historical narrative investigating the 
impact of pre-colonial activities (in his case, slave exports) on the modern 
economic performance of African economies, we explore a narrative that 
attempts to stitch the overall narrative underpinning these discourses together. 
These underpinning narratives recognise a common position – that current 
economic trends have significant connections or associations with history-centric 
geographic and institutional arrangements (see Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 
2001/2012, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Banerjee & Iyer, 2005, among a 
plethora of others). Such arrangements remain relevant as they characterised, 
and most likely continue to do so, the societies that have lived in their historical 
lands since the advent of significant European (or other foreign) geopolitical or 
socioeconomic influences. 
Our research however, contributes to the literature by introducing an IV 
approach to the M&P (2013, 2014) core research design. In doing so, we are able 
to suture together history-informed variations in the experiences of pre-colonial 
ethnic homelands and their relationships in different forms of European contact 
with observed modern economic and institutional improvements or their lack of. 
Thus providing a functional storyline for how such relationship history between 
the Europeans and the African tribal homelands would have filtered through to 
contemporary differences in the quality of national institutional levels as observed 
in the region today. Three main forms of European relationships are observably 
proposed and harnessed to predict current variations in national institutional 
quality, within this study. These interactional forms include, but not exclusively: 
- Missionary activities: these were targeted at institutionally affecting the cultural 
fabric of the indigenous ethnic nations’ peoples especially on issues of religion and 
biblical education 
- Economic activities: this kind of activity mostly affected the formation of economic 
based institutions on the pretexts of commerce. In the African case, it was mostly 
rapacious and extractive in nature; structures were setup to accrue resources from the 
hinterlands to the coast 
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- Colonial administrative interactions: which are known to have defined the nature of 
national boundaries as currently known and set the precedence for national 
institutional transformations especially in the political sphere 
Each of these channels (or instruments) is addressed in more detail in the 
methodology section, below, with some insightful justifications provided – 
highlighting why they are relevant in a study such as this. Probing these observed 
forms of interaction with the pre-independence Europeans provides a good 
framework for teasing-out relevant aspects of current cross-sectional variations 
in institutional levels. Particularly as these modern institutional arrangements, 
were effectively a foreign introduction into the structures and systems of the 
African indigenous geopolitical lifestyle; they were fundamentally, creations of 
these ‘prodding’ Western civilizations embodied by their European 
representatives. Additionally, significant elements of these pre-colonial ethnic 
homelands and cultures persist to this date; further providing a valid 
administrative level for conducting the research herein with respect to our 
dependent variables of interest. Being coerced into colonially defined nation 
states, understanding how the resulting national institutions affected current 
developmental levels within those demarcated pre-colonial groups provides an 
interesting research inquiry. 
 
2.1.3 – Overview of Chapter’s Remaining Sections 
The next section (section 2.2) is the Literature review, which provides a brief 
discussion of the immediate literature relevant to the methodology, motivation 
and approach adopted herein. The section following section 2.2, section 2.3, 
provides an overview of the dataset, how it was obtained and setup. Maps and 
initial summary measures of the essential variables are also provided and briefly 
discussed to demonstrate some semblance of what is to be expected. Finally in 
section 2.4, the estimation results are reported and discussed. This is immediately 
followed by a conclusion and an enumeration of key identified weaknesses and 
areas for possible extension or improvements to the study as a whole. 
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Section 2.2 – Background and Literature Review  
2.2.1 – Linking Modern Institutions with Economic Development 
in Africa 
There are a number of identifiable conduits via which institutions may have 
historically affected current economic outcomes and continue to do so for 
developing countries. For the African economies, one of these influential 
pathways is through the experience of colonization and other forms of substantial 
initial European contact. As already hinted, in the preceding section 2.1.2, 
European colonization of the African continent happens to be one of the most 
significant modern channels of institutional transformation. Colonisation left in its 
wake a near shift or replacement in the political administrative structure of pre-
existing governance territories closely following the European exploration and 
slave trading in Africa. There is a huge debate in the growth literature 
demonstrating that colonization affected economic development in Africa quite 
variedly. There are positions suggesting that not only did the colonial identity 
matter for signposting current variations in a country’s institutional quality but 
that the length of the colonial administration also exerted distinguishing 
influences; further stimulating dissimilar developmental patterns across countries 
in Africa and the wider global economic landscape (see Glaeser & Schleifer, 2002; 
La Porta et al, LLS, 2008).   
Another closely related causal conduit between institutional and economic 
development, no doubt, involves geography. This is among one of the strongest 
mechanisms often adopted in modern researches of institutional influences on 
economic development. It may certainly well be the reason why it has repeatedly 
been suggested as more important in explaining variations in economic wellbeing 
globally than any other conduit ever used in the entire chronicle of the 
Institutions-Development narrative (see Sachs, 2003). In this pro-geography 
narrative, there are two distinctly broad routes of inquest. One focuses on the 
geography of location endowments, while the other emphasizes the geography of 
natural resource endowments. It is within the theoretical premises of locational 
endowments (positional advantage) that works such as AJR (2001); Easterly & 
Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (RST, 2004), among others attempt to link 
geography with current developmental levels through their impacts on 
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institutional quality. The other line of closely related inquisition emphasizes the 
relevance of geographic channels through natural-resources’ contaminating 
influence interacted with or through institutional quality (see Mehlum et al, MMT, 
2006; Acemoglu et al, ARV. 2004; Sarmidi et al, SLJ, 2014) further deepening the 
Dutch-disease or Resource cause (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997) storyline. As a 
central pivot relating everything together, historical validations have become very 
relevant in these development discourses. As a result history tends to form the 
bedrock or analytical adhesive of most identification strategies in the inquest to 
uncover and unbundle the impacts of fundamental sources of economic 
development such as institutions. 
 
2.2.2 – Review of the Research Design and Objective 
As earlier alluded, this thesis chapter seems to string together a number of 
already highlighted bits of related literature from the economic growth discourse 
in an effort to further illuminate on the mechanisms through which national 
institutions affect subnational economic development. Although so much has 
already been done in the empirical literature towards presenting some consistency 
in the analytical endeavours associating pre-colonial societal structures and 
current economic development in the African economies, a lot more can still be 
done to identify relevant and informing channels of institutional persistence from 
the multiple administrative levels found in the region. Nunn & Puga (2012) for 
instance, argue that difficult geographic terrains provided an exogenous obstacle 
to over exploitation of human resource through the slave trade era in Africa; AJR 
(2001) argue that the link between institutional development and modern 
economic growth can be clarified by observing European residence patterns 
reliably associated with observable cross-sectional variations in the disease 
environment or death prevalence in the respective colonial territories across the 
world; Gennaioli and Rainer (2006) posit that the anthropological characteristics 
of pre-colonial ethnic groups mirroring their political institutional complexity may 
still persist today - providing some noteworthy insight into understanding patterns 
consistent with current institutional quality (especially those pertaining to 
governance); while Austin (2010) opines, quite similarly but slightly contradictory 
to the position of AJR (2001), that the settlement patterns of the colonisers were 
as informative in explaining the variations in economic development as was the 
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differing colonial administrative policy regimes spanning the African geopolitical 
territory.  
Our paper seeks to re-visit such an already vastly researched economic 
development inquiry by applying a duo-level identification strategy not previously 
adopted in a similar fashion, prior to this in the literature. We explore variations 
in commonly used measures of institutional quality from a different perspective. 
By initially instrumenting these institutional measures using incisive geographical 
and historical characteristics of ethnic lands in Africa, a deeper and 
comprehensive pre-treatment of national institutional quality is attempted. This 
eventually enables an identified estimation of the impact of national institutional 
quality on economic activity at the subnational level. Exploiting the intrinsic 
national institutional variations created by the exogenous colonial demarcation of 
ethnic groups on the continent (following M&P, 2014), permits the approach 
herein to nexus cross-sectional variations in the experiences of these demarcated 
ethnic lands, consequent to the continent’s colonial episode, with corresponding 
current country-level institutional outcomes. There is a forthright story that 
connects the developmental experiences of the pre-colonial development era with 
that of the colonial period and which in turn aligns with the modern 
developmental experiences presently observed.  
By adopting an instrumental variable (IV) approach, this research seeks to 
reconsider this story and fuse together storylines previously analysed individually. 
The key instruments we adopt depend on variations in the extent of each modern 
country’s and demarcated pre-colonial ethnic group’s exposure to particular 
dealings and aspects of European contact. The makeup of these dealings defined 
the Europeans’ initial and subsequent encounters with the pre-modern ethnic 
administrative societies existing at the time and those that would later persist. 
The historical and analytical narrative is that certain types of exposures ought to 
have positively primed the ensuing post-colonial administrative countries of the 
African continent towards better or improved modern institutional outcomes 
whiles others achieved the polar opposite. Very much in line with the narrative 
proposed by AJR (2001) but critiqued by Glaeser et al (GLSS, 2004), who 
hypothesise that modern institutional forms (or quality) reflect the kind of not-
so-distant historical interactions the Europeans had with their areas of geopolitical 
influences. AJR (2001), conjecture that modern institutional quality in former 
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colonies reflects the nature of colonial economic activity that was exerted on the 
respective colonial territories. That in cases where the organisations of contact 
involved lots of resource extraction (mostly in Latin America and African colonies), 
then ‘extractive institutions’ were setup; while areas where residence 
arrangements were intended or conducive (such as in Australia and New Zealand), 
the resultant institutional setup reflected those typical to practices found back in 
their countries of origin (AJR, 2001: 1374-1376). Glaeser et al (2004) argue 
however, that better institutions can often be viewed as consequential to 
economic vibrancy or improved human capital and not necessarily the treatment 
as quite ordinarily envisioned. Stringing all these positions together from the 
Institutions-Development nexus makes it apparent why attempts to understand, 
confirm or affirm the treatment links between institutional and economic 
developments are pertinent. 
 
2.2.3 – Review of the Background to the Theoretical Framework 
European encounter with the African continent over the 19th and 20th centuries 
affected and influenced the region in a plethora of significant ways. As already 
mentioned earlier, these influences channelled through structural and 
institutional dimensions of African life, touching on culture (through education 
and religion), commerce (through commerce in goods and slaves), and politics 
(through colonisation). Socio-political and economic changes were spurred and 
championed to reflect particular dimensions and interests of each channel of 
influence. A summary of this framework, inspiring our current study, is shown in 
the layout below: 
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Figure E – 2.2.1: European Contact and Modern Institutional Development 
 
Starting with the channel of cultural influences, Nunn (2010), for instance, 
points out that the location of missionaries on the African continent not only 
signposted a number favourable habitable circumstances for the European 
missionaries such as proximity to clean water sources, areas favourable to 
imported supplies from their home-countries and fertile soil for sustainable 
agriculture, etc., but that their decision to locate their missions also reflected 
areas of necessity - where for instance, slave trading was prevalent and needed 
action to stir its abolition (pp. 147-148). Nunn (2010) also finds that areas that 
received greater missionary contact are today more likely to proclaim their 
religious orientation as Christian. If this history or identification is apt, then we 
should expect to find distance to where missionary centres were sited to provide 
some relevant information consistent with current patterns of national 
institutional quality at the split ethnic homelands. Particularly because, the 
activities the missionaries advocated were reported to have initialised 
mechanisms promoting pro-developmental circumstances such as western type re-
educational endeavours, humanitarian values of equality, religious values of 
recognising written laws through pro-attitudes towards religious commandments 
and the gains from hard ‘honest’ work, etc. These mechanisms, all things being 
equal, should eventually have set the precedence for western-type ‘good’ 
institutional outcomes as observed and expected in modern developed economies 
Initial European 
Exposure (pre- and 
pro- colonialism)
•Culturally through the interconnected 
transformations of the educational and 
religious systems. Such establishments as 
earlier championed by the church provided the 
spin centres for humanitarian activism, initial 
re-educational indoctrinations and public 
philanthropies/charities
•Economically through infrastructural 
development both for exploitative purposes 
and in a few cases supported residential 
intentions of the Europeans. The exploitative 
arrangements also provided the bedrock on 
which rent seeking, the birth of corruption and 
badly behaving political elites all started and 
thrived
•Politically, mostly via colonialism
Cultural, Economic 
and Political 
channels of 
influence
Modern Institutional 
development 
(quality)
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or societies echoing this developmental era. If however the reverse is the case 
and we discover that areas farther away from such historical missions are 
institutionally better off today, this could indicate that the locals’ attitudes 
towards these Western visitors were perceived in similar guise irrespective of their 
(Europeans) operational motives and approaches. 
On the second channel of European-championed economic activities, a number 
of fairly documented pathways are apparent. But of relevance in this paper are 
those of slave trading, primary produce and natural resource extraction. Following 
the theories underpinning studies like AJR (2001) and Nunn (2008), we exploit the 
position that European influence through economic activities such as slave trading 
provided a negative shock to current economic activity through institutional 
development38. The position forwarded by this line of inquiry is that the extractive 
nature of such economic activities garnered by the Europeans in Africa, from the 
time of the slave trade era to the post-colonial period of natural resource and 
cash crops trading, created and sustained the path dependence attuned to 
exploitative relations which would later characterise most of the countries within 
the region. This path dependence was sustained by a responsive creation and 
promotion of diminutive institutional foundations which is more likely the source 
of manifestations of corruption, cross-cultural mistrust and ethnic wars, weak 
governance, among others, observed in modern African societies (see Whatley & 
Gillezeau, 2009; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011 for related research on the subject). 
Because, the African region had very limited infrastructural development at the 
advent of European arrival, it is easy to conceive that most European economic 
activity would have heavily relied on subsequent infrastructural creations such as 
the explorer (trade) routes. This provides significant premise for attempting to 
test if the national prevalence of this infrastructure negatively or positively 
affected subsequent institutional quality. Since this historical routes-network was 
in relatively scant supply, it is not inappropriate to measure it at the national 
level. Especially given that its prevalence would have had permeating influences 
nesting a number of ethnic homelands within its proximity. We attempt to 
measure exposure to this dimension of European activity by controlling our first-
stage model on modern average institutional quality for the number of routes 
                                         
38 For some earlier historical discussions on the subject, see Rodney (1973) and Manning (1983), for instance. 
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within the historic network that fall within the associated modern country 
territory. If this initial exploration infrastructure provides consistent explanations 
of the statistical variations in the national institutional quality of the country-split 
ethnic groups being analysed, then there is some evidence to suggest this initial 
exposure to ancillary exploitative economic activities correlates with weak 
modern institutional outcomes. 
As highlighted in an earlier paragraph, colonisation in Africa was a relatively 
more modern exogenous shock to the geopolitical landscape of the administrative 
units on the continent. As equally portrayed in our chart above, this political 
channel existed in harmony with either the cultural and economic channels or 
forms of interaction that post-dated the slave trade era. So it is a bit over-the-
top or ambitious to attempt to simultaneously, within our current framework, 
measure the impact of colonisation on institutional quality. It is even more 
tenuous to do this when you consider the fact that there were at least four major 
European colonial administrative identities in the scramble for territory in the 
African region. Also, all these European countries had their own distinct 
institutional calibrations. In this light, our model attempts to control for the 
identities of these colonial administrations as unobservable fixed-effects. In order 
to account for the unique contributions each colonial identity would have had on 
their respective colonies in their current post-colonial institutional 
establishments39. Similarly in this light, we also control for the legal origin 
following Glaeser & Shleifer (2002). We believe that both set of controls are 
sufficient to control for any colonial dynamics that may affect the other two forms 
of initial European contact within the African region. 
 
  
                                         
39 For an easy-read review on the subject matter of colonization and its impacts, see Ziltener & Künzler (2013). 
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Section 2.3 – Model Framework and Data Sources 
2.3.1 – The Model 
Inst̂ ic = γ̂1Xic + γ̂2Zic + μe       (1) 
yic = θInst̂ ic + βXic + αe + εic       (2) 
where, 
- Zic, is a vector holding the set of excluded instruments to help identify the 
endogenous variable, average institutional quality, Inst̂ ic. The list include – distance 
to the nearest historical missionary station, an indicator to capture whether a split 
ethnic homeland’s associated country had a historical European explorer/trade 
route(s) passing within its current national borders or not, an index measuring a 
country’s state history, and indicator controls to capture the identity of the associated 
country’s major European colonial power and its legal origin; 
- Xic, is a vector of control variables characteristic of the literature capturing 
exogenous geographic features and endowments including population density and 
the split tribal polygon’s homeland area; 
- ‘μe’ and ‘αe’, are ethnic-specific characteristics and are used to control for ethnic 
fixed-effects when the fixed-effects IV estimation is adopted; 
- εic, is the error process hypothesized to follow a white noise IID process. However, 
because there is a likelihood that the constant variance assumption is violated, the 
standard errors are thus adjusted for any arbitrary potential heteroscedasticity; 
- 𝒚𝒊𝒄, is the response variable of interest and it attempts to capture the level of current 
economic activity observed for each split ethnic homeland. There are two main 
proxies – the average night light density variable and the average roads length 
variable; 
- subscripts: ‘𝒊’, identifies the split ethnic polygon or historical homeland, while ‘𝒄’, 
identifies the country, and ‘𝒆’, identifies the full tribal state in its un-split form.  
We choose to run our estimations at this level of analysis for a number of 
analytically and methodologically convenient reasons. The most apparent of these 
being that it allows us control for and hence factor out any inherent pre-colonial tribal 
characteristics that are latent or unobservable but remain very relevant for explaining 
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modern growth dynamics at the tribe-to-country levels40. This is because this dataset 
is designed so that only partitioned tribal homelands are considered and as a result 
partitioned groups are clustered into the same group dynamics when dealing with 
any single tribal homeland. 
In a ‘lone’ instrumental regression framework, our research design uses the 
variables in the excluded instruments vector (𝒁𝒊𝒄) in equation (1) to identify 
exogenous split ethnic and national level variations in institutional quality. By 
convention, the first-stage equation for the potentially endogenous treatment 
variable (institutions) also includes the included instruments (𝑿𝒊𝒄), which equally 
act as additional exogenous control-variables in the second stage regression 
specification on economic development. The instrumental variable framework 
then allows us provide interpretations of causal treatment effects of institutional 
quality on our proxies of economic development at the country-split ethnic 
homeland level. One might argue that simply adopting the single equation 
framework at the demarcated ethnic level as done in the corresponding base 
specification model in M&P (2014) might suffice to provide an identified impact 
of lagged-period average national institutional quality on current tribal homeland 
economic development (see pp.165). However, we argue that such an approach is 
insufficient to guarantee an exogenous treatment of national institutions on 
subnational development. Particularly because the economic development proxy 
adopted for the subnational split ethnic homelands is the average night light 
density variable, which is more or less a measure of infrastructural development 
than it is a reflection of actual per capita income flows. Although, conventional 
measures of per capita income have been proven to correlate significantly with 
the night-lights density measure of economic activity (Henderson, Storeygard & 
Weil, 2012), it remains a relatively slower changing capture of development and 
not as flow-based as its GDP-type counterpart. Also being relevant to subnational 
development, it could also include elements, unaccounted for, innate to the cross-
sectional level that may equally be correlated with the unexplained components 
(residual) of the single equation model. These unexplained correlated variations 
might not be as manifest for an analysis at the aggregated national-level especially 
                                         
40 See Gennaioli & Rainer (2007) for an illustration of a very informative empirical work relating specific pre-
colonial characteristics with modern economic development dynamics. 
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given that single measures of both institutions and development are usually 
adopted to represent an entire country and not representative at a subnational 
administrative level.  
Quite similarly, one could argue that institutional quality by its very nature 
would dissipate at the national borders relative to the national averages. This is 
partly because the cost of maintaining national institutional integrity are much 
more costly and infeasible at the peripheries compared to areas and districts 
closer to the centre or national capitals. Since our study is focused on exploiting 
variations made feasible by these demarcated tribal homelands at the fringes of 
their respective nation state borders, we should also expect an incomplete or 
fuzzy story from attempting to directly match national institutional quality values 
to economic development at these peripheral subnational regions. Attitude based 
institutions are also in most cases slower-moving (Roland, 2004) just like 
infrastructural development measures; as a result they would not provide 
sufficient deviations from the past to deserve a valid predetermined identification 
strategy. Additionally, our level of analysis at the split ethnic homelands indicates 
by definition that these split groups share common borders. It would be likely that 
at such borders, national variations in economic wellbeing are less distinct to 
provide sufficient dissimilarities. Split ethnic homelands still share a common not-
so-distant ethnic level geopolitical and socio-cultural history. Hence they are 
bound to have very similar circumstances or verily absorb cross border advantages 
via ease of relocation. This is not an elusive idea as border controls in most African 
regions are quite limited with most of such neighbouring countries belonging to 
mutual regional economic trade unions such as the EAC, ECCAS, SADC and the 
ECOWAS41, etc. Subnational variations in economic activity would resultantly be 
driven equally by individual exposures warranting the need for an identification 
strategy that brings into perspective the unique experiences consistent at these 
split ethnic homelands level. 
Our method of institutional filtration or identification, as revealed in the 
preceding equations above, harnesses key dimensions from the literature in 
constituting its instruments set. To the best of our knowledge, these ‘excluded’ 
                                         
41 The EAC is an acronym for East African Community; the ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African 
States; the SADC: Southern African Development Community; and the ECOWAS: Economic Community 
of West African States. 
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instruments have not been engaged in a similar fashion in the literature prior to 
ours. We have done our selection in this manner to allow fundamental multilevel 
variations to be netted. Such variations as consistent with the unique halves of 
each split ethnic group and the corresponding national features specifically and 
ubiquitously characterising them. 
 
2.3.2 – About the Sort of Endogeneity Underpinning Our 
Research Design 
It is imperative to provide some discussion to shed further light on the kind of 
bias necessitating the identification strategy we have adopted herein. Inherent in 
the IV methodology are often discussed three sources of endogeneity – 
simultaneity, omitted variable bias and measurement error (see Wooldridge, 
2008:506-536). A look at the structure of the data characterising this study, 
provides an initial indication that could inform us about some inherent possible 
sources of such endogeneity. Being a multilevel design framework, it is not 
farfetched to conjecture that the patterns of bias could be consistent with a 
combination of simultaneity biases stemming mostly from the country-level and 
of measurement error accruing mostly from the subnational level. Essentially 
because, institutions observed at the national level, is being regressed on an 
income proxy measured at the subnational tribal level. These two biases usually 
operate in opposing directions causing the conventional OLS-based models to 
inadequately account for the resulting endogeneity. As a result this yields 
inconsistent and unsurprisingly misleading estimates.  
Taking a more focused view of these two biases in turns, we can conjecture 
that: 
- The first potential bias stems from the position that levels of economic activity and 
institutional quality simultaneously elicit each other. If on the average ethnic 
homelands within a country are richer, they certainly can afford better institutions 
through channels such as increased ability to enforce and monitor collective 
behaviour in line with decreasing corruption, better rule of law, and improving 
governance effectiveness. This bias is consistent with the country-level cross 
sectional studies such as AJR (2001), Rodrik et al (2004), and more recent cohorts. 
- The second potential source of endogeneity bias acknowledges that national averages 
for institutional quality may not exactly or seamlessly map to subnational levels of 
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economic activity - thus creating an avenue for a possible bias based on measurement 
error. This is very much related to the notion of the ecological fallacy in applied 
statistics. Its precise application here is more of a mapping matter: where our right-
hand-side (RHS) variable institutional quality observed at the national level might 
not exactly map unto a previously non-existent national historical experience through 
the individual experiences of the component ethnic homelands spanning that current 
country. This further provides a likely indication why our results not using 
exogenous sources of institutional variations (IV variables) consistent with the 
historic experiences of subnational ethnic homeland level have generally relatively 
smaller coefficient estimates and are sometimes statistically insignificant. The 
argument here is that given we are dealing with national institutional quality 
outcomes applied to the bordering demarcated tribal homelands, it is more useful to 
use historical data varying sufficiently at these split levels to predict or map these 
national institutional values to these split subnational areas. And this link in theory 
should be able to yield predicted measures of institutional variations distinct from 
those observable in other fringes of the associated country. 
Our discussion in favour of these two sources of endogeneity – simultaneity and 
measurement error – does not in any way exclude the possibility of the third 
channel – omitted variable bias. It is possible, as we later acknowledge in the 
weaknesses subsection of this chapter, that not being able to control for inherent 
unobservable variations at the lower political administrative levels (such as 
cultural and other non-institutional structural patterns) could pose further 
empirical challenges. 
 
2.3.3 – Exclusion Restriction Condition 
To effectively attempt to justify our selected instruments, we provide some 
arguments in this section to dispel major doubts about how our selected 
instruments measuring aspects of historical European contact could have affected 
modern economic development indirectly mostly through modern institutional 
quality within the African subnational regions. Essentially, we attempt to layout 
a narrative to validate the key untestable assumption of the IV-method that there 
should not be any systematic relationship (covariance) between the 
unobservable(s) (error process from equation 2 in the model subsection above) 
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and our selected instruments (diagrammatic portrayal is provided in Figure F - 
2.3.1 below). While there are no analytically watertight instrument(s) in most 
empirical econometric exercises, we believe that the temporal break in the sort 
of economic activities carried out in each of the contact phases between the 
African region and with the key European powers covered in this study provides a 
good platform to strengthen our narrative. The contact phases referred to include 
the initial European contact through the activities of the explorers – the 
commercial activities in slaves and essential natural resources that would 
immediately characterise this period, the missionary activities – that mostly 
initially involved the propagation of the gospel thus promoting mostly cultural 
changes, and the colonial periods – which mostly involved attempts to implant 
western type institutional and infrastructural changes so as to setup and secure 
imperialist empires to initially empower or enrich the governing imperialists’ 
home countries (also refer to chart in Figure E – 2.2.1 above). These phases 
particularly help us demonstrate that the angle and type of economic activity that 
was the product of these different historical periods were unanimously 
differentiated from the kind of economic activity characterising modern states 
within the African region now. To defend this claim, we only need to look at the 
pervasive theme behind the nationalist drive for independence which manifested 
across the region from the late 1950s. This unanimous drive reflected an outright 
rejection of the imperialist extractive status quo for a more inclusive and 
retentive regime of political governance. 
These instruments elaborated below are by no means perfect and with some 
thought it is quite easy to find weakening empirical and econometric counter-
positions. More so when the instruments involved are historical measures that can, 
in some circumstances, be found to link past variations in levels of economic 
wellbeing and institutional dynamics with their respective current levels, even 
when trivially conceived. As an example, Banerjee et al., 2012 highlight that 
access to transportation networks are endogenous to economic outcomes through 
their connection with historical cities, for instance. This can pose an empirical 
issue as Jeffery Wooldridge rightly points out that “even a small amount of 
correlation between [instrument(s)] and [unobservable(s)] can cause serious 
problems for the IV estimator” (Wooldridge, 2008: 514). We argue that although 
most historical instruments are not perfect, our chosen approach or method is 
89 
 
89 
 
made most relevant as it ties nicely with the central theme of this entire thesis – 
one of promoting a plausible narrative that attempts to knit together history, 
geography, culture and institutions. 
 
 
Figure F – 2.3.1: Diagram to Demonstrate the Indirect Link between our Selected 
Historical Euro-Contact Variables and Current Economic Activity via Modern 
Institutional Quality 
 
To proceed, we attempt to individually consider each of the excluded 
instrumental variables used to proxy for European contact and that used to proxy 
for the national state history. The principal position for the instrumental variable 
approach proposed herein is that, the variations in the exposures of both 
subnational split ethnic homelands and their respective aggregated postcolonial 
national boundaries to differing contexts, types and forms of European contact, 
can provide a unique dais for linking known (observable) historical experiences 
with the current institutional evolution and eventual quality at the national level. 
The key premise put forward by our identification schema hence, is that the 
multivariate experiences in national institutional quality filtered by these key 
proposed forms of European contact at the different administrative levels can 
provide an exogenous causal channel to economic activity at the subnational split-
ethnic level. This position is not new to the literature and can be found, for 
instance, in arguments proposed by Herbst (2000) and further engaged by M&P 
(2014). They postulate that the reason national institutional impacts may be 
Historical Variables (Instruments capturing dimensions of 
European contact in different subnational African regions 
and used in filtering exogenous variations in the 
endogenous institutional quality variables):
- nearest distance to an early missionary station
- presence of an explorer/trade route in national border
- national state history index
- indicator for the main colonial administrative identity
- indicator colonial legal history
Level of Modern Economic Activity 
(endogenous dependent variable)
Level of Modern Instutional Quality 
(endogenous explanatory variable)
Demonstrating 
no direct link 
Demonstrating a 
unidirectional link 
Demonstrating a 
bidirectional link 
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negligibly linked to subnational peripheral regions is because a number of factors 
limited the extent of pre-colonial and colonial relations with significant peoples 
and lands across the African region. However, this core theme can equally be 
harnessed to further explain why national institutions may, in fact, be relevant 
for subnational economic outcomes. Particularly given that we are able to observe 
relevant patterns and variations in key proximate historic forms of interaction 
between the institutionally impelling Europeans and the consequently impelled 
African territories. 
Starting with the distance to the early missionary stations and a national 
indicator of the presence of any historic explorer and trading routes, we are able 
to capture proximity (or exposure) of an ethnic homeland to influences of 
missionary and extractive economic activities prior to independence. Because we 
are aware of the type of activities missionaries engaged in within their areas of 
location and operation from historical accounts, we can posit that proximity to 
the cultural, re-educational, and humanitarian activities injected by the 
missionaries existing at the time provided the bedrock for the implantation and 
cultivation of early institutional forms that resembled those from the missionaries’ 
host countries. These neo-institutional installations, under normal circumstances, 
should have provided outlines compatible with modern notions of “good 
institution” as embodied by the developed countries of the post-colonial powers.  
One could argue that the location of these missionary stations were themselves 
consistent with the location of other pre-colonial footprints such as early 
infrastructural development for the movement of goods and service to promote 
the economic activity dominating this era42. As a result providing a revealed 
falsification as a valid instrument given that such pre-colonial developmental 
injections would likely have equally set the precedence for modern levels of 
economic activity having persisted to this day - thus justifying what we now 
observe as higher levels of economic activity in these subnational locations. The 
problem with this latter counter-position is that the nature and type of economic 
activity at the pre-colonial economic era was not designed to enrich the local 
African economies. Instead economic activity then as we have come to 
understand, was depletory and extractive in nature - often orchestrated to enrich 
                                         
42 See Figure G - 2.3.2 below, for a visual sense of this argument. 
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the respective home economies of the associated European governments. That 
being said there is no apparent persistence or link between this kind of economic 
activity from the pre-colonial and early-colonial era with that of the modern era. 
What we rather had was a pre-colonial era characterized by exploitative economic 
activities designed to, at best, empower a tiny faction of individuals or micro-
units within the exploited local communities to aid the promotion of slave trading 
and the other resource quarrying ventures. With these micro-unit empowerment 
schemes, it could be argued that the forms of economic activity during the pre-
colonial and early-colonial periods provided the antecedence for the persistence 
of bad institutional manifestations such as corruption via intangible but real 
channels such as ‘local elitism’. There was a clear break from these earlier periods 
from the kind of economic activity observed now. In more recent times 
subnational regions now have higher capacities for canvassing or lobbying for 
better circumstances and higher levels of economic outcomes from their 
respective national and subnational governments and administrative 
representatives.  
Though arguably related as highlighted above, the second instrumental variable 
used herein attempts to capture the proximity of split tribal homelands to the 
trading routes. Since these early infrastructural feats served a considerably wide 
geographical area, it suffices to capture their impact at a national level rather 
than at the demarcated tribal level as we do with the missionary stations 
instrumental variable. The trading and exploration routes were a European 
championed infrastructural system built to transport resources and slaves from 
the hinterlands to the coasts for exports to lands beyond the oceans. Missionaries 
also located their stations strategically close to areas where deleterious economic 
activities were highest so as to maximize the impact of their humanitarian 
presence and benefit from proximity to the transportation of resources from their 
home countries. However, this doesn’t affect the rationale justifying the use of 
these two instruments. It rather strengthens their concurrent adoption, as it 
demonstrates that pre-colonial European activities fringed about particular 
locations irrespective of the ethos characterizing or dominating each activity’s 
basis. It is also pertinent that both instruments are adopted as they provide 
historically motivated subnational variations in national institutional quality of 
very distinct but related aspects of European activity in these African regions. 
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Both measures would equally allow us reveal whether these distinct set of 
European activities correlated differently or similarly with the national 
institutional dynamics of the associated countries. 
Another very interesting fact related to the data and the choice of the 
proximity to missionary stations as a good instrument for capturing the formation 
of good institutional outcomes at the subnational level, is that most of these 
stations have remained to this day (White, 2010:12; Nunn, 2010:148) and were the 
locations from which the churches orchestrated their cultural and re-educational 
exploits in their respective African territories of operation. Being mostly Catholic 
and early protestants such as the Methodists, Baptists and Anglicans, they 
provided infrastructural facelifts in the form of church buildings and surrounding 
compounds from where early affordable re-educational and capacity building 
activities spurred. Being funded by their respective parent churches and mostly 
motivated by non-pecuniary objectives, they were also inclined to setup and 
expand to the non-favourable interior hinterlands to promote pro-European 
culturally transforming campaigns. This is in contrast with the infrastructure the 
Europeans erected to serve the economic purposes of that era such as the 
historical explorer routes (or early railways), which although still visible to this 
day are mostly non-functional. We can further demonstrate this by overlaying a 
current map of modern day railway routes over the map for the trading or explorer 
routes as shown in Figure G - 2.3.2 below. The historical missionary stations are 
also included to provide a visual idea of how these three experiences are visually 
correlated. We can rightly see that the two transport routes do not intersect in 
most cases, thus indicating the break in the objective behind the infrastructural 
developmental designs between the nature of movement at this historical 
exploitative period and that of today. It is also important to note that the initial 
infrastructural infusions by the missionaries promoted the cultural and instructive 
transformations that ought to have laid the foundations favourable to 
contemporary institutional conceptions and their eventual development. This 
however would not have directly fed into increased modern-day economic activity 
unless through recent favourable institutional development consistent with the 
current global political atmosphere. This argument is apparent because it is easy 
to see that while the motive of economic activities have considerably changed 
between the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, the values, principles 
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and motives of most of the institutional fabrications that empowered the churches 
(missionaries) prevail to this day from their inception. Following this proposed 
narrative we can show that the impact of contemporary national institutional 
quality on modern economic activity could be estimated through the exposure of 
demarcated subnational ethnic homelands to patterns of the associated layout of 
historical European missionary stations and the early constructed trading or 
explorer routes. This therefore demonstrates that these two instruments are at 
least conceptually exogenous to unobserved factors of current subnational 
economic activity, all things being equal. 
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Figure G – 2.3.2: A Geographic Intersection of the Historical Explorer (Trading) Routes, 
the Modern Rail Routes and the Historical Missionary Stations in Africa 
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The third instrumental variable attempts to measure the history of a country’s 
national identity associated with a demarcated ethnic homeland43. It varies at the 
same level as the national institutional quality variable and provides an indication 
of the extent of national administrative or coordinative amiability to the 
institutional shock of European influence at the time of their en-mass entry and 
involvement with the African territories from the pre-colonial times onwards. It is 
expected that modern national territories that had a longer history of multi-tribal 
coordination very similar to the subsequent post-colonial state would have been 
more agreeable to the exogenous aggregation of ethnic administrations into new 
single states with foreign common institutional frameworks. As a result, countries 
having higher state history indices are expected to on average have higher values 
of modern national institutional quality, other things (covariates and instruments) 
being equal (held constant or controlled for). Being more resilient to global 
shocks, older states are more likely to experiment and be more successful with 
outward looking ideas such as global political integration; thereby, deepening an 
efficacious adoption of institutional forms similar to those found in the wealthier 
Western economies.  
It is difficult to find how this variable could map so lucidly unto economic 
activity at the subnational level via another channel as clearly as it would through 
its impact via national institutional quality. Unless we observed that there was a 
pervasive case of a few ethnic groups per country - so that most of the countries 
were fairly ethnically homogenous - we do not expect ethnic specific pre-colonial 
geopolitical characteristics to have dominated similar national level 
characteristics. But African countries were and remain mostly ethnically 
heterogeneous; as a result subnational geopolitical variations are quite distinct 
from those at the national level. Making it less likely that unobserved drivers 
contained in the error-process of the system equation varying at the subnational 
tribal level would map neatly or directly with this state history index (varying at 
the national-level); thus buttressing the exclusion restriction validation for such 
an instrument. 
The last set of instruments control for both the colonial identity and the legal 
origin of the country associated with the split ethnic homeland. These are a 
                                         
43 We provide some more information on the source of this variable in the data sources section 2.3.4.3 below. 
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warranted set of instruments controlling for the colonial and early post-colonial 
advent of socio-economic and geopolitical systems in tandem with the foreign 
policies of the global political climate promoted by the leading European 
economies in the late 17th century onwards. Not only did each European colonial 
state set-up institutional and structural forms that were fundamentally different 
from each other, but also these institutions were a ubiquitous break from the pre-
colonial geopolitical status quo of the previously disaggregated institutional and 
structural practices of the already existing tribal states. With such European 
driven institutional implantations and the concomitant exogenous aggregation of 
pre-existing tribal lands distinct legal, economic, and political institutional forms 
and evolutionary paths were stirred.  
It is evident how this provides a viable channel for exploring a dimension 
through which current institutional variations at the national level appear to be 
pulsating current disaggregated differences in the economic activity of split ethnic 
homelands as observed in our study. Also, because most of the types of economic 
activity embarked on by the colonial states in most of the African territories were 
extractive or locally unpopular, it is difficult to see why unobserved sources of 
current levels of economic activity would co-vary with this set of instruments 
rendering them invalid. The evidence of the unpopular nature of the colonialist 
administrations is buttressed by the unanimous efforts made by the African nation 
states to seek, demand and fight for self-governance independent of their 
previous respective colonial governments. However, because the different 
foundations of institutional arrangements took their roots and persisted in most 
cases, we find a channel through which this exogenous shock affected current 
institutional manifestations further impacting modern levels of economic activity. 
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2.3.4 – Variables and Data Sources 
2.3.4.1 – The Dependent Variables Measuring Economic Activity 
To advance our analysis herein, we adopt two main proxies of economic 
development (economic activity) observed at the subnational split ethnic 
homeland level. The first of these is based on the DMSP-OLS nightlight data from 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data repository44. 
This dataset provides a measure of nighttime light density at a 30 arc-second 
resolution excluding other noisy light sources from the sun, the moon, glares, 
cloudy observations, lighting features such as auroras, and etc. The values in the 
variable are nominal and range between 0 and 63. We use a more recent account 
of the average over the 2010-2011 period. The potential problems with using the 
stable night light data, as a time series is that such a measure would definitely be 
very dependent on the condition of the satellite detecting it and on prevailing 
atmospheric or cloud circumstances. While it is easy to account for atmospheric 
and cloud conditions in such a model it is a lot more difficult to guarantee and 
control for conditions in the health of the detection satellite and that is why this 
dataset is most useful for cross-sectional purposes for any given point in time.  
On the second matter of light stability at night in most African countries, it is 
common knowledge that electrification is a challenge and in most cases power 
generation for domestic artificial illumination is usually shared between the 
national power grid and private power generation sources. With this in mind, it is 
not startling to expect that rationing is prevalent and is the norm. For this reason, 
providing an alternative measure of economic activity at the same geopolitical 
administrative level as the nighttime lights data is pertinent. This is because 
regions may most likely have suffered protracted blackouts over the period the 
satellite did its recordings causing the polygonal average of an area to be small 
even though it might have had as much or even more light at other times 
throughout the day compared to the other areas measured with relatively higher 
light intensities.  For this variable, we obtain averages for each demarcated ethnic 
homeland polygon and compute the natural log of the resulting polygonal average 
pixel values. 
                                         
44 http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html  
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The second proxy for economic development (our dependent variable) is a 
relatively more stable and permanent cumulative measure of infrastructural 
development. It measures the average lengths of all access road traversing each 
demarcated ethnic groups’ homeland polygon. These access routes include any 
official, recognised and named access route on land and over water compiled for 
each split polygon in our sample. This paper has applied this dataset as an 
alternative (robust) measure to confirm whether the treatment effects we 
observe permeates key facets fundamental to everyday economic activity. Road 
infrastructure is a relatively steady capital-intensive developmental feat and it 
can show to a large extent the level of or potential for economic activity in any 
average city or dwelling area (or in this case a split ethnic region). We obtain this 
data as a ‘geodatabase’ of polylines from the Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center - SEDAC website45. It has been compiled globally using data entry sources 
from each country and as a result the road network compilation ranges from the 
1980s to 2010 depending on the countries and what dates they confirm with their 
respective entries into the repository.  The data version we have employed in this 
research is the Global Roads Open Access Data set (gROADS) v1. The dataset uses 
as common data model approach on the UN Spatial Data Infrastructure Transport 
(UNSDI-T) version 2. It is collected from multiple sources and hence the road 
network representation is available over the span of 1980 to 2010, depending on 
the country.  
In a majority of cases, road network representations from source countries have 
no confirmed dates. Although this is a weakness, the infrastructural coverage is 
not systematically correlated with other fundamental factors inherent to 
individual countries as a number of measures were taken by the dataset’s 
compilers to ensure data validity using Google Earth high-resolution imagery and 
GPS track data to confirm individual data source entries. Additionally, an update 
to the dataset was compiled for 27 countries and 6 smaller geographic units by 
Columbia University’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network 
(CIESIN). They focused mainly on developing countries with relative data paucity. 
With such a concerted approach, this dataset provides comparability of average 
road lengths across areas within its scope of coverage.  In this study, we compute 
                                         
45 http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/groads-global-roads-open-access-v1  
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and adopt the variable in a similar fashion to the nighttime lights density data 
above by obtaining averages for each split ethnic homeland polygon and then take 
the natural log. 
Although the nighttime lights data has been discussed and referred to quite 
extensively in the literature as a relatively good proxy measure for economic 
activity, the roads access proxy has not received equal use especially in the 
economic growth literature. Since we are going to be using this additional proxy 
in this chapter and the next (chapter 3), we attempt to provide some 
demonstration of its suitability as a fairly decent proxy for economic activity, as 
well. Roads density has most popularly been previously used as right-hand side 
control measures for infrastructural development and urbanization in the 
economic development literature (Duranton et al., 2014; Faber, 2014; Storegard, 
2016)46. Roads density has been referred to in the GIS (geographic information 
systems) discourse as a companion proxy for economic development and 
urbanization at varied levels of political administrations or spatial resolutions 
(Mellander et al., 2015). It is also most suitable for developing countries where 
data paucity is an additional concern (ibid). Additionally economic activity or 
urbanization is a multifaceted phenomenon, so resorting to a single metric would 
not tell a well-rounded story. The variations in economic activity that both proxies 
(nighttime lights and roads access) bring to the study are not entirely overlapping. 
Both proxies capture diverging components of economic activity; thus using them 
both allows the study to bring these multi-dimensions into focus. This might be 
the reason why both proxies do not necessarily correlate as highly with each other 
as they individually do with our real national income measure – GDP (refer to the 
plots immediately below). For one it is easily arguable that while electrification 
could be pervasively relevant to an economy, road access could be biased towards 
key industries and sectors (see Chander & Thompson, 2000 for such findings on 
the selective economic impact of highway construction). This does not to dispute 
the role roads access can play in improving economic activity in general. It is in 
                                         
46 These studies however focus on different aspects of the access roads measure such as paved road, highways, 
distance between cities along road networks, etc. By focuses on average roads access length across 
demarcated polygonal boundaries, our study provides a type of quality measure as well rather than a 
quantity capture – which is what a density measure (mere count) would provide. Due to data availability 
for road types and other related characteristics, obtaining such classifications of roads in the dataset across 
all the countries in the SSA region for our sample would not be possible. So this provides a convenient 
adaptation to the dataset’s weakness in this regard.  
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fact quite conceivable to see how economic activity and development can be 
improved in this regard. Beuran et al. (2015:674) elaborate on a few of these 
channels in their study, which include – to facilitate key public goods (health and 
education, for instance) provisioning, facilitate markets access, and employment. 
Nighttime lights could pose additional issues as a sole proxy for economic 
activity in countries such as in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) countries where 
electrification rationing by the national grids of most countries is a pervasive 
reality (see Bhattacharyya, 2012; Cook et al., 2015). It might be a national or 
regional strategy to spatially allocate electricity to industrial areas during the 
daytime and then reallocate power (electricity) to residential areas at night. That 
said, it would result in such industrial areas being dark at night when the satellite 
sensing is occurring causing regions with many of these included industrial 
locations to be persistently darker relative to other locations when they might 
otherwise be booming with economic activity all year round. Therefore bringing 
the roads access proxy to the literature provides an additional robustness measure 
given that roads are a more stable infrastructure based indicator that is not biased 
in such a manner. One downside for using this measure is that, the roads access 
measure is a stock over the period for which it has been captured. This is a 
weakness given that the income measure it is meant to proxy is usually a flow. 
This weakness is however mitigated because the models we adopt using these 
proxies are setup in a cross-sectional fashion, which conveniently bypasses the 
concerns of variations over time. 
Below, we provide some plots to show the correlation between summed 
nighttime lights and GDP (gross domestic product), summed length of access roads 
and GDP, and summed-up length of access roads and nighttime lights – all 
aggregated to the national level. The second of the plots does the same thing but 
looks at the variables in their weighted-average forms so as to facilitate 
comparison across countries of different population levels and land masses. We 
decide to look at these variables at the national aggregate levels as there are no 
reliable measures of economic activity available and comparable across the 
countries in our adopted sample.  
In the first set of these plots (Figure H - 2.3.3, below) we see the linear 
association (at the levels) between the popular nighttime proxy (in sums) and real 
national income (GDP) is as strong – at about 93% - as similarly maintained in the 
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literature (see Ghosh et al., 2013). The linear association at the levels for the 
summed length of access roads with real GDP is about 61%. While the direct 
correlation between nighttime lights and the alternative roads access proxy is 
about 54%. This is a lesser degree of linear association between both proxies 
compared to their individual linear associations with GDP; which is equally 
maintained after they have both been weighted by the size of each country’s 
polygon (about 14% in this case). As shown in Figure I - 2.3.4 below, when we 
consider the access roads proxy in its polygonal average form it is as correlated 
with real GDP per capita as is the average nighttime lights (about 32% and about 
36% for average roads length-to-GDP per capita and average nighttime lights-to-
GDP per capita, respectively). As earlier highlighted, while these show that they 
are both correlated with national income (at both levels and per capita measures) 
to similar extents, their relatively lower correlations with each other indicate that 
they might be capturing disparate dimensions of economic activity that may be 
worth considering. 
 
 
 
Figure H – 2.3.3: Plots Showing the Linear Association between the 2 Proxies of 
Economic Activity (polygonal sums) and Economic Activity with Real GDP 
Where: the income variable is measured in real national aggregate terms collected from the Penn World Table 8.0, while the nighttime 
lights and access roads are also in national aggregate levels (they have not been weighted in this figure); plots using 51 African countries 
and all values have been logged for rescaling reasons 
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Figure I – 2.3.4: Plots Showing the Linear Association between the 2 Proxies of 
Economic Activity (polygonal weighted-averages) and Economic Activity with Real GDP 
Per Capita 
Where: the income variable is measured in real per capita national aggregate terms averaged from 1990-2010, while the average 
nighttime lights (2010-2011) and length of roads access (1980-2010) are measured as aggregate national polygonal-averages; plots using 
51 African countries 
 
 
2.3.4.2 – The Endogenous Treatment Variables Measuring Institutional Quality 
There are four institutional quality measures adopted in this paper. Three are 
from the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) by Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi (KKM, 2009, 2011) - the corruption control index, the rule of law index, 
and the governance effectiveness index. All three indices have been averaged 
from time of initial availability, 1996 to 2010. The values on these indices range 
from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher values represent higher institutional quality and 
vice versa. The fourth measure of institutional quality is an indicator of the quality 
of governance measure based on the mean value of the ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) data variables: “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled between 0 and 1. Higher values in the scale 
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represent higher quality of government values. This composite measure is 
obtained from the Quality of Governance Basic Dataset, a project by the University 
of Gothenberg. We have adopted this ‘institutions’ metric as an alternative 
measure of institutional quality in our study. This variable has been averaged over 
the period 1990 to 2010 at the country level accompanying each split ethnic 
homeland.  
The choice of these four indices to capture institutional quality are by no means 
comprehensive. There are alternative measures of institutional quality available 
out there in the literature. We have particularly chosen the first of these two (the 
corruption control index and the rule of law index) so that our discussions and 
results are comparable to the immediate literature as per Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou (M&P, 2014). While the latter two (WBGI’s governance effectiveness 
index and the ICRG’s quality of governance measure) are arbitrarily added for 
robustness (comparison) purposes. The latter two indices also provide a relatively 
broad measure (in topic scope) to the subject of institutional quality; thus making 
it most applicable to our study as concerns governance in a more holistic fashion 
for the African countries under study. The other measures in the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WBGI) such as the voice and accountability, political 
stability, absence of violence and regulatory quality measures capture relatively 
more specific dimensions of the institutional quality subject matter and tend to 
be popular in the literature for studies relating to property rights, political 
instability and freedom of speech and association topics. Although these topics 
are equally important we do not include them herein; particularly for the sake of 
analytical brevity and contextual relevance. As a result we decide to restrict our 
analysis to these four institutional quality measures or indices. 
 
2.3.4.3 – The Instrumental and independent Exogenous Variables 
A bulk of the regressors in this paper’s models is from Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) sources. This is particularly useful as this study’s unit of analysis is 
at the subnational level and most development-based measures available are 
usually compiled at the country-nation level. Additionally, GIS data and modelling 
allows for a more relevant opportunity to quite easily control for geographic 
influences. Geographic influences have been theorized in the literature to exert 
quite an effect on key development indicators in the empirical literature (see 
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Bloom et al, 1998; Sachs, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Nunn & Puga, 2012; etc.). 
This chapter’s analytical reference point is the split ethnic homeland polygon 
based on the anthropological work on pre-colonial ethnic societal characteristics 
by Murdock (1959). Our dataset is very similar in structure to the replication 
datasets used in the Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) and M&P (2013) studies.  
Following similar practice as characteristic in the literature using these dataset 
types, we match each ethnic or tribal group’s identified homeland from the 
Murdock map to the countries currently recognised over these territories. This is 
done using a spatial joining tool with respect to the spatial reference information 
available from both the Murdock map and those of the countries currently 
overlaying these areas. There are in total 835 tribal homeland polygons identified 
in the Murdoch (1959) spatially referenced ethnic map for the African region 
excluding the 8 uninhabited areas located on the map. From this larger sample of 
tribes, we are able to identify 227 valid-split tribes whose historical homelands 
fall in at least 2 modern-day independent countries spanning a sample of 47 
countries on the African continent. This gives us a full sample of 526 observations 
in total.  We have tagged these demarcated homelands as valid-splits with the 
additional conditions that each country-split ethnic polygon is greater than a 100 
square-kilometres and belong to a tribe with at least 10% of its historical homeland 
found in more than one modern country’s geopolitical territory. This latter 
criterion is consistent with that adopted by M&P (2014). We have used this 
threshold to accommodate for trivia splits, which may be the result of any 
erroneous outcomes of the geocoding process itself. Figure J - 2.3.5 below exhibits 
the full sample and valid-split sample of the Murdock (1959) tribal homelands map 
with the countries currently wielding their geopolitical institutional fervour over 
these African territories, respectively. 
Most of the distance-based (distance to border, distance to sea coast, and 
distance to missionary location) metrics have been calculated using the nearest 
distance algorithm in ArcGIS 10.1. They represent the distance from the split 
ethnic homeland’s centroid point to the nearest polygon or point of the relevant 
phenomena of interest. The distance to seacoast is computed using the ‘Water 
Polygons’ data available on the Open Street Map Data website47. The distance to 
                                         
47 http://openstreetmapdata.com/data/water-polygons  
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capital variable on the other hand was obtained using a centroid-to-centroid 
geodetic distance algorithm (“geodist”) user-written for STATA users. These 
distance variables are also all measured in kilometres.  
The polyline shapefile used for the exploration route analysis is obtained from 
Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) based on work originally from Roland A. Oliver (2000) 
and digitized by Matthew T. Ciolek (2001)48. The data on the location of missionary 
stations is obtained from Nunn (2010) based on a map published by William R. M. 
Roome (1924)49. 
 
 
Figure J – 2.3.5: The Original 835 Ethnic Homelands (Murdock, 1959) and the 
accompanying 233 valid-splits 
 
The state history index, one of the excluded instruments, is the ‘statehist’ 
variable version 3.1 obtained from the work of Bockstette, Chanda & Putterman 
(2002)50. This variable provides a proxy measure between the values of 0 and 1, 
where 0 indicates a country with the least state history and 1 indicates one with 
                                         
48 This “data is on the historical location of towns and routes from the Sahara trade…” It has been referenced 
in Nunn & Wantchekon (2011: 3240). See Figure G - 2.3.2 above, for a visual presentation of the spatial 
location of these routes. 
49 See Figure G - 2.3.2 above, for a visual of where the stations were located. 
50 http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty/Louis_Putterman/antiquity%20index.htm  
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the most state history. The index overall, attempts to capture the extent to which 
a modern national state was the location of a united nation-state, empire, or any 
other form of unified political administrative entity every half-century since the 
first century.  
The population density data is obtained from the Andy Nelson (2004) African 
Population Distribution Database, UNEP GRID Sioux Falls Dataset of population 
numbers per square-kilometres in 2000. This data is available at the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Environment for Development website51. 
The variable has been natural-logged in the estimations carried out herein.  
A number of additional control variables are used to account for the natural 
endowments of each demarcated ethnic homeland. There are two indicators to 
control for the natural resource endowments. These are dummy variables to 
identify the presence of diamond deposits and onshore deposits of oil and gas 
petroleum products, respectively. The diamond deposits variable is obtained from 
a shapefile from the Diamond Resources dataset on the USGS website52. While the 
petroleum deposit dataset is available at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 
website53. An additional variable controls for a split group’s (split ethnic 
homeland) proprietorship of inland water; this is measured as the total area 
covered by a river, stream or lake. This variable is available for download as a 
raster file, titled Global Lake and Wetlands Database Level 3 (GLWD-3), on the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) website54. 
In convention with the literature, key aspects of a split group’s natural ecology 
are equally controlled for. Four widely treated dimensions are considered: general 
ecological ambience using measures of mean rain and mean elevation, agricultural 
ecology measured using a soil productivity index, and a disease ecological measure 
- using the malaria ecology index. The mean elevation variable measures the 
average surface elevation for each split ethnic polygon; based on a joint work by 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. 
                                         
51 http://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/datasets/datalist.php  
52 https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Diamond-Resources/  
53http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/Petroleum-Dataset-
v11/  
54http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/global-lakes-and-wetlands-database-lakes-and-wetlands-grid-
level-3  
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National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0. The soil productivity 
index measures the average suitability of the soil of each polygon in our sample 
to the crop best adapted to that soil’s type, condition and composition. It is a 
dataset published by the FAO in 2002 with index values ranging from a minimum 
of 1 to a maximum of 97; where values increase in tandem with the soils 
productivity and suitability to the chiefly adapted crop. Finally, the malaria 
ecology index is based on the work of Kiszewski, Mellinger, Speilman, Malaney, 
Sachs, and Sachs (2004). It measures the prevalence and exposure of each split 
ethnic polygon to the malaria endemic. 
 
2.3.5 – Initial Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(0.001 + Average Nighttime lights 
density index 2010-2011) 
526 0.5516535 2.797105 -4.60517 3.270541 
Log(Average Roads Length over the 1980-
2010 period) 
519 2.840186 0.8937715 -0.7694919 5.620769 
Country's WBGI Corruption Control Index 
(average 1990s - 2010) 
526 -0.7727009 0.4919724 -1.738412 0.8818495 
Country's WBGI Rule of Law Index 
(average 1990s - 2010) 
526 -0.889778 0.5735923 -2.348055 0.6000053 
Country's WBGI Governance Effectiveness 
Index (average 1990s - 2010) 
526 -0.8317847 0.5430416 -2.174895 0.5986422 
Country's Quality of Governance Index  
(ICRG QOG - average 1990s - 2010) 
451 0.3879278 0.1195069 0.1258818 0.6521715 
Country's WBGI Corruption Control Index 
(average 1990s - 2005) 
526 -0.7745004 0.5183785 -1.676455 0.8334835 
Country's WBGI Rule of Law Index 
(average 1990s - 2005) 
526 -0.9141688 0.5914214 -2.197272 0.5751488 
Country's WBGI Governance Effectiveness 
Index (average 1990s - 2005) 
526 -0.8114545 0.5529397 -2.070641 0.6860611 
Country's Quality of Governance Index  
(ICRG QOG - average 1990s - 2005) 
451 0.3960776 0.1248166 0.1280382 0.6793258 
Nearest Split Ethnic Centroid Distance to 
Confirmed Missionary Locations (1,000s 
KM) 
526 0.2070467 0.2319605 0.0015858 1.313903 
Indicator for the presence of a historical 
explorer route passing through country's 
border 
526 0.8840304 0.3204932 0 1 
State History Index (Bockstette, Chanda & 
Putterman, 2002 - discounted at 10%) 
487 0.4105477 0.2152004 0.0465868 0.9473389 
Never Colonised Indicator 526 0.039924 0.1959669 0 1 
British Colony Indicator 526 0.3707224 0.483458 0 1 
French Colony Indicator 526 0.4239544 0.4946537 0 1 
French Legal Origin Indicator 495 1.591919 0.4919754 1 2 
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Log (1 + Population Density at 2000) 526 3.006171 1.749962 -4.60517 6.242243 
Distance to Sea (Measured in 1000 KMs) 526 0.6301444 0.4522818 0 1.796686 
Distance to Country Border (Measured in 
1000 KMs) 
526 0.0406222 0.0439317 0.0000553 0.320909 
Distance to National Capital (Measured in 
1000 Kms) 
526 0.5504251 0.3947329 0.0050121 1.929665 
Mean Elevation (Measured in 1000 KMs) 526 6.016954 1.083722 1.062245 7.795999 
Soil Productivity Index 526 9.460107 14.57147 1.307692 88.54546 
Malaria Ecology Index 526 13.8157 8.608235 0 33 
Log Split Land Area 526 2.00502 1.551917 -2.149397 6.125164 
Diamond Mine Present Indicator 526 0.0969582 0.2961825 0 1 
Petroleum Well Present Indicator 526 0.0608365 0.2392577 0 1 
Indicator for the presence of Inland Water 
Body (KM) 
526 0.7604563 0.4272113 0 1 
Table K – 2.3.1: Tabular Summary of the Variables used in the Models 
 
As highlighted earlier, there are 526 observations from 227 tribal groups 
represented in 47 countries on the African continent within our designed sample. 
This is the full sample that constitutes the valid-split ethnic homelands. However, 
the observations in each specification are driven by data availability across the 
variables utilised in the different estimated models because, not all the variables 
have observations across the full sample of 526 for the 227 valid-split tribal 
homelands. The access roads length, institutional quality, legal origins and state 
history index variables have ‘missing’ observations in a number of instances. This 
certainly poses a limitation to the data points available to the estimations carried 
out, but not so significantly as to alter the findings and results embedded within 
the discussions carried out. In a similar light, our logged nighttime lights variable 
would have untenable regions with pre-transformation values of zero. So in 
conformity with the literature, we adjust this variable by first adding 0.01 to it 
before taking its natural-log. A summary table of all the variables involved in our 
regressions are provided in the Table K - 2.3.1 above. 
The spatial intersection procedure utilised in this work also helps to mitigate 
observational loss even further. It unifies each demarcated tribal homeland within 
each country even when these tribal homelands are further split into disjointed 
homeland-islands by the associated country’s national frontier. We have tagged 
such disjointed but amalgamated homeland polygons as non-linear splits, while 
those with no apparent homeland boundary interruptions have been termed as 
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linear splits55. A graphical illustration has been provided below to demonstrate the 
distinction between these two coined terminologies - linear splits and non-linear 
splits. As illustrated in Figure K - 2.3.6 below for instance, the tribal land of the 
‘Dialonke’ is found in three countries (Senegal, Mali and Guinea). But because of 
the non-smoothness or irregularity of the national borders in most parts of Africa, 
tribes such as the ‘Dialonke’ and ‘Foutadjalon’ have their homelands split within 
and across national border demarcations. The visible lack of tribal border 
continuity for the ‘Foutadjalon’ tribe in Guinea in Figure K - 2.3.6 demonstrates 
this appropriately, for instance. As a result, it is useful that the spatial 
intersection tool we adopt incorporates an aggregation or fusion function that 
identifies and matches tribal homelands at an amassed tribe-to-country level 
regardless of whether this is from a uniform continuous tribal homeland polygon 
or not.   
An illustration of the linear type split on the other hand is much more 
predominant and is what one would naturally expect to find when conducting this 
kind of research. Its type is illustrated in Figure L - 2.3.7 below between the 
‘Boran’ in Ethiopia and the ‘Boran’ in Kenya. Given the prevalence of the linear 
type splits, it brings to question the widely held claim in the literature, that tribal 
homelands and their resulting wellbeing were significantly affected by the 
outcomes of such non-linear intra-group demarcations. It indicates that such 
claims might be over-propagated far and beyond their actual relevance or 
importance in explaining local economic developmental dynamics. It appears 
more likely that other fundamentals at the tribal (ethnic) or micro levels may be 
at play not necessarily associated with these border related issues observed at the 
national frontier. 
 
                                         
55 This is done for illustrative purposes and is not characteristic of any associated terminologies used in the 
accompanying literature. 
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Figure K – 2.3.6: An Illustration of a Non-Linear Split 
 
 
Figure L – 2.3.7: An Illustration of a Linear Split 
 
When it comes to visualizing the measures of economic activity and of 
institutional quality used in our model estimations, we find some consistency in 
the claim that there are observable breaks or cross-sectional variations at the split 
ethnic homelands level. These breaks can be observed at both administrative 
levels characterising this research; that is both at the national country-level and 
the subnational split-tribal level. It can also be observed, from Figure M - 2.3.8 
below, that there is also a considerable degree of within country variation across 
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ethnic groups within each country for the dependent variables, which have been 
advantageously observed at the demarcated ethnic homeland administrative 
level. 
 
 
Figure M – 2.3.8: Average Nighttime lights density (Log (1 + Average 2010-2011)) and 
Average Roads access length (Log (average cumulated up to 2010))  
 
Looking at the institutional quality variables, we are able to also observe the 
break in institutional quality between splits of the same tribal origins found in 
different countries much clearer. M&P (2014) use the discontinuity charts and 
methodology to portray this much clearer; it is nonetheless as clear in the 
graphical illustration displayed in Figure N - 2.3.9 below. We can see how the 
colours vary across split ethnic homelands at the country border subnational 
locations with the World Bank’s Corruption control and Rule of law estimates 
based on Kaufmann et al (KKM, 2009) – averaged over the 1996 to 2010 period. 
Although the values are changing at the national frontier as expected, the 
respective colours represent cluster-ranging values and should not change so 
readily if national institutional outcomes were regionally clustered, for instance. 
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Figure N – 2.3.9: National Average Corruption Control and the Rule of Law Estimate 
from the World Bank Governance Indicators (1996-2010) 
 
 
Section 2.4 – Results and Interpretation 
2.4.1 – The Base Model 
From the results of the base model in Table L - 2.4.1 below, it is evident that 
national institutional influences are on average positive in their impact on 
economic activity at the subnational demarcated ethnic homeland level. This 
observation is consistent across the average nighttime lights density data used in 
the literature and with the roads access data, which we adopt in this paper. The 
claim by M&P (2014) that the statistical significance is contestable and sensitive 
to other relevant controls present in the model especially ethnic fixed-effects 
remains very much held and consistent with our findings. When ethnic fixed-
effects are controlled for, it becomes evident that national institutional quality 
starts to become mostly statistically insignificant and the magnitudes of these 
coefficients also reduce in general. This finding is not only consistent with the 
literature but also with our additional (robust) measure of economic activity, 
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which we propose in this work. Apart from instances with the second and fourth 
institutional measures in our average access roads length estimations below, the 
rest are statistically insignificant once tribal specific characteristics are controlled 
for. 
The trend and behaviour of the coefficients of the institutional variables 
reducing in both magnitude and significance when tribal fixed effects are 
controlled for, to some extent, may indicate the relevance of un-observed tribal 
factors over national institutional impacts at the bordering subnational regions or 
territories. It may also indicate reasons associated with the possible notion that 
national institutional dictates are not so welcome or as effective in bordering 
regions of each country, where a sense of national identities may be less important 
compared to a sense of tribal identities. This is not such a farfetched inkling for a 
continent such as Africa, where border controls are relatively weak and a sense 
of fused belonging and identities characterise border subnational regions. As is 
quite apparent, their tribal identity happens to be the predominant reality at the 
national boundaries, which have affected pervasive national homogeneity by 
introducing diverging national loyalties. Such a conflict in loyalties could certainly 
affect the effectiveness or reach of national institutional values at such peripheral 
areas of the associated nation states.  
There are certainly other elements or even components of a country’s very 
national institutional makeup driving economic activity for these subnational 
regions at the peripheries but they might require a clearer identification approach 
to capture them. What we observe in these initial results could also be a signal 
explaining an increased tendency for bordered subnational regions to rely on non-
national institutional frameworks at the peripheries of national identities. Further 
reflecting not only the weaknesses of the extent of country-level institutional 
influences but also the notion that a sense of national institutional identities take 
a relatively longer time to take root; especially in such subnational regions where 
tribal histories are much older and hence more crystallised. A deeper assessment 
of such intricacies is certainly very plausible and can be further carried out 
adopting methods that systemically harvest the common experiences of these 
subnational regions present in more than one national institutional identity 
simultaneously. It is in this light we go ahead to carry out deeper assessments of 
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a similar framework in the next section, but by adopting history-motivated 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations. 
 
 
Table L – 2.4.1: Results from the Base Model with an OLS Specification 
 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
VARIABLES y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1
WBGI Corruption Control Index 
(average 1990s - 2007) 0.455** 0.264
(0.190) (0.268)
WBGI Rule of Law Index (average 
1990s - 2007) 0.529*** 0.263
(0.172) (0.219)
WBGI Governance Effectiveness 
Index (average 1990s - 2007) 0.528*** 0.294
(0.177) (0.232)
Quality of Governance Index  (ICRG 
QOG - average 1990s - 2007) 2.233** 1.427
(0.998) (1.159)
Population Density (at 2000 in 1000s of 
Peoples) 0.678*** 0.676*** 0.670*** 0.612*** 0.350*** 0.347*** 0.352*** 0.380***
(0.0759) (0.0750) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.115)
Adjusted R_Square 0.353 0.358 0.357 0.374 0.353 0.355 0.355 0.395
R_Square/Within R_Square 0.368 0.373 0.371 0.391 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.411
F-Statistic 30.21 31.14 31.13 30.01 16.19 16.14 16.28 16.46
No. of Observations 526 526 526 451 526 526 526 451
No. of Clusters . . . . 227 227 227 223
(H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O)
VARIABLES y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2
WBGI Corruption Control Index 
(average 1990s - 2007) 0.0702 0.0627
(0.0657) (0.0733)
WBGI Rule of Law Index (average 
1990s - 2007) 0.205*** 0.129**
(0.0618) (0.0571)
WBGI Governance Effectiveness 
Index (average 1990s - 2007) 0.156** 0.0985
(0.0687) (0.0633)
Quality of Governance Index  (ICRG 
QOG - average 1990s - 2007) 0.559 0.552*
(0.348) (0.286)
Population Density (at 2000 in 1000s of 
Peoples) -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.228*** -0.217*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.159*** -0.151***
(0.0219) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0325)
Adjusted R_Square 0.355 0.370 0.362 0.377 0.231 0.244 0.236 0.276
R_Square/Within R_Square 0.370 0.385 0.377 0.394 0.249 0.262 0.254 0.296
F-Statistic 20.00 21.44 20.75 19.09 7.279 7.399 7.365 6.901
No. of Observations 519 519 519 445 519 519 519 445
No. of Clusters . . . . 227 227 227 223
OLS Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tribal Fixed Effects Specification No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Logged Split Ethnic Land's Average Stable Nighttime Lights Density at 2010-2011 (NOAA data repository)
Dependent Variable: Logged Split Ethnic Land's Average Access Roads Length 1980 - 2010 (NASA SEDAC data repository)
Controls: Population density, distance to sea, distance to border, distance to associated national capital, mean elevation, soil 
productivity, malaria succeptibility index, land area, diamond mines indicator, petroleum sites indicator and water bodies indicator
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2.4.2 – National Institutional Impact on Subnational Economic 
Activity (using an IV specification) 
In Table M - 2.4.2 below, we display results adopting an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach harnessing the divergent historical experiences of each halves of 
demarcated ethnic homelands, which form the analytical unit of this research 
design. These distinct historical experiences are more proximate when historically 
compared to the tribal values and institutions of the characteristic halves. They 
are also composed of both national and subnational experiential components 
(mechanisms). The instruments as chosen reflect these equally appropriate 
prongs, which are believed to have affected the institutional evolution of each 
demarcated halves of formerly unique ethnic identities or homelands. 
As can be observed from the results below, the introduction of this IV-design 
certainly provides an interesting set of results to the debate in this literature. We 
seem to find results consistent with both the cross-country and subnational level 
literatures depending on what measure of economic development adopted. In 
these results we find that after controlling for the exogenous historical 
experiences of each ethnic split, there appears to be a pattern consistent with 
national institutional relevance. This is however specific to the measure of the 
level of economic activity adopted. The exogenous historical experiences of each 
ethnic split are sourced from both national and subnational premises relevant to 
the evolution and sustenance of modern institutional manifestations at the 
national administrative levels. 
These results in Table M - 2.4.2 show that national institutional quality 
measures are not statistically significant after controlling for ethnic fixed-effects 
across country at these subnational-bordering regions. This still corroborates the 
findings from the base OLS estimations above and also the findings from M&P 
(2014). Interestingly, our initial estimations in estimations 1-4 show that even 
before introducing the tribal fixed-effects statistical significances are much less 
than those observed in their A-D and H-K OLS counterparts above. The results 
differ very much from those in table 4.3 below however. We find that when the 
dependent variable is altered to the average access roads length variable, the 
national institutional quality measures stay statistically significant even after 
controlling for these ethnic level fixed-effects. These are in contrast with M&P’s 
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(2014) findings but are very much in resonance with the cross-country studies such 
as AJR (2001) and their cohorts.  
Our results also show that not only are the magnitudes of the coefficients 
(depicting the impact of national institutional quality on economic activity at the 
subnational split ethnic level) increasing when the IV method is adopted, but 
generally become more statistically significant compared with the OLS estimations 
above. This finding is maintained even in the presence of unobservable tribal 
fundamentals. This suggests that an unidentified or unfiltered institutional 
measure at the national level may appear to be irrelevant to the variations in the 
level of subnational economic activity at these peripheral regions. It may also 
suggest a much deeper methodological concern about the sort of endogeneity 
inherent in the relationship between national institutional dynamics and 
subnational economic development as earlier discussed in section 2.3.2 above. It 
could be an empirical confirmation that the issue of measurement error embedded 
in the endogeneity problem may be driving the bias characterising the relationship 
between both these variables of interest compared to that of reverse causality. 
When we change the measure of economic development to the average access 
roads length variable however, our findings flip in statistical significance and start 
to resemble those found in the country-level empirical studies. These findings are 
supported by the history of the African region and of the literature on the impact 
of national institutions on peripheral subnational regions. In this literature, it is 
often hypothesized that national institutions are much more felt in the national 
capitals and those subnational regions fringing these capitals (see Herbst, 2000; 
Boone, 2003; etc). With these results using our history channelled IV procedure, 
we are able to rediscover a place for the relevance of colonial and countrywide 
institutional outcomes on economic activities even at the geopolitically distant 
hinterlands. This stands in contradiction with the literature as propagated in the 
discussions of Herbst (2000), Bates (2008), and revalidated by the results of M&P 
(2014), for instance. In our findings as shown in Table N - 2.4.3 below, national 
institutions appear relevant after you control for the endogeneity embedded in 
the relationship it has with subnational economic activity. This control we show 
ought to sensibly reflect the historical background of the subnational economic 
units spanning the subnational ethnic homelands as engaged in this study. 
Interestingly, the key findings contained in Table N - 2.4.3 are robust to all the 
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widely used geographic, ecological and demographic controls often adopted in 
similar research designs in the literature. 
Holistically, the results buttress the position that areas that had closer 
proximity to missionary activities as measured using the distance to missionary 
stations were not necessarily associated with higher national institutional values 
as expected. As observed in our first-stage results below each of the results from 
Table M - 2.4.2 and Table N - 2.4.3 respectively, we find that distance to the 
missionary stations is positive and mostly statistically significantly related to the 
respective measures of national institutional quality. This indicates that areas 
farther away from these stations were on the average associated with national 
institutional values. This is also very much in line with the findings involving the 
measure of exploitative European contact using the presence of a European 
exploratory route for any associated country. The coefficient associated with this 
instrument shows that national level exposures to the exploitative activities of 
the Europeans are on the average negatively and statistically associated with 
national institutional quality. We can find the contribution of these channels by 
looking at the selected output from the First-stage regressions in the bottom 
section of each table in Table M - 2.4.2 and Table N - 2.4.3 below.  
On the average, we find that national institutional quality positively impacts 
subnational economic activity at the borders. Specifically, a unit increase in 
national institutional quality results in between 26% to about 200% increase in the 
nighttime light density levels compared to approximately 6% to 130% increase in 
the average roads access length, depending on the measure of national 
institutional quality and the estimation technique adopted. These results are on 
the average robust to the inclusion of unobservable ethnic level specific 
characteristics, which may certainly be of considerable relevance for bordering 
subnational regions. These regions may not readily be accessible by the national 
machinery of most countries’ institutional enforcement and monitoring 
programmes given the predominant sparseness of border identity for these 
peripheral regions in Africa. We observe on the other hand that demarcated areas 
associated with a nation-state with a higher sense of nationalistic identity are 
statistically and positively associated with higher modern national institutional 
quality values. This is not surprising as such areas would have begun existing as 
multi-ethnic communities before the advent of the Europeans harnessing and 
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adopting a sense of identities beyond the individual ethnic nations that composed 
such super-states. We are able to deduce this using the state history index 
developed by Bockstette, Chanda & Putterman (2002). 
We equally find that our instruments after controlling for tribal fixed effects 
are robust to key statistical tests on the exclusion restriction condition as shown 
by the ‘Jansens’ test of over-identifying restrictions. This provides further 
statistical validation for the exclusion restriction storyline provided in section 
2.3.3 above. 
 
 
Table M – 2.4.2: Results from the Nighttime Lights Density Measure Using Our IV-
identification Strategy 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1 y1
WBGI Corruption Control Index (average 1990s - 2010) 1.583** 0.881
(0.740) (0.714)
WBGI Rule of Law Index (average 1990s - 2010) 0.902* 0.639
(0.476) (0.482)
WBGI Governance Effectiveness Index (average 1990s - 2010) 0.933** 0.595
(0.429) (0.454)
Quality of Governance Index  (ICRG QOG - average 1990s - 
2010)
3.104* 1.987
(1.633) (1.698)
Population Density (at 2000 in 1000s of Peoples) 0.675*** 0.653*** 0.644*** 0.622*** 0.264* 0.251* 0.261* 0.310***
(0.0797) (0.0760) (0.0764) (0.0759) (0.136) (0.131) (0.136) (0.110)
IV Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tribal Fixed Effects Specification No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Centred R_Square/Within R_Square 0.362 0.387 0.383 0.406 0.406 0.408 0.412 0.450
Adjusted R_Square 0.345 0.371 0.366 0.388 -0.126 -0.122 -0.114 -0.0719
F-Statistic 24.98 26.73 26.71 27.71 13.08 13.40 13.77 14.65
No. of Observations 456 456 456 409 415 415 415 345
No. of Clusters . . . . . . . .
Degree of Freedom 12 12 12 12 196 196 196 168
 Kleibergen-Paaps Weak Identifcation Test Wald Statistic 26.25 49.90 53.10 145.9 17.94 28.07 20.60 41.39
Jansens Test P-value For Overidentifying Restrictions 0.0548 0.0435 0.0465 0.0200 0.281 0.309 0.315 0.164
 Kleibergen-Paaps Underidentification Test LM Statistic 69.38 75.34 91.81 71.82 61.09 72.30 70.77 50.32
 Kleibergen-Paaps Underidentification Test LM P-value 0 0 0 0 8.24e-10 0 0 9.37e-08
The C-Statistic (for - Distance to the nearest Missionary station) 8.739 3.459 5.128 0.00731 11.42 5.778 14.46 9.581
P-value of C-Statistic 0.00311 0.0629 0.0235 0.932 0.000726 0.0162 0.000143 0.00197
Anderson-Rubin F-test of significance of endogenous regressors 0.00240 0.00240 0.00240 0.00147 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.0569
P-value of Anderson-Rubin F-test of endogenous regressors 0.00442 0.00442 0.00442 0.00308 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.107
No. of Tribal Clusters 184 184 184 156
Nearest Split Ethnic Centroid Distance to Confirmed Missionary 
Locations (1,000s KM)
0.3859*** 0.2732* 0.2894** 0.0022 1.1993*** 0.9688** 1.4879*** 0.3421***
'(0.1386) '(0.1531) '(0.1341) '(0.0270) '(0.3595) '(0.4096) '(0.4146) '(0.1054)   
Indicator for the presence of a European Explorer route in associated 
country
-0.1146** -0.2321*** -0.1733** 0.0953*** -0.2977*** -0.5034*** -0.4317*** 0.0662*  
'(0.0583) '(0.0699) '(0.0828) '(0.0182) '(0.0749) '(0.0922) '(0.1081) '(0.0353)   
State History Index (Putterman, 2012 - discounted at 10%) 0.2473** 0.2229 0.4022*** -0.0507* 0.8351*** 0.8647*** 1.0263*** 0.0289
'(0.1190) '(0.1387) '(0.1283) '(0.0273) '(0.1729) '(0.2059) '(0.2038) '(0.0449)   
Adjusted R_Square 0.25 0.333 0.394 0.643 -0.345 -0.152 -0.126 0.296
Centred R_Square/Within R_Square 0.282625 0.361883 0.420171 0.660614 0.316113 0.414282 0.427504 0.655187
F-Statistic 23.61657 43.48632 71.68912 131.7966 11.87181 19.85018 12.2856 37.16442
F-Statistic showing joint strength of Instrumental variables 26.25456 49.89797 53.10294 145.9253 17.94483 28.07402 20.5999 41.39437
No. of Observations 456 456 456 409 415 415 415 345
Tribal Fixed Effects Specification No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full-set of Controls: Population density, distance to sea, distance to border, distance to associated national capital, mean elevation, soil productivity, malaria 
succeptibility index, land area, diamond mines indicator, petroleum sites indicator and water bodies indicator
Dependent Variable: Logged Split Ethnic Land's Average Stable Nighttime Lights Density at 2010-2011 (NOAA data repository)
First-stage Results for the IV Regressions Above
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Table N – 2.4.3: Results from the Average Access Roads Length Measure Using Our IV-
identification Strategy 
 
2.4.3 – Brief summary of findings 
In summary, we find that contrary to an un-instrumented model there is 
considerable evidence to indicate that the impacts of European-filtered national 
institutional quality is statistically significant for explaining the variations of 
economic activity in the subnational ethnic homelands of Africa. This is especially 
so when we provide an alternative measure of economic development using the 
average access roads length. This finding appears robust to alternative measures 
of national institutional quality. Although we do not find the same outcome using 
the average nighttime lights density variable as adopted in M&P (2014), our 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2 y2
WBGI Corruption Control Index (average 1990s - 2010) 1.225*** 0.609***
(0.230) (0.206)
WBGI Rule of Law Index (average 1990s - 2010) 0.779*** 0.387***
(0.134) (0.132)
WBGI Governance Effectiveness Index (average 1990s - 2010) 0.756*** 0.398***
(0.132) (0.116)
Quality of Governance Index  (ICRG QOG - average 1990s - 
2010)
2.412*** 1.340***
(0.604) (0.421)
Population Density (at 2000 in 1000s of Peoples) -0.186*** -0.199*** -0.208*** -0.199*** -0.145*** -0.155*** -0.147*** -0.164***
(0.0265) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0239) (0.0336) (0.0338) (0.0318) (0.0324)
IV Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tribal Fixed Effects Specification No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Centred R_Square/Within R_Square 0.0192 0.271 0.247 0.334 0.115 0.207 0.171 0.298
Adjusted R_Square -0.00784 0.251 0.226 0.314 -0.688 -0.511 -0.580 -0.379
F-Statistic 16.59 20.76 19.83 18.45 5.045 5.153 5.882 6.071
No. of Observations 449 449 449 403 406 406 406 338
No. of Clusters . . . . . . . .
Degree of Freedom 12 12 12 12 193 193 193 166
 Kleibergen-Paaps Weak Identifcation Test Wald Statistic 26.22 49.78 53.01 145.7 16.89 26.97 20.32 40.20
Jansens Test P-value For Overidentifying Restrictions 0.0520 0.00942 0.0117 6.71e-05 0.583 0.400 0.680 0.204
 Kleibergen-Paaps Underidentification Test LM Statistic 68.22 74.23 91.87 71.64 57.31 69.10 70.45 49.33
 Kleibergen-Paaps Underidentification Test LM P-value 0 0 0 0 4.41e-09 0 0 1.44e-07
The C-Statistic (for - Distance to the nearest Missionary station) 10.02 3.800 5.706 0.0266 10.98 5.747 14.59 10.09
P-value of C-Statistic 0.00155 0.0512 0.0169 0.871 0.000919 0.0165 0.000134 0.00149
Anderson-Rubin F-test of significance of endogenous regressors 0 0 0 0 0.00131 0.00131 0.00131 0.000347
P-value of Anderson-Rubin F-test of endogenous regressors 0 0 0 0 0.00470 0.00470 0.00470 0.00224
No. of Tribal Clusters 181 181 181 154
Nearest Split Ethnic Centroid Distance to Confirmed Missionary 
Locations (1,000s KM)
0.4044*** 0.2841* 0.3020** 0.0043 1.1682*** 0.9639** 1.4930*** 0.3552***
'(0.1362) '(0.1521) '(0.1331) '(0.0269) '(0.3540) '(0.4086) '(0.4122) '(0.1040)   
Indicator for the presence of a European Explorer route in associated 
country
-0.1116* -0.2310*** -0.1795** 0.0936*** -0.3086*** -0.5254*** -0.4535*** 0.0637*  
'(0.0588) '(0.0701) '(0.0824) '(0.0185) '(0.0761) '(0.0929) '(0.1071) '(0.0362)   
State History Index (Putterman, 2012 - discounted at 10%) 0.2353* 0.2193 0.4204*** -0.0486* 0.8373*** 0.8905*** 1.0717*** 0.0338
'(0.1201) '(0.1406) '(0.1299) '(0.0279) '(0.1743) '(0.2077) '(0.1992) '(0.0462)   
Adjusted R_Square 0.253 0.335 0.397 0.645 -0.342 -0.143 -0.108 0.295
Centred R_Square/Within R_Square 0.28664 0.364341 0.423724 0.662269 0.322321 0.42271 0.440602 0.6577
F-Statistic 23.79585 44.27269 73.10094 132.4316 12.08857 20.14894 11.67797 35.40559
F-Statistic showing joint strength of Instrumental variables 26.21707 49.78453 53.01406 145.735 16.88728 26.97096 20.3214 40.1971
No. of Observations 449 449 449 403 406 406 406 338
Tribal Fixed Effects Specification No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full-set of Controls: Population density, distance to sea, distance to border, distance to associated national capital, mean elevation, soil productivity, malaria 
succeptibility index, land area, diamond mines indicator, petroleum sites indicator and water bodies indicator
Dependent Variable: Logged Split Ethnic Land's Average Access Roads Length 1980 - 2010 (NASA SEDAC data repository)
First-stage Results for the IV Regressions Above
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findings using this measure corroborates theirs, which uses an alternative 
identification strategy and empirical methodology. 
We find in general from the first-stage regressions that, pre-colonial European 
contact, on the average, appears to have had a debilitating effect on institutional 
quality regardless of whether the type of activity encouraged exploitation through 
commerce or whether it was subtler by adopting the machinery of religion. The 
latter of these ideas was not an expected outcome but it is plausible. The locals 
at the time could easily have perceived either form of European infiltrations as 
invasive and negligent of their inherent pre-existing traditional values. As a result 
they would have nurtured a sense of disdain very early on and responded 
negatively towards any form of European influence including the sense of a 
national identity and the institutional dynamics that would have followed after. 
We see that a national historical feature, such as the national administrative 
identity of the country is equally very important and provides a positive 
explanation of current average institutional quality. Indicating that a nation 
state’s history may be very relevant, as peripheral states would definitely 
cooperate in the nation state’s interest the longer they have been part of such a 
national historical identity. 
By introducing an alternative measure of economic development to the 
empirical discourse we are able to probe deeper the effect national institutional 
outcomes have on urban development from multiple dimensions and perspectives. 
This average access roads length variable is a measure that captures economic 
activity quite differently from the nighttime lights density variable. Particularly 
because it does not change that much from year to year but certainly does reflect 
the potential and level of development and potential for urbanisation for a 
particular region. Since both measures capture some form of infrastructural 
development, it is quite interesting to compare the results of national institutional 
development on their cross-sectional variations across our African subnational 
demarcated ethnic homelands sample. This finding could also be indicative of the 
analogy that roads is more of a public infrastructure compared to local or domestic 
illumination efforts which are more of a private endeavour with the exception of 
street lighting. As a result, our nighttime lights index is less likely to be correlated 
with national institutional quality compared to the average roads length index. 
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2.4.4 - Key Weaknesses of Study 
This study has a number of weaknesses; our enumeration as listed below is by 
no means exclusive or conclusive of itself. 
Firstly, the research would have benefited from a much more subnational 
mono-levelled analysis. Given that the institutional measure is observed and 
measured at the national level, it does not allow the model to control for other 
non-measurable country level phenomena such as internal coordination, current 
international influences, etc., which would have easily been captured using 
country level fixed-effects. Although a lot has been captured or soaked up using 
ethnic fixed-effects, including country fixed-effects would have definitely helped 
to further eliminate any suspicions of an omitted variable issue. 
Secondly, the multidimensionality in the data structure created by our key 
variables being observed at both the country-level and the split ethnic homelands 
subnational-level inclines our model framework to additional residual noise. 
Although we have adopted an IV methodology, which could mitigate this issue, a 
less noisier model framework would have been possible if there was a clear signal 
mechanism or process in the modern regional geopolitical system that more 
strongly linked institutional quality at the national level to economic activity at 
the subnational level apart from the historical signal mechanism adopted herein. 
For instance, it would have been more useful if there were a national institutional 
variable measured at the subnational state or intra-regional administrative 
(provincial) level. This would have provided additional justification or robustness 
to the results obtained in this study as the link between subnational administrative 
institutional apparatuses and economic activities at the ethnic homeland is more 
obvious than claims of direct channels with their respective central governments. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 2.1 – Definition of Regression Variables 
Variable Units of Measure 
Variable(s) Used 
from Original 
Dataset 
Source 
Log(0.001 + 
Average 
Nighttime lights 
density index 
2010-2011) 
Polygonal-average 
of Index between 0 
and 63 
GRID values 
Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series: 
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites
.html 
Log(Average 
Roads Length 
over the 1980-
2010 period) 
Polygonal-average 
in 1000 Kilometres 
LENGTH_KM 
Global Roads Open Access Data Set (gROADS), v1 
(1980 – 2010): 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/groads-global-
roads-open-access-v1 
Country's WBGI 
Corruption 
Control 
Country-level 
Index between -2.5 
to +2.5 
N/A 
World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (KKM, 2009, 2011): 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#h
ome 
Country's WBGI 
Rule of Law Index 
Country-level 
Index between -2.5 
to +2.5 
N/A 
World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (KKM, 2009, 2011): 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#h
ome 
Country's WBGI 
Governance 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Country-level 
Index between -2.5 
to +2.5 
N/A 
World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (KKM, 2009, 2011): 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#h
ome 
Country's Quality 
of Governance 
Index 
Country-level 
Index between 0 
and 1  
icrg_qog 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Basic Jan 2015: 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive 
Nearest Split 
Ethnic Centroid 
Distance to 
Confirmed 
Missionary 
Locations (1,000s 
KM) 
Polygonal-average 
in 1000 Kilometres 
NAME - 
representing the 
individual 
missionary stations 
Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) based on work originally 
from Roland A. Oliver (2000) - available in his 
replication-data section: 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/roome_map_
1924.zip?m=1364314848 
Indicator for the 
presence of a 
historical explorer 
route passing 
through country's 
border 
Country-level 
Dummy variable 
Explorer_N - 
representing names 
of the individual 
routes 
Nunn (2010) based on a map published by William R. 
M. Roome (1924) - available in his replication-data 
section: 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/3610301/Colonial
_railways.zip 
State History 
Index (Bockstette, 
Chanda & 
Putterman, 2002 - 
discounted at 
10%) 
Country-level 
Index between 0 
and 1 
statehistn10v3 
Version 3.1 based on work by Bockstette, Chanda & 
Putterman, 2002 : available at 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty
/Louis_Putterman/antiquity%20index.htm 
Never Colonised 
Indicator 
Country-level 
Dummy variable 
ht_colonial 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Basic Jan 2015: 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive 
British Colony 
Indicator 
Country-level 
Dummy variable 
ht_colonial 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Basic Jan 2015: 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive 
French Colony 
Indicator 
Country-level 
Dummy variable 
ht_colonial 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Basic Jan 2015: 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive 
French Legal 
Origin Indicator 
Country-level 
Dummy variable 
lp_legor 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Basic Jan 2015: 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive 
Log (1 + 
Population 
Density at 2000) 
Polygonal-average: 
Discrete Count 
Variable 
grid_code 
UNEP/GRID - Sioux Falls Dataset (Africa Population 
Distribution Database): 
http://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/datasets/datalist.php 
Distance to Sea 
Nearest distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a 
Geodatabase of 
Polylines 
Water Polygons: Available at the Open Street Map 
http://openstreetmapdata.com/data/water-polygons 
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Distance to 
Country Border 
Nearest distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a Shapefile 
with National 
Boundary Outlines 
National Administrative Boundaries, v3 (2000), 
Gridded Population of the World (GPW), v3: 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/gpw-v3-
national-admin-boundaries/data-download 
Distance to 
National Capital 
Centroid distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a Shapefile of 
National Capital 
centroid points 
ArcGIS Data Gallery - World Cities: 
http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=dfab3b294a
b24961899b2a98e9e8cd3d 
Mean Elevation 
Polygonal-
averages but used 
as the 
log(kilometres) 
From Data 
provided in 
ArcView ESRI 
Grid Format 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, 
TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.: 
http://nelson.wisc.edu/sage/data-and-
models/atlas/maps.php?datasetid=28&includerelatedlin
ks=1&dataset=28 
Soil Productivity 
Index 
Polygonal-average 
of Index between 1 
and 97 
GRID values 
representing Soil 
Quality 
TERRASTAT I, FAO Soil Productivity Index 
Malaria Ecology 
Index 
Polygonal-average 
of Index between a 
lowest value of 0 
and highest value 
of 38.081 
GRID values 
representing 
Incidence rates 
Malaria Ecology Map based on work by Kiszewski, 
Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs 
(2004): available at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/people/gmccord/sitefile
s/file/malaria_ecology.zip 
Log Split Land 
Area 
Polygonal-average 
in 1000 Kilometres 
N/A 
Obtained from the Geographic intersection of the 
Country-level administrative boundaries - obtained 
from the Diva GIS website 
http://biogeo.ucdavis.edu/data/world/countries_shp.zip; 
and the Tribal Homeland Boundaries based on the work 
of Peter Murdock (1959) - available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/murdock_sha
pefile.zip?m=1364315353 
Diamond Mine 
Present Indicator 
Polygonal Dummy 
variable 
NAME - 
representing the 
individual sites 
Diamond Resources from the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (PRIO) website: 
https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-
Datasets/Diamond-Resources/ 
Petroleum Well 
Present Indicator 
(On-shore) 
Polygonal Dummy 
variable 
NAME - 
representing the 
individual sites 
Petroleum Dataset from the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (PRIO) website: 
https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-
Datasets/Petroleum-Dataset/ 
Indicator for the 
presence of Inland 
Water Body (KM) 
Polygonal Dummy 
variable 
N/A 
Global Lakes and Wetlands Database: Lakes and 
Wetlands Grid (Level 3): 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/global-
lakes-and-wetlands-database-lakes-and-wetlands-grid-
level-3 
Table O – Appendix-Table 2.1: Variable Definition of Regression Analyses Variables 
 
 
Appendix 2.2 – List of Countries Sampled in the Regressions 
Sample of Countries Involved in this Chapter's Analyses 
Algeria Libya 
Angola Malawi 
Benin Mali 
Botswana Mauritania 
Burkina Faso Morocco 
Burundi Mozambique 
Cameroon Namibia 
Central African Republic Niger 
Chad Nigeria 
Cote d'Ivoire Republic of Congo 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo Rwanda 
Djibouti Senegal 
Egypt Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea Somalia 
Eritrea South Africa 
Ethiopia Sudan 
Gabon Swaziland 
Gambia Tanzania 
Ghana Togo 
Guinea Tunisia 
Guinea-Bissau Uganda 
Kenya Zambia 
Lesotho Zimbabwe 
Liberia   
Table P – Appendix-Table 2.2: List of Countries Used in the Regression Analyses 
 
Appendix 2.3 – List of the 227 Tribal Homelands Sampled in the 
Regressions 
List of the 227 Tribal Groups Used in the Regression Analyses 
ABABDA BUEM HIECHWARE LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) NSUNGLI TIENGA 
ADELE BULOM HLENGWE LOBI NUKWE TIGON 
AFAR BUSA HOLO LUGBARA NUSAN TIGRINYA 
ALUR BWAKA IBIBIO LUNGU NYAKYUSA TLOKWA 
AMBA CHAGA IFORA LUVALE NYANGIYA TOMA 
AMBO CHAKOSSI IMRAGEN MADI NYANJA TONGA 
AMER CHEWA ISHAAK MAKONDE NYASA TRIBU 
ANA CHIGA IWA MALINKE NZANKARA TRIPOLITANIANS 
ANUAK CHOKWE JERID MAMBILA PANDE TUBURI 
ANYI DAGARI JIE MANDARA POPO TUKULOR 
ASBEN DARI KABRE MANGA PUKU TUMBUKA 
ASSINI DAZA KANEMBU MANYIKA RESHIAT TUNISIANS 
ATTA DENDI KAONDE MASAI RONGA UDALAN 
ATYUTI DIALONKE KAPSIKI MASALIT RUANDA VAI 
AULLIMINDEN DIDINGA KARA MASHI RUNDI VENDA 
AUSHI DIGO KARAMOJONG MASINA RUNGA VILI 
AVATIME DIOLA KARE MATAKAM SABEI WAKURA 
AZANDE DUMA KGATLA MBERE SAHO WANGA 
AZJER DZEM KISSI MBUKUSHU SAMO WUM 
BABUKUR EGBA KOBA MBUNDA SANGA YAKA 
BAJUN EKOI KOMA MENDE SEKE YAKOMA 
BALANTE ESA KOMONO MINIANKA SHAMBALA YALUNKA 
BANYUN EWE KONGO MOMBERA SHEBELLE YAO 
BANZIRI FANG KONJO MPEZENI SHUWA YOMBE 
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BARABRA FON KONKOMBA MUNDANG SONGHAI ZAGHAWA 
BARARETTA FOUTADJALON KONO MUNDU SONINKE ZEKARA 
BARGU FUNGON KONYANKE MUSGU SOTHO ZIMBA 
BASHI GADAMES KORANKO NAFANA SUBIA  
BATA GIL KOTA NALU SUNDI  
BAYA GOMANI KOTOKO NAMA SURI  
BERABISH GREBO KPELLE NAUDEBA SWAZI  
BERTA GRUNSHI KRAN NDAU TABWA  
BIDEYAT GUDE KREISH NDEMBU TAJAKANT  
BIRIFON GULA KUNDA NDOGO TAMA  
BOBO GUN KUNG NDUKA TAWARA  
BOKI GURENSI KUNTA NGAMA TEDA  
BONDJO GURMA KWANGARE NGERE TEKE  
BONI GUSII 
LAKA 
(ADAMAWA 
NGUMBA TEM  
BORAN HAMAMA LAMBA NGWAKETSE TENDA  
BRONG HAUSA LAMBYA NSENGA THONGA   
Table Q – Appendix-Table 2.3: List of Tribe Groups Used in the Regression Analyses 
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Chapter Three: 
The Geopolitics of Ethnic Boundary Demarcations 
and African Economic Development 
Abstract 
The study of under-development and tribal boundary demarcations in Africa has previously 
been limited to the Euro-centric position that the colonial scramble for resource and territory left 
the inherited post-colonial nation-states fundamentally ill-positioned to develop at a similar pace 
with the rest of the world. In this chapter, we argue that this narrative is as much intra-national 
(local, inward or internal) as it is inter-national (cross-national, outward or external). We find using 
an original dataset design that economic under-development can be observed as badly in 
subnational African tribal homelands that were solely affected by intra-national or provincial 
border demarcations as in tribal homelands that were jointly affected by both intra-national and 
inter-national border demarcations. Interestingly, subnational tribal homelands in Africa that were 
only demarcated inter-nationally were not significantly negatively associated with economic 
development as the relevant literature would have us believe; this persists even after controlling 
for two key politico-economic pre-colonial tribal characteristics. 
The local dynamics associated with these patterns are further explored in line with the local 
trust and ethnic discrimination literature. We find that the patterns of under-development 
observed using the nighttime lights index and the average roads length measures are consistent 
with the attendant local trust and ethnic discrimination channels. While local trust measures are 
consistently negatively and significantly associated with subnational locally demarcated tribal 
homelands, ethnic discrimination by the government is significantly targeted at or positively 
associated with tribal homelands that were demarcated intra-nationally (splits at the sub-national 
frontier only) and similarly at those that were jointly demarcated both intra-nationally and inter-
nationally (splits at both sub-national and international frontiers). Our results go to show that local 
dynamics are as debilitating as externally composed ones and ignoring these in our study of 
African development could certainly ill-inform any policy attempts interested in achieving 
economic or politico-economic progress. 
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Section 3.1 – Introduction 
Economic development is a multifaceted phenomenon. The idea that the 
drivers of economic growth can be classified broadly as proximate and 
fundamental factors has dominated the empirical literature for quite a while now 
(Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013). However, the approaches employed to distinctly 
assess these classes of growth-stimuli with regards to economic outcomes across 
economic units remain an avenue for significant contributions to the literature. 
Economic development in Africa had over decades been pervasively 
investigated from a country-unit perspective (Grier & Tullock, 1989; Barro, 1996; 
Easterly & Levine, 1997; Alesina & Perroti, 1996; Alesina et al, 1996; Englebert, 
2000; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (AJR), 2001; Glaeser et al, 2004; etc.). As a 
result, key fundamental issues affecting the geo-institutional fabric of the growth 
environment, such as the relevance of ethnic structures for instance, were 
relegated to aggregated-dimensions consistent with those country-unit constructs. 
The connection between geography, politics and socioeconomic outcomes are very 
intricately interwoven - more so within the African context (Bloom et al, 1998; 
AJR, 2001; Naude, 2004; MacKinnon & Cumbers, 2009; Crescenzi & Percoco (Eds.), 
2013; Auer, 2013; etc.). The significance of the African ethno-cultural angle seems 
particularly dominant, however: mundanely appearing to be the glue holding and 
orchestrating most levels of societal organisation, even in modern times (Nunn, 
Robinson & Weigel, 2015). The very institutional fabric underpinning the African 
development model is not easily investigable without a framework that rightly 
recognizes the inherent importance of disaggregation and individuality made 
relevant by the enduring manifestation of ethnic identification in African 
geopolitical states. This itself contradicts the notion of statehood imposed by the 
colonial and subsequent postcolonial political construct. 
While the literature has capitalized on very worthwhile issues of ethnic 
heterogeneity and dissension in its assessment of this inherent ethno-institutional 
interplay, few studies have gone further to actually assess the challenges broader 
issues of ethnic partitioning bring to bear on economic development. It is common 
knowledge that the African region is among the most ethnically dense continents 
in the world. It is also acknowledged that the amalgamations of different such 
ethnicities into single nation-states following the Berlin conference of 1885 may 
have contrived the protracted geopolitical environment of institutional infancy 
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resulting in sustained weak economic outcomes compared to other parts of the 
world. However, the subject of ethnic demarcations (cleavages) has only recently 
begun being empirically analysed from a disaggregated subnational 
administrative-level by the likes of Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2011) - who 
address our question from an ethno-country level of administrative interaction (or 
geo-intersection). By operating at a more disaggregated level, key aspects of this 
research area can be explored much deeper. This is particularly because the 
African socio-political and economic landscape is still very much rife with sub-
regional themes of ethnic and tribal individualism and dissentions. 
 
3.1.1 – Contribution 
In this paper we attempt to assess the relationship between ethnic homeland 
demarcations and economic activity from a multilevel analytical perspective. It 
considers this African-relevant empirical question by looking at 3 different kinds 
of ethno-geographic splits arising from the geopolitical interaction (or geo-
intersection) of historic ethnic homelands with modern subnational African states. 
This approach is multilevel in that it accommodates a framework where ethnic 
homelands are nested within the administrative jurisdictions of subnational state 
or provincial boundaries, which are further nested within the central 
administration and territory of their corresponding countries. As a result of this 
design, our study of split-ethnic homelands is divided into two administrative 
dimensions or frontiers. This allows us to obtain four split-ethnic categories, which 
could be viewed either as a split-intensity index measuring the outward degree of 
tribal demarcations or as an ordinal classification of related types of tribal 
demarcations56. These split categories correspond to different levels of ethnic 
homeland demarcations: that is tribal homelands with no splits at both frontiers; 
those split at the sub-national frontier only; those split at the international 
frontier only; and those jointly split at both the sub-national and inter-national 
frontiers, respectively. Consequently, this makes our design subtly yet 
significantly unique from those that have previously looked at fundamental African 
development issues from different ethno-country perspectives such as Fearon, 
                                         
56 It is important for the reader to note at this point that the terms tribes and ethnic groups are used 
interchangeably. Also the term state is used to stand-in for the next subnational administrative or provincial 
level to a country. The country is sometimes referred to as a nation-state, which is distinct from the 
subnational state or state, as already highlighted. 
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2003; Nunn (2008); Nunn & Puga (2012); Michalopoulos (2012); Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou (2013, 2014, 2011). 
We attempt to achieve our primary objective of assessing the impact of ethnic 
homeland demarcations on the cross-sectional variation of subnational economic 
activity in Africa by specifically: 
i. Looking at the average impact of different levels of ethnic or tribal homeland 
demarcations on economic development using a novel-fabricated measure of geo-
ethno-split intensity index. This index provides a single measure of the intensity of 
the geographic (geopolitical) demarcations of ethnic homelands within and across 
countries. It also provides the literature with an alternative measure of ethnic 
fragmentation based on the administrative level and the point of effect for each 
respective ethnic homeland. Such a measure not only allows this analysis to capture 
the average impact of moving laterally across each category but also allows the study 
to demonstrate the debilitating impact of ethnic cleavages in general on the 
identification and development of these geopolitical units within the African region 
ii. The application of our multilevel approach to the empirical question of ethnic 
partitions in Africa also affords us the opportunity to evaluate its mixed impacts on 
economic development. In this design, differing sources or actors of ethnic homeland 
partitioning within Africa are considered. Thus providing us with an avenue for 
juxtaposing their individual associations with economic activity across the 
geopolitical units of interest 
iii. Also by comparatively analysing the effects of tribal demarcations from a source or 
actor perspective, we are able to statistically revisit claims: that the exogenous 
uninformed scramble for African territories conducted by the European powers at the 
time of the Berlin conference would have created better current economic outcomes 
had these ethnic nations been demarcated and individually identified along tribally 
conscious lines. Such an assessment is pertinent and becomes feasible within a 
framework as ours. Particularly because, we exploit a pseudo-experimental design in 
which each country should have had, ex-poste, an opportunity to fabricate 
geopolitically administrative identities consistent with the homelands and customary 
practices of its constituent tribes using subnational or internal boundaries following 
the independence drive of the late 1950s. Although, most countries resulting from 
the colonial scramble for Africa inherited and maintained their respective outer 
national boundaries and identities as initially prescribed and later formally agreed on 
at the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of 
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the OAU in Cairo of July 1964, the internal partitioning and governing of each 
country remained an independent responsibility of each realized multi-ethnic nation-
state. The resulting multi-ethnic nation-states certainly had more knowledge of the 
extent of their respective existing cultural diversity or homogeneity and would have 
been compelled to create institutions and geopolitical delimitations consistent with 
their respective internal ethno-polity structures to maximize any possibility for 
national singularity or nationhood. Taking this narrative to the inquiry affords us the 
opportunity to unearth possible root causes of underdevelopment beyond the over-
dramatized colonialism and imperialism arguments still dominating the African story 
after over three-decades of widespread regional political independence 
The core premise of our study is that: regardless of the type or source, the 
geopolitical demarcations and polarization of tribal states in Africa have direly 
affected the development of economic activity in subnational areas across the 
African region. While this angle of research enquiry has previously been explored 
at both the cross-national and ethnic-country levels, we are yet to see how 
differing political agents of such demarcations may have affected economic 
activities distinctly. There are two main classes of political agents at play in this 
discourse.  
The first of these classes, were the pre-colonial European political agents that 
divided and amalgamated a significant number of previously autonomous ethnic 
homelands into whole new governable territories (or polities). These polities were 
noticeably governed by key European colonial powers that administrated each only 
almost autonomously; these colonies would later become recognized countries in 
the post-colonial independence era from the late 1950s.  
The second class of agents is the principal administrative governments of the 
respective post-colonial independent nation-states themselves. There is no reason 
to believe that these second set of political agents did not know the underlying 
geopolitical structures of the ethnic homelands spanning their respective national 
territories. Although the timing, design and motives of their ethnic-demarcation 
actions may have varied for each country across the region, they nonetheless had 
a significant impact on the eventual turn of events both socio-politically and socio-
economically for the experiences of each resulting tribal homeland. 
A lot has been said about just how dismal the ill-informed scramble, conquest 
and imperialist colonisation of Africa was on the modern development of the 
countries spanning the region. However, little has been done to actually compare 
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and demonstrate how different types of tribal demarcations or how the extent of 
such demarcations collectively affected developmental differences across 
different African subnational states. With the framework harnessed herein, we 
can assess this scenario and confirm whether it is the European scramble that is 
mostly to blame or whether there are other much related underlying local factors 
of equal attention to be reflected on. 
 
3.1.2 – Analytical Background 
The multilevel framework adopted herein is not so farfetched from the socio-
political reality of most African economic and political administrative 
arrangements. Most of these arrangements are multi-tier in nature permitting 
most country-governments to replicate their machineries at subsequently lower 
levels of administration (or subnational states such as provinces, protectorates, 
regions, divisions, local government areas, etc.). These frontline governance 
constituents or administrative arms usually act as institutional appendages with 
which respective central governments are able to gain administrative proximity 
to grass-root levels (or ethnic homelands) for the pooling, provisioning and 
consolidation of national resources. They are effectively a systemic adaptation of 
national institutions to the unique and nuanced experiences of internally existing 
subnational ethnic dynamics. The relevance and justification for intra-national 
regional territorial delimitations and demarcations can be substantially found in 
the decentralisation literature. It is often argued therein that the delegation of 
fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities to subnational levels of 
government not only necessitates bringing economic and political systems closer 
to the people but also ensures the integration of the national political system 
itself (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird 1998).  
For countries in one of the most culturally diverse continents of the world, it is 
no surprise that national demarcations consistent with subnational ethnic 
differences and similarities are an inevitable inclination. By analysing the cross-
sectional development of economic levels at this tribal-subnational (split) level, 
we can provide initial insight into the actual outcomes of this sort of political 
decentralization regardless of the intrinsic motives. When we speak of motives 
here, we are recognising the position that some of the existing subnational 
demarcations may have been politically engineered to diffuse the political 
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influence of competing ethnic groups and not necessarily as engines for promoting 
power-sharing, governance quality or administrative accountability as we would 
expect57. This is not surprising especially as the unofficial goal of most political 
parties in ethnically-dense countries are not necessarily directed at ideological 
supremacy but at ethno-regional identification and empowerment58. In fact, 
ethnic (or tribal) identification, and individual behaviour, political and 
socioeconomic circumstances are not easily separable – particularly so for multi-
ethnic countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Eifert et al, 2010). 
By geographically inferring the nature, type or source of ethnic homeland 
demarcations from a subnational perspective this study is able to not only unearth 
the impact of ethnic boundary fragmentation on economic activity but also reveal 
how the intensity of such splits correlates with economic development as well. 
Although some channels are explored in the general discussions around the results 
of this chapter, causal pathways are not themselves its central focus. With such a 
functionally relevant level of administrative disaggregation, this work focuses on 
comparing the cross-sectional average levels of economic activity (development) 
across differing actors or degrees of geopolitical ethnic homeland splits. Such a 
non-causal analysis could, at the least, be relevant to absolving or reinforcing the 
role of the European scramble for African colonies versus those propagated by 
local non-European dynamics on its regional development. Also if nothing else, 
this provides the empirical literature with an alternative measure of ethnic 
homeland fragmentation very different from those previously adopted. We are 
able to identify major classifications, types or sources of ethnic homeland 
cleavages; and how these provide differing perspectives on the sources and 
distribution of economic development across the African continent at a provincial 
level. 
A number of interesting paths of inquest can arise from a research such as this. 
Its findings could firstly be relevant for its plain purpose of demonstrating the 
association between differing ethnic homeland demarcations and economic 
development (the main objective). Or secondly, it could provide a much deeper 
inference about the key findings especially with respect to uncovering some 
                                         
57 We expand on these opposing positions or arguments a few paragraphs down. 
58 This is a very similar notion to that discussed in Wimmer and Cederman, 2009: 317, where they opine that 
unlike empires, the politics of nation states will hover around the relative distribution of ethnic groups’ 
access to political power. 
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dynamics inherent to the geopolitical and socioeconomic landscape of the 
subnational regions involved.  
If for instance, it turns out that areas of intra-national (or local) ethnic 
demarcations seem to be as underdeveloped as those areas affected by European-
led demarcations. Then it could indicate that the schism engineered at this level 
was as debilitating on economic activity as was that done in ignorance by the 
Europeans. This could be a signpost supporting the narrative that the intra-
national demarcations of ethnic homelands in Africa might itself be part of a 
deeper local political and economic power game orchestrated to weaken 
potentially competing ethno-political minorities against their dominant 
(incumbent) counterparts. That dominant ruling tribes (governing incumbents) 
attempt to localise potential ethnic tensions stirring from ethno-political 
competition to the local subnational levels thus redirecting the interests of these 
minority groups away from national politics and such like affairs unto local ones.  
A country that embodies such dynamics happens to be one of the most populous 
and ethnically diverse countries in Africa, Nigeria. This is a country where even 
the formula about how national resources (political-power and economic wealth) 
are internally distributed is often rife with ethnic and tribal subjects. A typical 
illustration of this issue is on the matter of state creation (a major mechanism for 
national resource allocation), which is mostly done down the lines of ethnic 
identity and to ameliorate claims of disenfranchisement from national affairs 
(Vande, 2012 and Adeyemi, 2013). In such cases subnational-state creation (power 
decentralization) is a buyout effort to decrease the probability for cessation or 
irredentist demands by affected interest groups.  
Also state creation could minimise increased demands for political competition 
and participation at the national levels. This channel is definitely consistent with 
the segregation  trust  institutional-quality  economic-development 
argument put forward by Alesina & Zhuravstaya (2011). This is mostly because we 
would expect that disenfranchised or politically isolated groups would naturally 
have minimal confidence (trust) in the politically dominant groups to fairly 
allocate public (national) goods towards their homelands compared to the 
homelands of the politically dominant group.  
Similarly, it is likely that the extent of ethnic demarcations also maps unto 
relative underdevelopment through the ethnic-inequality  political-inequality 
(political discrimination)  unfair allocation of public-goods  regional economic 
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under-development channel as argued by Alesina, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 
(2012)59. Both routes linking ethnic discrimination with economic development are 
very similar or more or less entangled, as they would inevitably result in a loss of 
trust amongst ethnic groups in cooperative endeavours. This is because public 
goods provisioning and the equitable or fair allocation of shared national wealth 
is itself a symptom of the quality of governance or a component of the broader 
national institutional framework.  
On the other hand, it could be the case that while the European-forced 
demarcations on ethnic homelands appear to have had debilitating consequences 
for development, the locally fabricated split tribes could have been positively 
associated with economic outcomes. This is the kind of outcome that proponents 
of African decentralization expect. It signals that internal partitions were 
designed with knowledge of the inherent local ethnic homeland structures in order 
to maximize cooperative functioning both at the local and national echelons. As a 
result the problems of ethnic domination and fears of local resource exploitation 
by dominant groups are staved off and those of devolution, regionalization, and 
ethnic cooperation are thus promoted.  
In this paper, we argue that our results seem to support the former much more 
than the latter. It appears that demarcations at the local echelons happen to be 
consistently larger and more significantly associated with lower developmental 
levels. This is in contrast to those areas affected by the uninformed European-
only splits or those unaffected by any sort of demarcations at all. This suggests 
that the findings in the literature providing support for European-induced 
underdevelopment through the scramble for Africa, as contained in the ethnic 
fractionalization literatures and their affiliate narratives, may in fact be echoes 
of deeper subnational-level dynamics independent of that type of European 
influence as propagated by the anti-imperialist studies.  
Further implying that although ethnic cooperation matters in a multi-ethnic 
structure as in African nation-states, it matters through more local channels than 
through aggregated national ones, contrary to what the earlier anti-colonialist 
researches would have us believe. The link between human interaction 
(institutionally and individually) and land or territoriality is quite a strong one; it 
often underpins many other issues around strides at state creation and nationalism 
                                         
59 Also see Burgess et al, 2013 for a similar study where they show that access roads development projects 
were under-provisioned for ethnically under-favoured ethnic groups. 
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(Saltman (Eds.), 2002). After all early evidences of regional ethnic tensions, 
dissentions and competition for land and resource-wealth in Africa predate 
European influences of colonialism or imperialism (see Besley & Reynal-Querol, 
2014). 
 
3.1.3 – Survey of Chapter’s Remaining Sections 
The section following this, the second section, is the literature review that 
provides an overview of selected papers from the literature relevant to ethnic 
demarcations and economic development. The third section is the model 
specification and data setup section, which provides information on the models to 
be estimated, a brief description and summary of the variables used, their sources 
and also information on how the overall dataset is setup. Section four is the results 
and interpretation section, which displays the results and attempts to provide 
some intuitive interpretations in line with narratives introduced and maintained 
throughout the entire chapter. This final section also includes a general conclusion 
which recaps on the major findings, their implications and provides some avenues 
for further research based on the weaknesses of those from this research. 
 
Section 3.2 – Literature Review 
Understanding development patterns in Africa has been at the heart of 
economic development analysis for over 4 decades now. This is because although 
the region is rife with the abundance of peoples and natural resources, it has been 
plagued by widespread fundamental challenges to its ability to utilize and harness 
developmental recipes in the same manner as other countries from other regions 
of the world having similar endowment constellations. In this section, we attempt 
to briefly review the literature related to how ethnic demarcations have affected 
developmental strides in Africa and elsewhere relevant in the world. 
 
3.2.1 – Ethnic Demarcation and Economic Performance 
While the empirical literature on ethnicity and African development has 
previously predominantly focused on channels through conflict (Easterly & Levine, 
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1997; Wimmer & Cederman, 2009; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a & 2005b)60 
via demography-motivated notions of ethnic divisions or clustering 
(fractionalization, diversity, polarization, etc.), the literature on ethnic homeland 
boundary alterations (geography-motivated) have remained relatively meagre. 
The interlacing of geographic endowments (homeland ownership including the 
accompanying natural resources) and political influence can to a considerable 
degree mask the underlying relationships between demography-based treatments 
of the ‘ethnicity-development’ discourse. Discussion on ethnic demarcations and 
economic development in Africa has so far accentuated the modern incidence of 
the European scramble for land, resources and influence in the region. Themes of 
border artificiality (Asiwaju, 1985; Griffith, 1986; Alesina, Easterly & Matuszeski, 
200661; Fall, 2010; Green, 2012), forced-integration (“suffocation”) and forced-
separation (“dismemberment”) (Englebert & Carter, 2002) appear to dominate 
the primary conduits via which the scramble linked historical homeland 
demarcations with current strides in economic development. Other sub-channels 
have been explored and it is not improbable that demarcations at different 
administrative levels could in some cases generate positive and in others negative 
associations with the development of economic activity62. 
The debate on local (intra-national) demarcations can themselves be found in 
the decentralization discourse, which has mostly been non-African. In this 
literature, decentralization at the subnational administrative levels can both be 
good and bad for development depending on specific circumstances and on the 
case study in-view. According to the consolidation discourse, amalgamation of 
subnational groups results in bigger more efficient mechanisms for the allocation 
of public goods at their respective grass root interests benefiting from positive 
economies of scale effects (see for instance Dollery et al, 2006; Slack & Bird, 2013; 
etc.). While opponents to this amalgamation narrative argue that more 
administratively fragmented systems representing clear common singular interests 
                                         
60 For readers interested in this debate, they could also see the counter-literature arguing that conflict is not 
necessary significantly associated with ethnic fractionalization as one would expect (Bowen, 1996; 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a; Collier 2007: 25-26; etc.). 
61 This was later published as Alesina, Easterly & Matuszeski (2011) in the Journal of the European Economic 
Association. 
62 See Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) for a review of the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on 
economic activity and the underpinning micro-theory. 
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tend to encourage local participation, administrative responsiveness and 
accountability to the local interests they serve (see Faguet, 2004, for instance).  
It is not hard to see how the ethnic diversification literature can fit into these 
themes of intra-country demarcations, particularly when such demarcations relate 
with the amalgamation of smaller ethnic homelands into relatively bigger 
subnational administrative units or the splitting of bigger ethnic homelands into 
multiple subnational administrative units. Miguel & Gugerty (2005) shows that 
ethnic diversity in rural western Kenya was associated with weaker social 
sanctions resulting in the shrinking of needed public goods provisioning (such as 
“primary school funding and water-wells maintenance”). Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 
(1999) do a similar work with datasets on U.S. cities, metropolitan areas and urban 
counties and find that ethnic fragmentation was inversely associated with key 
productive public goods provisioning such as education, roads, and etc. This line 
of narrative relating ethnic diversity (heterogeneity) in subnational areas with 
economic development through public goods provisioning is very much consistent 
with that which attempts to connect ethnic diversity with governance quality (see 
La Porta et al, 1999 and Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005).  
At this point one can see how these two literatures (decentralization and 
ethnic-heterogeneity) knit together: amalgamation appears to be more 
detrimental to the provisioning of public services (or goods) in more ethnically 
heterogeneous circumstances compared to decentralization, while the reverse is 
more likely true for more ethnically homogenous areas where commonness in 
heritage fuels administrative cooperation. Although, Dippel (2014) in his study on 
Native American reservations shows that even for ethnically and linguistically 
homogenous groups, forced integration into a system of shared governance was 
associated with a 30% decline in present day levels of economic development. It 
is important to note here however, that these were for groups distinguished at 
sub-tribal bands implying that while they may be of common ancestry at the tribal 
level they are quite distinct groups at a finer more detailed level of classification. 
The African growth literature is very well researched for how cross-national 
demarcations of ethnic homelands associate with the economic development of 
affected areas. Cross-national ethnic demarcations are very much the penetration 
method in this literature. It is argued that such demarcations affected the 
homeland and cultural identities of tribes at the periphery of colonially inherited 
national borders. This further resulted in the polarization of both homelands and 
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peoples; where the affected areas have been found to not only be associated with 
weaker national institutions on the average (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2014) 
but also have been found to have higher average conflict incidences 
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012). Although some authors such as Gennaioli & 
Rainer (2007), Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013) and Fenske (2014) argue that 
the politico-economic and unique fundamentals of key pre-colonial tribal states 
made them more affable to modern recipes of political and economic 
development. 
Taking a summative glance at these intersecting discourses on ethnicity and 
economic development in Africa, we find that the partitioning of ethnic 
homelands created a regional environment marred by both ethnic divisions63 
(Easterly & Levine, 1997; Alesina et al, 2003; Fearon, 2003) and ethnic inequality 
or political inequality (Alesina & Zhuravstaya, 2011; Burgess et al, 2013; Hodler & 
Raschky, 2014). Each of these narratives demonstrate (even though differently) 
that: the loss of historic homeland arrangements for a significant percentage of 
African tribes (Asiwaju, 1985) resulted in a loss of politico-economic bargaining 
influences and created institutional (cultural and territorial) instabilities, which 
eventually translated into varying levels of economic development at various 
administrative levels. 
 
 
  
                                         
63 This could equally be referred to using any of the compound classifications adopted in the literature: 
cleavages, fragmentation, fractionalization, polarization and etc. 
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Section 3.3 – Model Framework and Data Layout 
3.3.1 – The Core Model 
𝑑𝑒𝑣ejc =  θ1split_indexe + β1Xejc + β2Xe + αc;j + ∋𝑒,𝑗,𝑐    (1) 
and: 
∋𝑒,𝑗,𝑐 =  Uj + Vc + εejc        (2) 
where: 
- 𝒔𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒕_𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒆, is our categorical variable classifying each ethnic homeland into 0 – 
for those with “no-splits”, 1 – for those “split at the sub-national frontier only”, 2 – 
for those “split at the inter-national frontier only” and 3 – for those “jointly split at 
both the sub-national and inter-national frontiers simultaneously” 
- 𝑿𝒆𝒋𝒄, is a vector of control variables characteristic of the literature capturing 
exogenous geographic, ecologic and demographic features including a general 
intercept. These control variables vary at the ethnic-state (subnational) split level; 
while 𝑿𝒆 are historic pre-colonial covariates (political decentralization and 
settlement pattern indices) that vary at the ethnic or tribal level 
- 𝜶𝒄 ; 𝒋, controls for either country specific characteristics (c) or state (or subnational) 
level specific characteristics (j). Such as institutional and administrative dynamics, 
which may vary from one subnational jurisdiction to another 
- ∋𝒆,𝒋,𝒄, is the error process conjectured to be composed of three components - 𝜺𝒆𝒋𝒄 
follow a white noise IID process, while 𝑼𝒋 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑽𝒄 represent the variance 
adjustments of the error-process for both the subnational state and country levels, 
respectively, which we use in estimating our multilevel model variants. 𝑼𝒋 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑽𝒄 
allows the model to control for these two sources of variation in the error-term which 
otherwise would not be captured by 𝜺𝒆𝒋𝒄 resulting in omitted variable issues and such 
like biases 
- 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒋𝒄, is the response variable of interest and it attempts to measure the level of 
current economic activity observed at the demarcated ethnic homeland level. There 
are two main proxies used in this study – the average nighttime lights density variable 
and the average access roads length variable. Both have been normalized to represent 
units per square kilometres, respectively. To minimise measurement problems 
arising from both the data transformation approach and the actual measure of variable 
having a significant number of zeroes in it, we also provide estimates using the 
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variable in its original ordinal discrete form using a fixed-effects negative binomial 
estimator 
- subscripts: 𝒆, 𝒋 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄, identifies the split ethnic polygon, the corresponding 
subnational state and the country, respectively 
We have chosen to specify the model above to be consistent with a multi-level 
dataset structure. There is at least one ethnic group or tribal homeland (e) for 
each subnational state (j) within each country (c). As a result, there are an 
unbalanced number of observations per group in our designed sample. We choose 
to estimate the model above using an overarching multilevel (mixed-level) model 
with a maximum likelihood estimator, “mixed”, found in STATA64. This provides 
us with an advantage over conventional longitudinal models given this 
unbalancedness in our data structure (see Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Adopting such 
an approach allows us to estimate our desired model coefficients relatively more 
efficiently while controlling for multi-way nesting and cross- (or in-) variation 
patterns underlying the model’s errors process. As a result we are able to obtain 
estimates for the differing variances in the error-structure at each level of our 
analysis (in this case 3). We nonetheless compare our results to the Fixed-effect 
(FE) estimations conventional to the growth discourse where we control for 
unmeasured time-invariant heterogeneity consistent at state- (subnational-) or 
country- specific characteristics such as institutional dynamics, for instance. In 
such instances, we adjust for any potential multi-way cluster robust standard 
errors consistent with a three-way structure (ethnic-state-country) following 
Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller (2011). 
 
  
                                         
64 This is a computer application like Eviews, Matlab, or R normally used for statistical data analysis and for 
preparing statistical outputs (graphs and tables). 
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3.3.2 – The Model for Exploring Some Deeper Local Channels 
(following Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011)65 
y𝑖,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐 =  αc + θ2split_index𝑒 + 𝛽1X𝑖,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐 + 𝛽2X𝑑,𝑐 + 𝛽3X𝑒 +  ∋𝑖,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐  (3) 
because the error-term can equally be affected by the data structure, which is 
multi-nested at the ethnic and district levels, we also go ahead and provide 
estimates incorporating a mixed-effects structure:  
∋𝑖,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐 =  U𝑑 + V𝑒 + ε𝑖,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐        (4) 
where: 
- 𝑿𝒊,𝒆,𝒅,𝒄, 𝑿𝒅,𝒄, 𝑿𝒆 are vectors of control variables varying at the individual, district and 
tribal levels, respectively, mostly following the model originally adopted in by Nunn 
& Wantchekon (2011). These include the individual’s: education levels, occupation, 
religion, living conditions, age, gender, urban indicator for living location, 
perception of tribe’s political discrimination, perception of tribe’s economic 
conditions; the affiliated district’s: ethnic fractionalisation index and fraction of 
ethnicity within district; and the tribe’s: city status in year 1400, pre-colonial explorer 
contact status, total pre-colonial missions in area; malaria ecology, pre-colonial 
railway contact, pre-colonial political centralization index, and pre-colonial 
settlement status indicator. Two respondent level variables are introduced as 
additional controls (individual perception of political discrimination against own 
tribe and own tribe’s economic conditions), because we conjecture that these are 
correlated with both trust and patterns of internal tribal homeland demarcations66 
- 𝜶𝒄 is the country-level specific characteristics capturing shared unobserved 
heterogeneous effects such as institutional and other fundamental dynamics specific 
to each respondent’s country. These may, themselves systemically affect the trust 
disposition (or inclinations) of each respondent and the patterns of ethnic 
demarcations characteristic to each respondent’s country 
- ∋, is the error process hypothesized to have three components for the base model - 
while 𝜺,𝒊,𝒆,𝒅,𝒄 follows a white noise IID process, 𝑼𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑽𝒆 represent the variance 
adjustments of the error-process for both the subnational state level and country 
                                         
65 For more details on how the original model is set up and for further information on the variables used in this 
trust model, please refer to the original paper. We also adopt this latter model to test some of the channels 
introduced and discussed in section 3.1.2, above. 
66 There are some theoretical and empirical allusions to this position in the literature survey and analytical 
background sections above. 
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levels, respectively. 𝑼𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑽𝒆, allows the model to control for two sources of 
variation in the error-term which otherwise would not be captured by 𝜺𝒊,𝒆,𝒅,𝒄 resulting 
in omitted variable bias 
- 𝒚𝒊,𝒆,𝒅,𝒄, is alternatingly one of 5 trust measures used in the paper by Nunn & 
Wantchekon (2011) including an additional variable measuring the extent of 
government nepotism (or tribal favouritism) following a channel similar to that 
explored in Alesina, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2012). The trust variables 
include trust for local councils, trust for neighbours, trust for relatives, trust for other 
tribes’ members, trust of own tribe’ members, respectively 
- subscripts: 𝒊, 𝒆, 𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄, identifies the Afrobarometer67 respondent, the respondent’s 
ethnic or tribal group as defined by Murdock (1959), the respondent’s subnational 
district, and the respondent’s country, respectively 
To estimate the model laid out in equation 3 and 4 above, we adopt a maximum 
likelihood ordinal-logit estimator68 with a three-level mixed-effects framework 
(expatiated in equation 4) to capture the survey’s multi-cluster and multi-nested 
dynamics inherent in the data structure. This adjustment in our overarching 
assumption controls for intra-cluster correlations because the respondents 
involved in our estimations are resident in different districts and belong to 
different tribal homelands (or groups).  
We use this latter model specification (equations 3 and 4) to test two of the 
likely channels via which split categories may be associated with specific patterns 
of underdevelopment as discussed in our analytical background in section 3.1.2 
above. Since the exploration of causal channels is not the focus of our current 
study herein, we focus on the micro-trust and tribal fairness conduits. It has been 
discussed extensively in the literature how local trust intricacies affect economic 
development via mechanisms of coordination and institutional quality (see for 
instance: Alesina & Zhuravstaya, 2011). Additionally, because our dependent 
variables from our core model of interest (equation 1 in section 3.3.1 above) are 
                                         
67 This is the survey-based Afrobarometer Merged Round 3 Dataset available for 18 countries for the 2005 
survey stream. The codebook can be found on the http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/data/round-
3/merged_r3_codebook2_0.pdf website, for those interested in how the survey questions are designed or 
framed. 
68 Although Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) use an OLS based model, we choose to use an ordinal-logit model, 
as we believe this provides a better treatment of the dependent variables – trust and fairness. These are 
ordinal variables with four response categories and not continuous variables. 
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public-good in nature (nightlights and roads), the resulting findings could readily 
be applicable to the empirical literature relating public goods (services) 
provisioning with ethnic fractionalisation (see for instance: Miguel & Gugerty, 
2005; Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999) and those associated with tribal level 
politico-economic dynamics that associate access to power with economic 
empowerment or uneven distribution of economic development (Alesina, 
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012). 
In both models to be estimated (equations 3.1 and 3.3), we are unable to 
control for tribal level fixed effects because our key right-hand side variable of 
interest, split index, is measured at the ethnic homeland level. As a result we 
control for two crucial and commonly used pre-colonial politico-economic controls 
in the literature (level of political complexity and settlement patterns) to account 
for the varying levels of institutional complexity for the tribal arrangements 
involved in our study. The only downside to this is that these two variables are 
obtained from the Murdock (1959) anthropological dataset on the activities of a 
subsample of 441 tribal homelands from the 834 homelands originally mapped. As 
a result only about half our full-data sample is considered when we control for 
these pre-colonial attributes. 
 
3.3.3 – Variables and Data Sources 
The dependent variables used in this paper are the average nighttime lights 
density measure by the DMSP-OLS nightlight data from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data repository and the average roads length 
data obtained from the Global Roads Open Access Data set (gROADS) v1, by the 
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC)69. Both measures are 
polygonal averages constructed at the split ethnic-state (subnational) level. The 
interesting thing is that although both these variables can gauge economic activity 
at disaggregated split-levels, they could equally be useful for capturing cross-
sectional variations in development consistent with the extent of government 
service or goods provisioning at such levels of governance administration. 
Nighttime light density would definitely capture significant amounts of street 
                                         
69 Please refer to section 2.3.4.1 for a more in-depth discussion demonstrating the suitability of the Roads 
access variable as a decent proxy for economic activity. Since these two proxies (nighttime lights and roads 
access) have been used in both chapters 2 and 3, they were discussed in more detail in the preceding chapter 
to avoid content repetition and any unnecessary verboseness. 
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lighting within communities, while roads infrastructure is a purely government-
provisioned service (or good) at these echelons of society. With such measures our 
study makes its findings relevant to both the urban economics literature on ethnic 
heterogeneity and public goods provisioning and the economic development 
literature on ethnic heterogeneity and development. 
The control variables are mostly composed of those often used in the literature 
for studies with similar analytical data structures. Three broad categories are 
adopted to classify the control variables used in our study: distance controls 
(distances to coast, national border, and national capital), geographical and 
ecological controls (mean elevation, soil productivity index, malaria index, 
absolute latitude, relative size of the split tribal homeland to the subnational 
state’s geo-size, natural resource endowment controls (indicators for diamond and 
oil deposits) and demographic control (natural log of the population density).  
All the controls are obtained using GIS sources. The mean elevation variable is 
measured as the average surface elevation for each split or non-split ethnic 
polygon. It is based on a joint work between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, 
TerrainBase, (version release 1.0). The soil productivity index measures the 
average suitability of the soil of each polygon in our sample to the crop best 
adapted to that soil’s type, condition and composition. It is a dataset published 
by the FAO in 2002 with index values ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum 
of 97; where values increase in tandem with the soils productivity and suitability 
to the chiefly adapted crop. The malaria ecology index is based on the work of 
Kiszewski, Mellinger, Speilman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004). It measures the 
prevalence and exposure of each split ethnic polygon to the malaria endemic. The 
onshore petroleum sites and the diamond sites endowments indicators are 
respectively obtained from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) websites70 71. 
An additional natural endowments variable controls for a represented group’s 
(split or un-split) proprietorship of inland water. It is measured as the average 
area covered by a river, stream or lake for each represented tribal polygon. This 
variable is obtained as a raster file, titled Global Lake and Wetlands Database 
                                         
70http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/Petroleum-Dataset-
v11/  
71https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Diamond-Resources/  
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Level 3 (GLWD-3), from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) website72. An initial 
summary description of the variables involved in the estimation of equation 1 is 
provided in Table R - 3.3.4.1 below. 
We arrive at our core data structure by spatially joining (intersection method) 
a recent map of the subnational administrative territories73 for each country with 
the Peter Murdock (1959) map of African tribal homeland predating colonial 
political activities in the region. There are initially 834 habitable ethnic tribal 
polygons and 1285 subnational polygonal territories74 (this includes island 
territories as well) in the peripheries of the African region. After selecting only 
those geographical intersections with a minimum of 100 square-kilometres, there 
are 728 subnational territories nesting the 834 tribal homelands spanning 50 
African countries. This results in a total of 2985 observations in our working 
sample, in its full breadth. The subnational territories map adopted herein is 
spatially clipped for the African region from the ‘RWDB2 Subnational-Ad2 
Polygonal Boundaries’ (current at: 26-09-2005) dataset and available from the FAO 
website75. For a visual inspection of the maps involved and the relevant territories 
included in this analysis, a quick map-intersection view is provided in Figure O - 
3.3.3.1, below. From this figure, we can see that going to the subnational level 
provides us with an incredible opportunity for understanding grass-root dynamics 
that might be affecting the development of African homelands. It clearly provides 
us with more data points and more variation opportunities for carrying out further 
in-depth analysis of some of the development theories already introduced and 
discussed earlier. 
The variables based on the Afrobarometer Round 3 data, as earlier highlighted, 
are obtained mostly from the replication file from the work of Nunn & Wantchekon 
(2011). We however, merge our tribal level split index with this principal dataset 
and include 2 additional variables (q80a and q80b, respectively) also found in the 
Afrobarometer that control for respondent’s perception of their tribe’s economic 
                                         
72http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/global-lakes-and-wetlands-database-lakes-and-wetlands-grid-
level-3  
73 This is at administrative level two, where administrative level one is the actual country level while level 
three is a higher level of administrative territories local to each one from level two. 
74 It is noteworthy that this figure includes the Spanish and Portuguese island territories in the seas North-West 
of Africa. 
75 http://ref.data.fao.org/map?entryId=936f7280-b06d-11db-8922-000d939bc5d8&tab=metadata  
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condition and political influence relative to those of other tribal groups. We 
believe these two variables are correlated with both our split index and the 
dependents variables (trust and fairness) adopted in our channels-exploration 
exercise. A summary table of all the variables involved in the estimation of 
equation 3  (find above) can be found in Table T - 3.3.4.3 below, while a more 
detailed explanation of the model selection and rational can be found in the paper 
by Nunn & Wantchekon (2011). This latter dataset used in exploring these two 
sub-channels comprises of 21480 respondents living in 1287 districts within 184 
Murdock-defined tribal homelands spanning 17 countries. 
 
  153 
 
153 
 
 
Figure O – 3.3.3.1: Map of National and Subnational Boundaries 
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Full Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (Stable Night light-density to 
split tribal homeland area ratio) 
2985 -8.254246 2.894378 -17.00652 -1.589045 
Stable Night light-density 
(ordinal) 
2985 6.282412 7.104989 0 60 
Log (Average Roads length to 
split tribal homeland ratio) 
2877 -5.24841 1.792807 -10.58359 -0.0465962 
Index of the extent of ethnic 
homeland splitting (ordinal) 
2985 2.022111 1.049151 0 3 
Log (Population density) 2985 2.98546 2.191487 -4.60517 9.067394 
Split Tribal homeland's Distance 
to sea (in 1000 KMs) 
2985 0.5631758 0.4399529 0 1.805956 
Split Tribal homeland's Distance 
to the National border (in 1000 
KMs) 
2985 0.0270168 0.0318217 7.08E-06 0.3067594 
Split Tribal homeland's Distance 
to the National capital (in 1000 
KMs) 
2985 0.4384652 0.3420012 0.0026696 1.941609 
Mean Elevation (in 1000 KMs) 2985 0.6036329 0.4767962 
-
0.2323125 
2.960833 
Soil Productivity index 2985 8.007492 13.21188 1 97 
Malaria Ecology index 2985 0.3382968 0.2541887 0 0.9407895 
Absolute Latitude 2985 12.69702 9.439829 0.0041917 37.07984 
Log (Split Tribal homeland land 
area to Unsplit Tribal land area 
ratio) 
2985 -2.180032 1.600903 -7.744343 0 
Indicator for the presence of 
Diamond mines 
2985 0.0515913 0.2212375 0 1 
Indicator for the presence of 
Petroleum wells 
2985 0.0847571 0.2785666 0 1 
Log ((1 + Average Inland water 
area)) 
2985 2.329027 17.5423 7.22E-06 548.5612 
Table R – 3.3.4.1: Tabular Summary of Variables used in Equation 3.3.1 
 
The table above provides a brief tabular summary of the variables involved in 
the estimations of equation (1) in section 3.3.1 above. While Figure P - 3.3.4.1 
below, provides a spatial map of our core right-hand side variable of interest (the 
split index). As is apparent, there is a considerably good amount of variation in 
this variable although there appears to be some country-based clustering patterns. 
This sort of intra-group variations arising from the two upper-administrative levels 
of our dataset (state and country levels) coupled with varying number of 
observations within each nested level, merits our preferred choice of a mixed-
effects model. Also the split index shows that there are more observations in 
categories 1 and 3 compared to categories 0 and 2. Actually Table S - 3.3.4.2 
below summarises this more aptly. Categories 2 and 3 capture influences of split 
impacts across national borders and jointly shows that about 56% of the ethnic 
homelands in our sample were divided across countries boundaries. Our study 
notwithstanding tries to compare this group with those who were only split locally 
or intra-nationally and those that were not demarcated at all by any of our two 
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key political actors (either Euro-colonialist or own-country governments); who as 
a result remained within the geopolitical confines of a specific or common 
country. 
 
Our Split Index Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 147 4.92 4.92 
1 1,169 39.16 44.09 
2 140 4.69 48.78 
3 1,529 51.22 100 
Total 2,985 100   
Table S – 3.3.4.2: Table Summary of our Split Index 
 
 
Figure P – 3.3.4.1: Spatial Map of the Split Index Variable 
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Variable names Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
How much do you trust your local 
council? (q55d) 20008 1.664484 1.101049 0 3 
How much do you trust people from 
other ethnic groups? (q84d) 20081 1.359245 0.9960181 0 3 
How much do you trust people your 
own ethnic group? (q84c) 20280 1.671795 1.002917 0 3 
How much do you trust your relatives? 
(q84a) 20396 2.184252 0.9592221 0 3 
How much do you trust your 
neighbours? (q84b) 20358 1.731506 1.008838 0 3 
How often is your ethnic group treated 
unfairly by the government? (q81) 18966 0.7928925 0.9795828 0 3 
Split Index by Tribal group 21480 2.031378 1.052663 0 3 
ln(1+Atlantic+Indian Slave Exports) by 
Tribal group 21480 1.967817 2.319538 0 6.752222 
Respondent's Perception of Ethnic 
Group's Relative Economic Conditions 
(q80a) 19667 3.157472 0.9856416 1 5 
Respondent's Perception of Ethnic 
Group's Relative Political Influence 
(q80a) 19194 3.058664 0.9901812 1 5 
District-level ethnic fractionalization 21480 0.4038963 0.2968748 0 0.9057617 
Proportion of ethnic group in district 21480 0.6020231 0.3477237 0.0027174 1 
Tribe's Average Malaria Ecology 21480 11.54582 9.765481 0 34.63975 
Total Catholic + Protestant mission per 
land area 21480 0.000223 0.0003402 0 0.0027638 
Indicator for historic contact with 
European explorer 21480 0.4342644 0.4956715 0 1 
Indicator variable for historic 
integration into the colonial railway 
network 21480 0.4381285 0.4961687 0 1 
Indicator for existence of city among 
ethnic group in 1400 21480 0.1216946 0.3269404 0 1 
Population Density Average for Tribal 
Group 21480 4.261382 1.000939 0.6981347 7.266834 
Log population density during the 
colonial period - from Murdock 18144 2.561385 1.309979 -4.273627 5.869599 
Pre-colonial settlement patterns of 
ethnicity: from Ethnographic Atlas v30 20295 6.105395 1.250319 1 8 
Pre-colonial juris. hierarchy beyond the 
local community: Ethnographic Atlas 
v33 20317 2.905744 0.913639 1 4 
What is the highest level of education 
you have completed? (q90) 21402 3.077937 2.008928 0 9 
What is your main occupation? (If 
unemployed, retired or disabled, what 
was your last main occupation 21392 15.75421 75.88902 0 995 
What is your religion, if any? (q91) 21388 28.72817 106.3576 0 995 
In general, how you describe your own 
present living condition? 21406 2.557647 1.203483 1 5 
Table T – 3.3.4.3: Tabular Summary of Variables used in Equation 3.3.2 
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As can be seen in the summary statistics in Table T - 3.3.4.3 above there is a 
considerable range of variables (individual, district and tribal level) involved in 
the survey-based model (equation 3, specified above). These have been adopted 
to explore the connection between our in-designed split index and the core micro-
level phenomena that have a theorized effect on the development of economic 
activity. In the section following this (section 4), we present and discuss the 
results from our estimations accordingly. 
 
 
Section 3.4 – Estimation Results and Interpretations 
3.4.1 – Tribal Demarcations and Economic Development using 
Nightlight density 
From Table U - 3.4.1.1 and Table V - 3.4.1.2 below we find that our split index 
appears consistently negatively associated with the nightlight density measures, 
indicating that the extent of ethnic demarcations are linked with patterns of 
underdevelopment in the African subnational regions, as represented. 
Particularly, we find that areas of split-categories 1 and 3 (tribal homelands only 
demarcated at the intra-national frontier and those jointly demarcated at both 
intra-national and inter-national frontiers, respectively) appear to be the most 
affected categories from our split index measure. Both categories appear to have 
similar magnitudes and sign in their associations with underdevelopment 
depending on the estimation considered. These results are consistent even after 
controlling for key selected pre-colonial politico-economic characteristics, such 
as the tribe’s level of political complexity and settlement patterns as provided by 
Murdock’s (1959) anthropological study. While tribal areas of split index category 
2 (tribal homelands affected by demarcations at the inter-national frontier only) 
also remain negative in their associations with development at this nighttime light 
density measure, but become statistically insignificant after controlling for pre-
colonial politico-economic features. Estimations 1 thru 4 differ from 5 thru 8 
because the latter explores the dependent variable in its original untransformed 
ordinal count form (0 - 63) and in the transformed continuous log of the ratio form 
but excluding the nighttime lights data points observed at the zero level. This is 
because we suspect that the zero-inflatedness of the nightlight measure increases 
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the imprecision or the associated standard errors post-transformation76. This can 
be confirmed by this zero-adjusted transformed dependent variable’s relatively 
wider range values of -17.00 (lower range) and -1.58 (upper range) in Table R - 
3.3.4.1 above, and the approximately twice as large standard-errors 
accompanying the associated estimates in estimations 1 thru 4 compared to the 
estimates of estimations 5 thru 8. With that in mind, we focus on interpreting the 
results from estimations 6 and 8 showing the split index categories without and 
with the two key additional pre-colonial tribal politico-economic controls. These 
two commonly used pre-colonial politico-economic features are the settlement 
patterns and political complexity of the corresponding tribal groups. Apart from 
the magnitude of the standard errors, the estimates also do not appear to differ 
significantly across the estimations from 1 thru 8 thus showing that the omission 
of the zero-region of the data does not seem to affect the result systematically. 
It also provides some indication confirming that the transformation of the 
nightlight ratio using the 0.01 sum-adjustment had quite a measurement effect 
on the nighttime lights density index measure. 
From our estimation results below, we find that not only are different frontiers 
of tribal demarcation associated with differing local homeland developmental 
levels but that being demarcated at all appears to have a positive association with 
underdeveloped in such split homelands on the average. This is still very much in 
line with the findings in the literature relating underdevelopment in African sub-
regions with ethnic homeland fragmentation (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 
2011). As already highlighted, we show that categories 1 and 3 seem to be the 
most relatively negatively affected areas development-wise. While category 2, 
although remaining consistently negative, nonetheless turns statistically 
insignificant when pre-colonial politico-economic attributes are controlled for. 
This is a very interesting and a unique finding, as it unearths some deeper 
information about the driving circumstances of (under-) development in African 
sub-regions.  
We find contrary to the literature that areas split inter-nationally seem to be 
the least underdeveloped compared to those split locally and those jointly split 
both locally and inter-nationally. This contradicts the literature on the scramble 
for Africa and its Euro-centric narrative, which proposes that pre-colonial, 
                                         
76 The transformation adopted is: 
𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠+0.01
𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝐾𝑀
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colonial, and post-colonial European politico-economic activities in Africa 
triggered a lot of the underdevelopment currently experienced on the continent 
(see Asiwaju, 1985; Alesina et al., 2011; Green, 2012). Our findings seem to 
support a more conservative counter-narrative: that it is as likely the case other 
locally brewed circumstances are adjacently at play igniting and fuelling these 
patterns of underdevelopment; and that these may actually be entirely 
independent of the European scramble and other related influences (see Fall, 2010 
for a similar call for such analytical conservatism especially when administrative 
borders are central to the evidence). Although, it is empirically implausible to 
explore a substantial counterfactual of comparable [African] territories that were 
not colonised or entirely unaffected by European political influences. We attempt 
to demonstrate that the mainstream narrative of the non-positive economic 
development effects of the European facilitated artificial African national 
frontiers is not the entire story. This artificial borders argument tends to put the 
actions of the European countries involved in the Berlin conference of 1885 in the 
driver’s seat of modern regional African economic underdevelopment (see Alesina 
et al., 2011)77. Fall (2010) attempts to analytically demonstrate in his article that 
this nature versus politics rhetoric has its unique empirical concerns as the 
naturalness (straight – artificial – versus squiggly – natural) of national borders are 
not entirely independent of the political or economic reality of the national 
territories involved. By adopting our approach, we sort of go beyond the nature 
of the border designs to focusing on the political actors involved. This in a way, 
inherently brings into the spotlight the narrative purporting that the European 
actors were not aware of the internal historic ethnic dynamics versus the post-
independent political administrators who are more likely to understand these local 
ethnic dynamics. These historical ethnic dynamics have also not really changed 
that much between both periods under study, thus providing the link between 
both periods often exploited in this cross-boundary (ethnic frontier and national 
frontier intersections) type of studies. 
As in estimation 8 below, we find that, holding all other covariates constant, 
areas affected solely by intra-national demarcations tend to be about 0.669 log-
                                         
77 It is important to note here that the artificial borders storyline is not necessarily restricted to the African case; 
and it in fact researches within the narrative often pool examples from regions and countries across the 
globe. However, when it is applied to the African case, the border delimitations that result from the 
agreements of the 1885 Berlin conference and the proceeding OAU’s Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government conference in Cairo of July 1964, we find ourselves apportioning substantial modern 
underdevelopment blames to the Europeans even following so many years of independent rule. 
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units or approximately 48.8%78 darker in nighttime lights density per square 
kilometre compared to those not split at all; while those areas affected by both 
intra-national and inter-national demarcations tend to be 1.001 log-units or 
approximately 63.2% darker than the non-split tribal homelands in terms of 
nighttime lights density per square kilometre. These values are of similar dynamics 
to those found in estimation 4 from Table U - 3.4.1.1 below with 0.571 (or about 
43.5% darker) and 0.728 (or about 51.7% darker) associated marginal drop in the 
log-count of the nighttime lights density index from the same group of demarcated 
tribal homelands compared to the non-split group, respectively. These results are 
robust to all the relevant controls (covariates) employed herein and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Both these coefficients in 
most cases (categories 1 and 3) appear to be approximately twice as much as the 
coefficients in category 2; this can be observed consistently throughout the 
estimations reported in Table U - 3.4.1.1 and Table V - 3.4.1.2 below. 
 
                                         
78 Taking the exponent of the coefficient gives you these effects in odds ratios when you are dealing with the 
count-version of the dependent variable as in estimation 4. However, it also gives you the average marginal 
effect when you are dealing with the rest of the estimations that treat the dependent variable as a continuous 
variable (ratio form) and follows the log-linear functional form. The actual percentage effects as discussed 
herein are arrived at using the expression: 1 − 𝑒(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
  161 
 
161 
 
 
Table U – 3.4.1.1: Estimation Output using the Nightlight density 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lasnlite001 lasnlite001 rsnlite rsnlite
Split Index Categories:                    Category_1 -0.964*** -0.172 -1.040*** -0.571***
'(0.245) '(0.598) '(0.143) '(0.187)
                   Category_2 -0.508 -0.00809 -0.732*** -0.328
'(0.354) '(0.748) '(0.167) '(0.218)
                   Category_3 -1.016*** -0.136 -1.298*** -0.728***
'(0.234) '(0.575) '(0.146) '(0.189)
Mean Elevation (in 1000 KMs) 0.135 -0.221 -0.0772 -0.156
'(0.360) '(0.324) '(0.202) '(0.186)
Soil Productivity index 0.00281 0.00357 0.00138 0.00122
'(0.00640) '(0.00596) '(0.00438) '(0.00304)
Malaria Ecology index -1.178 -1.612** -0.947** -0.745*
'(0.769) '(0.710) '(0.454) '(0.397)
Absolute Latitude 0.0389 0.00143 -0.00972 -0.00887
'(0.0310) '(0.0439) '(0.0128) '(0.0107)
Log (Split Tribal homeland land area to Unsplit Tribal land area ratio) 0.0684 0.179*** -0.268*** -0.252***
'(0.0560) '(0.0693) '(0.0357) '(0.0492)
Indicator for the presence of Diamond mines 0.393** 0.213 -0.051 -0.119
'(0.170) '(0.219) '(0.104) '(0.131)
Indicator for the presence of Petroleum wells 0.634*** 0.523* 0.154 0.19
'(0.240) '(0.278) '(0.135) '(0.127)
Log ((1 + Inland water area) to split land area) 0.00488 0.00546 0.00488*** 0.00492***
'(0.00339) '(0.00339) '(0.00108) '(0.000944)
Log (Population density) 0.548*** 0.551*** 0.371*** 0.383***
'(0.0426) '(0.0554) '(0.0550) '(0.0488)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to sea (in 1000 KMs) -0.26 -0.298 -0.335* -0.341*
'(0.432) '(0.408) '(0.183) '(0.188)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National border (in 1000 KMs) -12.13*** -13.67*** -13.86*** -14.50***
'(1.992) '(3.291) '(1.522) '(1.615)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National capital (in 1000 KMs) -0.35 -0.384 -0.045 -0.0235
'(0.444) '(0.624) '(0.285) '(0.328)
Pre-colonial Political Centralization Indicator (based on v33) 0.424** 0.195
'(0.203) '(0.129)
Pre-colonial Settlment Pattern Indicator (based v33) 0.0355 0.0931
'(0.165) '(0.0694)
Main Intercept -7.607*** -7.132*** -6.256*** -7.009***
'(1.301) '(1.844) '(0.512) '(0.517)
ln(alpha) -0.212* -0.454***
'(0.111) '(0.158)
Error-Variance adjustment at the Country-level 0.303*** 0.172*
'(0.106) '(0.0907)
Error-Variance adjustment at the State-level 0.177*** 0.176***
'(0.0256) '(0.0396)
Estimation Type:
OLS 3-way Robust Cluster (with Country-level FEs) YES YES NO NO
Mixed Effects Model Negative Binomial (with Ordinal Count DVs) NO NO YES YES
Observations 2,985 1,423 2,985 1,423
R-squared 0.399 0.44 . .
ll . . -7866 -3848
chi2 . . 1234 720.8
p . . 0 0
Number of groups 50 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variabes = Log (Stable Nightlight density to split tribal homeland area ratio or Stable 
Nightlight density - ordinal)
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Table V – 3.4.1.2 – Estimation Output using Nightlight - omitting the zero values 
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES lasnlite lasnlite lasnlite lasnlite
Split Index Categories:                Category_1 -1.006*** -0.644*** -0.987*** -0.669***
'(0.125) '(0.183) '(0.126) '(0.177)
            Category_2 -0.621*** -0.373 -0.624*** -0.318
'(0.153) '(0.262) '(0.144) '(0.210)
            Category_3 -1.409*** -1.007*** -1.376*** -1.001***
'(0.123) '(0.198) '(0.120) '(0.185)
Mean Elevation (in 1000 KMs) 0.0226 -0.0573 -0.0333 -0.0863
'(0.126) '(0.127) '(0.119) '(0.111)
Soil Productivity index -0.000702 -0.000865 -0.00109 -0.0012
'(0.00223) '(0.00201) '(0.00186) '(0.00154)
Malaria Ecology index -0.655** -0.642 -0.599** -0.464*
'(0.320) '(0.412) '(0.290) '(0.247)
Absolute Latitude -0.0293** -0.0243* -0.0196** -0.0208***
'(0.0136) '(0.0147) '(0.00805) '(0.00730)
Log (Split Tribal homeland land area to Unsplit Tribal land area ratio) -0.454*** -0.484*** -0.452*** -0.477***
'(0.0283) '(0.0446) '(0.0244) '(0.0363)
Indicator for the presence of Diamond mines -0.272*** -0.250* -0.271*** -0.244*
'(0.0852) '(0.137) '(0.0824) '(0.127)
Indicator for the presence of Petroleum wells -0.0723 0.0518 -0.0645 0.0667
'(0.0814) '(0.0885) '(0.0721) '(0.0831)
Log ((1 + Inland water area) to split land area) 0.00638*** 0.00508*** 0.00611*** 0.00509***
'(0.00185) '(0.00123) '(0.00144) '(0.00105)
Log (Population density) 0.237*** 0.250*** 0.234*** 0.251***
'(0.0330) '(0.0427) '(0.0307) '(0.0369)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to sea (in 1000 KMs) -0.184 -0.244 -0.221* -0.218
'(0.152) '(0.180) '(0.128) '(0.134)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National border (in 1000 KMs) -15.29*** -13.96*** -15.33*** -14.77***
'(1.376) '(1.840) '(1.394) '(1.776)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National capital (in 1000 KMs) -0.107 0.104 -0.119 0.00444
'(0.216) '(0.277) '(0.195) '(0.215)
Pre-colonial Political Centralization Indicator (based on v33) 0.0776 0.0799
'(0.112) '(0.101)
Pre-colonial Settlment Pattern Indicator (based v33) 0.13 0.154**
'(0.0888) '(0.0729)
Main Intercept -5.129*** -6.175*** -5.957*** -6.683***
'(0.535) '(0.713) '(0.291) '(0.419)
Error-Variance adjustment at the Country-level -0.781*** -1.066***
'(0.153) '(0.187)
Error-Variance adjustment at the State-level -1.659*** -2.86
'(0.211) '(3.361)
Estimation Type:
OLS 3-way Robust Cluster (with Country-level FEs) YES YES NO NO
Mixed Effects Linear Model (with Continuous DVs) NO NO YES YES
Observations 1,980 988 1980 988
R-squared 0.733 0.768 . .
ll . . -2407 -1152
chi2 . . 5883 1895
p . . 0 0
Number of groups . . 50 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variabes = Log (Stable Night light-density to split tribal homeland area ratio) -  zeros values 
excluded
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3.4.2 – Tribal Demarcations and Economic Development using 
Average Roads Length 
As conducted in Table U - 3.4.1.1 and Table V - 3.4.1.2  above, Table W - 3.4.2.1 
below equally provides estimates using a country-level FE-OLS79 specification with 
three-way cluster-adjusted standard errors (for estimations 9 and 10). It also 
includes a mixed-effects specification with error-variance adjustments at the 
district and tribal levels (for estimations 11 and 12). Given that the dependent 
variable in this subsection is the log of average access roads length to the 
represented split or non-split ethnic homeland land’s area ratio and that there are 
no additional adjustments to the variable that could compromise its underlying 
distributions or significant variations in the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors, we go ahead and report the estimation results for estimations 10 and 12 
respectively.  
As observed in the previous subsection using nighttime light density as our 
dependent variable, we similarly notice in estimation 12 that compared to the 
non-split tribal homelands, those demarcated internally (intra-nationally) tend to 
have 0.888 log units (58.9%) shorter road lengths per square kilometre on the 
average after controlling for other equally relevant covariates. While compared 
to non-demarcated tribal homelands, those demarcated tribal homelands jointly 
affected by both inter-national and intra-national frontiers tend to have 1.351 log 
units (74.1%) shorter average roads to land ratio, this is with the other key 
covariates left unchanged.  
And as in the previous subsection, tribal homelands affected by only inter-
national boundary frontiers appear to comparatively be the least affected. Tribal 
homelands in this category are found to be associated with 0.648 log units (47.7%) 
marginally shorter average roads length per square kilometres compared to the 
non-demarcated tribal homelands, all things being equal. These values are not 
very far from the corresponding marginal effects shown in estimation 1080 which 
are -0.953 log units (about 61.4% shorter roads) for category 1, -1.417 log units 
(about 75.8% shorter roads) for category 3 and -0.675 log units (about 49.1% less) 
for category 2 in terms of average roads length per square kilometres when two 
                                         
79 This means Fixed Effects Ordinary Least Squares specification. 
80 This is an alternative estimation using FE-OLS but with a 3-way (tribal, state, and country levels) cluster-
robust standard errors. 
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key pre-colonial tribal politico-economic characteristics are additionally 
controlled for. While the estimated coefficients for categories 1 and 3 are found 
to be statistically significant at 1% level of significant, that of category 2 remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  
We also observe similar patterns of general reductions across and between the 
categories of the split index coefficients with the introduction of the two key pre-
colonial politico-economic tribal attributes, earlier highlighted. This provides 
some indication that both measures of subnational development (average 
nighttime lights and average roads length) and the split index adopted herein are 
both linearly associated with levels of pre-colonial politico-economic complexity 
and that not controlling for them could provide misleading upwardly biased 
results. Our split index coefficients however remain both economically and 
statistically relevant even in the presence of all our adopted controls and 
covariates.  
Looking at all the results from the three tables discussed so far (the 2 above 
and the 1 below) we find that contrary to the Euro-centric literature cross-national 
boundary delimitations demarcating historic ethnic homelands does not appear to 
provide the most significant isolated association with underdevelopment in Africa. 
Our results provide some evidence to suggest that historic tribal homelands also 
affected by subnational boundary delimitations are associated with specific local 
dynamics that cause these areas to be as underdeveloped as those most badly 
affected simultaneously by demarcations at multiple levels or frontiers (that is at 
both inter-country and subnational frontiers). Local or intra-national sources of 
such tribal homeland demarcations consistently appear to be associated with 
negative developmental outcomes. To investigate the underpinnings of this 
statistical association inherent in our findings a bit further, we look to the urban 
economics and local-trust literature. We proceed in section 3.4.3 below, by 
attempting to explore some conditional associations between our split categories 
and local trust or tribal discrimination by slightly augmenting Nunn & 
Wantchekon’s (2011) base trust-specification. 
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Table W – 3.4.2.1: Estimation Output using the Average Roads Length 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES lg1roads lg1roads lg1roads lg1roads
Split Index Categories:               Category_1 -1.216*** -0.953*** -1.100*** -0.888***
'(0.140) '(0.183) '(0.119) '(0.179)
         Category_2 -0.885*** -0.675** -0.854*** -0.648**
'(0.165) '(0.308) '(0.147) '(0.264)
         Category_3 -1.660*** -1.417*** -1.556*** -1.351***
'(0.119) '(0.185) '(0.102) '(0.176)
Mean Elevation (in 1000 KMs) -0.057 -0.119 -0.119 -0.126
'(0.110) '(0.166) '(0.105) '(0.149)
Soil Productivity index -0.0039 -0.00514* -0.00461 -0.00505**
'(0.00358) '(0.00278) '(0.00288) '(0.00210)
Malaria Ecology index -0.362 -0.619 -0.361 -0.495
'(0.264) '(0.429) '(0.236) '(0.378)
Absolute Latitude -0.0321** -0.0262 -0.0237* -0.023
'(0.0148) '(0.0266) '(0.0130) '(0.0196)
Log (Split Tribal homeland land area to Unsplit Tribal land area ratio) -0.640*** -0.693*** -0.646*** -0.692***
'(0.0327) '(0.0432) '(0.0246) '(0.0315)
Indicator for the presence of Diamond mines -0.445*** -0.437*** -0.431*** -0.424***
'(0.118) '(0.148) '(0.101) '(0.128)
Indicator for the presence of Petroleum wells -0.511*** -0.476** -0.435*** -0.390*
'(0.177) '(0.235) '(0.150) '(0.208)
Log ((1 + Inland water area) to split land area) 0.00168 0.000844 0.00213 0.00121
'(0.00184) '(0.00143) '(0.00165) '(0.00127)
Log (Population density) -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.112***
'(0.0190) '(0.0284) '(0.0165) '(0.0265)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to sea (in 1000 KMs) -0.258 -0.309 -0.247 -0.219
'(0.293) '(0.382) '(0.253) '(0.329)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National border (in 1000 KMs) -17.46*** -15.91*** -17.47*** -16.16***
'(2.256) '(2.516) '(2.183) '(2.280)
Split Tribal homeland's Distance to the National capital (in 1000 KMs) 0.203 0.204 0.256 0.191
'(0.204) '(0.291) '(0.179) '(0.240)
Pre-colonial Political Centralization Indicator (based on v33) -0.239** -0.207**
'(0.100) '(0.0971)
Pre-colonial Settlment Pattern Indicator (based v33) -0.00547 0.00996
'(0.116) '(0.0963)
Main Intercept -3.277*** -3.867*** -4.123*** -4.588***
'(0.575) '(1.071) '(0.341) '(0.580)
Error-Variance adjustment at the Country-level -0.0681 -0.0759
'(0.115) '(0.106)
Error-Variance adjustment at the State-level -1.047*** -1.198***
'(0.134) '(0.249)
Estimation Type:
OLS 3-way Robust Cluster (with Country-level FEs) YES YES NO NO
Mixed Effects Linear Model (with Continuous DVs) NO NO YES YES
Observations 2,877 1,379 2,877 1,379
R-squared 0.716 0.755 . .
ll . . -4021 -1898
chi2 . . 10129 7831
p . . 0 0
Number of groups 50 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variabes = Log (Average Roads length to split tribal homeland ratio)
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3.4.3 – Tribal Demarcations and Local Trust or Ethnic 
Discrimination 
In order to attempt to unravel some of the local mechanisms that could likely 
be behind why intra-nationally split tribes lean towards similar levels of 
underdevelopment as those jointly split at the intra-national and inter-national 
frontiers, we look to individual-level data provided by the Afrobarometer survey. 
We specifically consider the local trust and tribal discrimination channels as these 
have both been considerably examined in the literature - both theoretically (see 
the literature survey by Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005) and empirically (see for 
instance, Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Burgess et al, 2013; Hodler & Raschky, 2014). 
We choose to reassess our split index as the same categories adopted in the 
previous subsection above so as to maintain some methodological connection. 
With this approach, we intend to try to pinpoint some correlated avenues via 
which underlying local dynamics (such as trust and tribal discrimination) filter into 
underdevelopment at these subnational regions. 
Excluding category 3, the estimated coefficients for our split categories of 
interest, as regards the trust regressions, appear to be very similar in magnitudes 
and standard errors. Looking at estimations 14 thru 18 in Table X - 3.4.3.1 below, 
we find that split category 1 (tribal homelands demarcated at the intra-national 
frontier) appears to be consistently negatively associated with our selected trust 
measures (trust for: local councils, adjacently interacting tribal groups, own-tribal 
groups, relatives and neighbours) and the coefficients appear to be within close 
proximity of each other ranging from -0.226 log odds (estimation 14) to -0.292 log 
odds (estimation 16). Category 1 appears to be the dominantly consistent category 
driving the outputs we observe in our tribal homeland level estimation results in 
Table U - 3.4.1.1, Table V - 3.4.1.2 and Table W - 3.4.2.1 above, because of the 
weakening trust base and the relatively higher prevalence of perceived ethnic 
discrimination accompanying intra-nationally split tribal homelands. Focusing on 
estimations 14 thru 18, we find that respondents from tribal homelands in split 
category 1 are marginally on the average approximately 20% to 25% less likely to 
have higher trust levels for their local councils compared to respondents from non-
demarcated tribal homelands. This is statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level and remains so when you consider other measures of trust at the same 
demarcation echelons. 
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Table X – 3.4.3.1: Estimation Output testing the local Trust and Tribal Discrimination 
channels 
 
  
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
robu_61 robu_11 robu_21 robu_31 robu_41 robu_51
VARIABLES tribal_favouritsm trust_local_council inter_group_trust intra_group_trust trust_relatives trust_neighbors
Split Index Categories:      Category_1 0.570*** -0.226** -0.284** -0.292** -0.268** -0.251**
(0.167) (0.0971) (0.114) (0.129) (0.128) (0.124)
                                      Category_2 0.492** 0.201 0.102 0.0842 -0.194 0.136
(0.224) (0.192) (0.195) (0.191) (0.192) (0.202)
                                      Category_3 0.545*** -0.106 -0.136 -0.160 -0.308** -0.196
(0.168) (0.101) (0.116) (0.132) (0.123) (0.122)
ln(1+Atlantic+Indian Slave Exports) by 
Tribal group
0.0177 -0.0461** -0.0137 -0.0467** -0.105*** -0.0518***
(0.0234) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0216) (0.0191)
Respondet's Perception of Ethnic Group's 
Economic Condition (q80a)
0.359*** -0.0855*** -0.0729*** -0.0473** -0.0551*** -0.0553***
(0.0256) (0.0224) (0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0210) (0.0208)
Respondet's Perception of Ethnic Group's 
Poltical Influence (q80a)
0.187*** -0.120*** -0.0139 -0.0527** -0.00699 -0.0255
(0.0331) (0.0241) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0217) (0.0213)
District-level ethnic fractionalization 0.0977 0.269** 0.361** 0.267* 0.165 0.178
(0.165) (0.131) (0.143) (0.141) (0.137) (0.142)
Proportion of ethnic group in district 0.192* 0.204** 0.0151 0.0578 0.165* 0.246**
(0.115) (0.103) (0.101) (0.106) (0.0996) (0.108)
Tribe's Average Malaria Ecology 0.0229** -0.00729 -0.0153** -0.0195*** -0.00700 -0.0212***
(0.00914) (0.00689) (0.00722) (0.00684) (0.00787) (0.00660)
Total Catholic + Protestant mission per 
land area
-10.06 33.33 -160.5** -266.8*** 15.22 -3.297
(94.85) (77.51) (78.17) (85.08) (85.43) (85.79)
Indicator for historic contact with 
European explorer
0.0222 0.278*** 0.151** 0.116* 0.0695 0.106
(0.0819) (0.0709) (0.0685) (0.0675) (0.0680) (0.0651)
Indicator variable for historic integration 
into the colonial railway network
0.0162 -0.145** -0.101 -0.0572 -0.125 -0.108
(0.0900) (0.0699) (0.0759) (0.0775) (0.0760) (0.0680)
Indicator for existence of city among 
ethnic group in 1400
-0.187 -0.0857 0.172 0.224** 0.617*** 0.441***
(0.128) (0.104) (0.111) (0.0995) (0.109) (0.0957)
Population Density Average for Tribal 
Group
-0.00285 -0.0909* -0.135** -0.229*** -0.170*** -0.271***
(0.0723) (0.0521) (0.0523) (0.0545) (0.0598) (0.0561)
Log population density during the 
colonial period - from Murdock
0.101** -0.0503 0.0287 0.0429 -0.0184 -0.0222
(0.0471) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0369) (0.0352) (0.0374)
Pre-colonial juris. hierarchy beyond the 
local community (v33)
-0.0275 -0.0388 -0.0577** -0.0743** -0.0853*** -0.0794***
(0.0388) (0.0279) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0311) (0.0292)
Constant
Error-Variance adjustment at the District-
level
0.438*** 0.141*** 0.270*** 0.225*** 0.152*** 0.222***
(0.0604) (0.0219) (0.0332) (0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0295)
Error-Variance adjustment at the Tribe-
level
0.0536 0* 0** 0 0 0
(0.0438) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Observations 14,583 14,550 15,195 15,308 15,367 15,341
Number of groups 1,172 1,172 1,174 1,177 1,178 1,178
ll -11839 -14844 -15589 -15375 -13556 -15361
chi2 2092 3281 2806 2883 3140 8306
p 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variabes = Selected Ordinal Categorical Variables measuring a Respondent's attitude towards Tribe related Trust and Favouritism
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Interestingly, our results show that for local trust measures, the tribal 
homelands demarcated only at the inter-national frontier (split category 2) appear 
to be mostly positively associated with trust (excluding the “trust for relatives” 
index) and are consistently statistically insignificant. We also find that while the 
homelands jointly split at both intra-national and inter-national frontiers (split 
category 3) have consistently negative coefficients, they are equally 
predominantly statistically insignificant, excluding the coefficient associated with 
the “trust for relatives” measure in estimation 17 (-.308 log odds or approximately 
26.5% less likely to perceive higher trust categories), which is not too far off in 
magnitude to category 1 (-0.194 log odds or approximately 17.8% less likely to 
have higher trust levels for their relatives). This indicates that the local trust 
mechanism or channel can provide a convincing rationalisation for why lower 
levels of economic development are at least associated with tribal homelands 
demarcated at this intra-national frontier as observed in the earlier estimation 
tables discussed in the previous subsections above.  
Fascinatingly, estimation 13 offers our discussions with an additional conduit 
providing some local level mechanism via which our split categories may be 
associated with underdevelopment at the sub-regional levels. We find that 
respondents from subnational homelands that are internally demarcated (split 
category 1) and those that were jointly demarcated locally and inter-nationally 
(split category 3) are respectively about 76.8% and 72.5% more likely to be 
associated with higher discrimination levels against them by their governments 
compared to respondents from un-split tribal homelands. This links quite smoothly 
with the literature suggesting that ethnically segregated groups are linearly 
associated with relatively weaker institutions and less public good allocations 
compared to unsegregated tribal groups (Burgess et al, 2013 and Hodler & 
Raschky, 2014 discuss similar findings). The coefficients 0.57 and 0.545 (for 
categories 1 and 3, respectively) are both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
While, as already predominantly observed, category 2 (tribal homelands 
demarcated at the inter-national frontier only) has the expected positive sign in 
this instance, remains relatively smaller in magnitude and drops a notch in 
statistical significance as well.  
What our results seem to demonstrate at this stage is that the local trust 
mechanism is a valid conduit for understanding the underlying dynamics explaining 
why locally demarcated tribal homelands have consistently lower levels of 
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development (as measure by nighttime lights and average roads length) compared 
to non-demarcated groups. While the ethnic favouritism measure seems to provide 
a valid reinforcement explaining why locally demarcated groups (category 1) and 
both intra-nationally and inter-nationally demarcated groups (category 3) appear 
to have lower development levels as measured in our study herein. What is equally 
consistent is that local dynamics appear to have equally or sometimes more 
damning developmental outcomes compared to the often-mentioned pressures 
exerted by the European scramble for territory and resources in African. Also, that 
focusing on such Euro-centric narratives may not provide an apt or comprehensive 
treatment (that is treatment in scope and depth) of studies on African 
development. 
 
3.4.4 – Concluding Remarks 
In summary our findings demonstrate that the extent of tribal homeland 
demarcations in African is detrimentally associated with corresponding 
developmental levels measured in nighttime lights and average roads length. As 
earlier posited herein, we show that the European scramble for African territories 
and resources was not the singular source of underdevelopment in the sub-regions 
of the continent. Essentially we see that intra-nationally demarcated tribal 
homelands appear to negatively outperform those tribal homelands solely 
affected by inter-national demarcations. While those jointly demarcated on both 
intra-national and inter-national frontiers (our most affected tribal homelands) 
appear to underperform as bad as the intra-national only demarcated groups. This 
indicates, as we further demonstrated, that local dynamics were as instrumental 
in realising such developmental underperformances as those inter-national 
dynamics, which are often researched in the African scramble literature such as 
conflict and etc. (see Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011, for instance). 
Our results also show that our split index categories are related with two key 
local dynamics underpinning low developmental outcomes in Africa. We find that 
the local trust dynamics help explain why intra-nationally demarcated tribal 
homelands are as underdeveloped as the most split category in our dataset (that 
is, tribal homelands demarcated both intra-nationally and inter-nationally). 
While, the local dynamics of ethnic discrimination provides an avenue to further 
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buttress why both categories 1 and 3 appear similar in magnitude as regards their 
economic developmental outcomes. 
 
3.4.5 – Avenues for Further Research 
This study herein is mostly demonstrative and even while it tries to show how 
our own-designed split index connects with developmental levels (measured using 
nighttime lights and average roads length), it does not provide any direct causal 
statistical framework. Further research that attempts to make such direct causal 
statistical relationships between our split index (or split categories) and 
developmental outcomes in these African sub-regions would be most informative. 
Such a study would allow one to obtain coefficient estimates demonstrating the 
direct extent or magnitude of these connections.  
One way in which causality can be assessed in such a framework as utilised 
herein would be to attempt to extend the research design beyond the African 
region to include regions and sub-regions across the world that have been affected 
by European type colonisation of similar scale. The objective thence would be to 
group the territories in similar spatial units (or political administrative units), 
experiences and other relevant characteristics. After which a propensity score 
matching methodology could be applied in an attempt to obtain average 
treatment effects on economic activity resulting from our designed classifications 
of political ethnic territory demarcations. One apparent challenge is that valid 
counterfactuals embedded in the propensity score matching procedure might not 
be readily available as there are very different experiences and inherent 
characteristics typifying the sample units from such a design. For instance, the 
ethnic dynamics of African tribal homelands are historically more recent than 
anywhere else in the world. Also, almost all of Africa [apart from Ethiopia and 
Liberia] was affected by European colonialism so obtaining appropriate 
counterfactuals within the African continent itself is near impossible81. 
Additionally but not so notably, the data structure and type for each empirical 
segment of this study is differentiated. This resultantly provides evidence 
applicable to both homeland and individual (respondent) unit levels. It is 
pervasively known in the literature that results from varying data aggregation 
                                         
81 An appreciation to one of my examiners, whose name I have chosen to withhold at this stage for anonymity 
reasons, for raising this point at my viva defence. 
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levels tend to range quite widely and are not easily clearly comparable. Adopting 
a dataset, in the future, with a uniform aggregation structure studying ethnic 
demarcations in a similar fashion and integrating causal channels similar to the 
trust and ethnic discrimination adopted herein would be way more informative 
than one conducted using datasets of varying aggregation structure or 
composition. In fact with such a dataset, it would be easier to explore more direct 
causal pathways for assessing the impact of ethnic demarcations on economic 
activity as both right hand side controls, instruments (mechanisms) and economic 
activity would be varying at the same level of variation. 
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Appendix  
Appendix 3.1 – List of Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Full Variable Name 
Units of 
Measure 
Variable(s) Used 
from Original 
Dataset 
Source 
Log (Stable Night 
light-density to split 
homeland ratio) 
Key variable is a 
Polygonal-
average of Index 
between 0 and 63 
GRID values 
Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series: 
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html 
Log (Average Roads 
length to split tribal 
homeland ratio) 
Key variable is a 
Polygonal-
average in 1000 
Kilometres 
LENGTH_KM 
Global Roads Open Access Data Set (gROADS), v1 (1980 –
 2010): http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/groads-
global-roads-open-access-v1 
Index of the extent of 
ethnic homeland 
splitting (ordinal) 
This Index ranges 
between 0 and 3. 
It is uniquely 
designed by this 
study. Higher 
values indicate 
that the source of 
boundary 
demarcation for 
the tribal 
homeland is 
approaching 
multiple 
administrative 
frontiers, where 
at least one of 
such frontiers is 
inter-national 
N/A 
Obtained from the Geographic intersection of the Provincial-
level administrative boundaries - 'RWDB2 Subnational-Ad2 
Polygonal Boundaries Map' available at the United Nations' 
FAO website: http://ref.data.fao.org/map?entryId=936f7280-
b06d-11db-8922-000d939bc5d8&tab=metadata ; and the 
Tribal Homeland Boundaries based on the work of Peter 
Murdock (1959) - available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/murdock_shapefile
.zip?m=1364315353 
Log (Population 
density) 
Polygonal-
average: Discrete 
Count Variable 
grid_code 
UNEP/GRID - Sioux Falls Dataset (Africa Population 
Distribution Database): 
http://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/datasets/datalist.php 
Split Tribal homeland's 
Distance to sea (in 
1000 KMs) 
Nearest distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a 
Geodatabase of 
Polylines 
Water Polygons: Available at the Open Street Map 
http://openstreetmapdata.com/data/water-polygons 
Split Tribal homeland's 
Distance to the 
National border (in 
1000 KMs) 
Nearest distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a Shapefile 
with National 
Boundary Outlines 
National Administrative Boundaries, v3 (2000), Gridded 
Population of the World (GPW), v3: 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/gpw-v3-national-
admin-boundaries/data-download 
Split Tribal homeland's 
Distance to the 
National capital (in 
1000 KMs) 
Centroid distance 
for each 
Polygonal-unit in 
1000 Kilometres 
From a Shapefile of 
National Capital 
centroid points 
ArcGIS Data Gallery - World Cities: 
http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=dfab3b294ab249
61899b2a98e9e8cd3d 
Mean Elevation (in 
1000 KMs) 
Polygonal-
averages 
Measured in 
1000 Kilometres 
From Data provided 
in ArcView ESRI 
Grid Format 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, 
release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.: 
http://nelson.wisc.edu/sage/data-and-
models/atlas/maps.php?datasetid=28&includerelatedlinks=1
&dataset=28 
Soil Productivity index 
Polygonal-
average of Index 
between 1 and 97 
GRID values 
representing Soil 
Quality 
TERRASTAT I, FAO Soil Productivity Index 
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Malaria Ecology index 
Polygonal-
average of Index 
between a lowest 
value of 0 and 
highest value of 
38.081. This is 
also used in the 
Survey 
regressions and 
in that case is the 
average for the 
respondent's 
associated Tribe 
GRID values 
representing 
Incidence rates 
Malaria Ecology Map based on work by Kiszewski, 
Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004): 
available at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/people/gmccord/sitefiles/file/
malaria_ecology.zip 
Absolute Latitude 
Non-negative 
values of the 
Latitude of the 
Ethnic Polygon's 
associated 
centroid 
Latitude 
Obtained from the 'RWDB2 Subnational-Ad2 Polygonal 
Boundaries Map' by the United Nations' FAO 
Log (Split Tribal 
homeland land area to 
Unsplit Tribal land area 
ratio) 
Log of the 
polygonal-
average 
N/A 
Obtained from the Geographic intersection of the Provincial-
level administrative boundaries - 'RWDB2 Subnational-Ad2 
Polygonal Boundaries Map' obtained by the United Nations' 
FAO; and the Tribal Homeland Boundaries based on the 
work of Peter Murdock (1959) - available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/murdock_shapefile
.zip?m=1364315353 
Log Split Land Area 
Polygonal-
average in 1000 
Kilometres 
N/A 
Indicator for the 
presence of Diamond 
mines 
Polygonal 
Dummy variable 
NAME - 
representing the 
individual sites 
Petroleum Dataset from the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) website: https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-
and-Resource-Datasets/Petroleum-Dataset/ 
Indicator for the 
presence of Petroleum 
wells 
Polygonal 
Dummy variable 
NAME - 
representing the 
individual sites 
Global Lakes and Wetlands Database: Lakes and Wetlands 
Grid (Level 3): 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/global-lakes-and-
wetlands-database-lakes-and-wetlands-grid-level-3 
Log ((1 + Average 
Inland water area)) 
Polygonal-
average measured 
in Kilometres 
N/A 
Global Lakes and Wetlands Database: Lakes and Wetlands 
Grid (Level 3): 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/global-lakes-and-
wetlands-database-lakes-and-wetlands-grid-level-3 
Historic Ethnic Group's 
Political Centralization 
Index 
Indicators for 
each of the 3 
Categories 
v32 
Obtained from the Tribal Homeland Boundaries based on the 
work of Peter Murdock (1959) - available at 
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/world.htm 
Historical Ethnic 
Group's Settlement 
Pattern 
Indicator 
variables are used 
for each of the 8 
Categories 
v30 
How much do you trust 
your local council? 
(q55d) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q55d 
These variables are available from the Afrobarometer 
Merged Round 3 Data for 18 Countries in 2005 at the 
Afrobarometer website: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-3-data-18-
countries-2005 
How much do you trust 
people from other 
ethnic groups? (q84d) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q84d 
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How much do you trust 
people your own ethnic 
group? (q84c) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q84c 
How much do you trust 
your relatives? (q84a) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q84a 
How much do you trust 
your neighbours? 
(q84b) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q84b 
How often is your 
ethnic group treated 
unfairly by the 
government? (q81) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 3 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
outcomes 
q81 
Respondent's 
Perception of Ethnic 
Group's Relative 
Economic Conditions 
(q80a) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 5 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
and worse 
outcomes 
q80a 
Respondent's 
Perception of Ethnic 
Group's Relative 
Political Influence 
(q80a) 
Ordinal 
Categories 
ranging between 
0 and 5 (higher 
numbers 
represent higher 
and worse 
outcomes 
q80b 
What is the highest 
level of education you 
have completed? (q90) 
Indicator 
variables are used 
for each of the 9 
Categories 
q90 
What is your main 
occupation? (If 
unemployed, retired or 
disabled, what was 
your last main 
occupation 
Indicator 
variables are used 
for each of the 27 
Categories 
present 
q95 
What is your religion, 
if any? (q91) 
Indicator 
variables are used 
for each of the 18 
Categories 
present 
q91 
In general, how you 
describe your own 
present living 
condition? 
Indicator 
variables are used 
for each of the 5 
Categories 
present 
q4b 
ln(1+Atlantic+Indian 
Slave Exports) by 
Tribal group 
N/A ln_exports 
These variables are available in  dataset in a replication 
archive from Nathan Nunn's (Nunn, AER 2011) Research 
Datasets website at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/nunn_wantchekon
_aer_2011_replication_files_0.zip?m=1364315322 
District-level ethnic 
fractionalization 
Observed at the 
Tribal level and 
ranges between 0 
and 1 
district_ethnic_frac 
Proportion of ethnic 
group in district 
Observed at the 
Tribal level and 
ranges between 0 
and 1 
frac_ethnicity_in_di
strict 
Total Catholic + 
Protestant mission per 
land area 
Discrete values at 
the Tribal level 
total_missions_area 
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Indicator for historic 
contact with European 
explorer 
Dummy Variable 
at the Tribal level 
explorer_contact 
Indicator variable for 
historic integration into 
the colonial railway 
network 
Dummy Variable 
at the Tribal level 
railway_contact 
Indicator for existence 
of city among ethnic 
group in 1400 
Dummy Variable 
at the Tribal level 
cities_1400_dum 
Population Density 
Average for Tribal 
Group 
N/A lpopd 
Log population density 
during the colonial 
period - from Murdock 
N/A ln_init_pop_density 
Table Y – Appendix-Table 3.1: Variable Definition of Variables used in Regression 
Analyses 
 
 
Appendix 3.2 – List of African Countries Sampled in the 
Regression Analyses 
 
List of sampled African Countries Used in the Analysis 
Algeria Ghana Somalia 
Angola Guinea 
South 
Africa 
Benin 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Sudan 
Botswana Kenya Swaziland 
Burkina Faso Lesotho Tanzania 
Burundi Liberia Togo 
Cameroon Libya Tunisia 
Central African Republic Madagascar Uganda 
Chad Malawi Zambia 
Comoros Mali Zimbabwe 
Congo Mauritania  
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
the 
Mayotte  
Cote d'Ivoire Morocco  
Djibouti Mozambique  
Egypt Namibia  
Equatorial Guinea Niger  
Eritrea Nigeria  
Ethiopia Rwanda  
Gabon Senegal  
Gambia, The Sierra Leone   
Table Z – Appendix-Table 3.2: List of Sampled African Countries involved in the 
Regression Analyses 
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Appendix 3.3 – List of Sampled Tribes Involved in the Core 
Regression Analyses (Subsection 3.3.1) 
 
List of the Sampled African Tribes Used in the Analysis 
ABABDA BUSANSI HLENGWE KWENA NAJI SILA 
ABARAMBO BUTAWA HOLO KWERE NALU SINZA 
ABE BUYE HOLOHOLO KWESE NAMA SIRTICANS 
ACHOLI BWAKA HUNDE LABWOR NAMIB SIWA 
ADAMAWA 
CAPE 
HOTTENTOT HURUTSHE LAGUAT NAMSHI SOGA 
ADANGME CHAAMBA IBIBIO 
LAKA 
(ADAMAWA NANDI SOKO 
ADARAWA CHAGA IBO 
LAKA 
(NDEBELE) NARON SOKOTO 
ADELE CHAKOSSI IDIO LALA NAUDEBA SOLIMAN 
AFAR CHAMBA IDOMA LAMBA NDAKA SOMBA 
AFO CHEWA IFE LAMBYA NDAMBA SOMRAI 
AFUSARE CHIGA IFORA LANDUMA NDAU SONGE 
AHAGGAREN CHOKWE IGALA LANGO NDEBELE SONGHAI 
AJUKRU CHOPI IGBIRA LELE NDEMBU SONGO 
AKPOSO CHUABO IJAW LENDU NDOB SONGOLA 
AKYEM COMORIANS IJEBU LENGOLA NDOGO SONGOMENO 
ALAGYA CYRENAICANS IKASA LENJE NDOKO SONINKE 
ALGERIANS DAFI ILA LESE NDOMBE SONJO 
ALUR DAGARI IMRAGEN LI NDORO SOTHO 
AMARAR DAGOMBA INGASSANA 
LIGBI, DEGHA 
(SE) NDUKA SUAFA 
AMBA DAGU IRAMBA LIKA NEFUSA SUBIA 
AMBO DAKA IRAQW LILSE NEN SUK 
AMER DAKHLA ISHAAK LIMBA NGALA SUKU 
AMHARA DAMA ISOKO LIPTAKO NGAMA SUKUMA 
ANA DAN ITSEKIRI LISI NGANDU SUMBWA 
ANAG DARASA ITTU LOBI NGBANDI SUNDI 
ANGAS DARI IWA LOGO NGBELE SURI 
ANTAISAKA DAZA IYALA LOKELE NGE SUSU 
ANTANDROY DEFORO JALO LOKO NGERE SWAZI 
ANTESSAR DEKAKIRI JANJERO LOMWE NGINDO TABWA 
ANUAK DELIM JARAWA LONGUDA NGIZIM TAGALI 
ANYANG DENDI JEBALA LOTUKO NGOMBE TAJAKANT 
ANYI DERA JEN LOVEDU NGONGO TALODI 
ARAD DIALONKE 
JERAWA, 
CHAWAI (SW) LOZI NGONYELU TAMA 
ARAGO DIAN JERBA LUAPULA NGUMBA TANALA 
ARI DIDA JERID LUBA NGUMBE TANGALE 
ARUSI DIDINGA JIBU LUCHAZI NGURU TANNEKWE 
ASBEN DIGO JIE LUGBARA NGWAKETSE TASUMSA 
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ASHANTI DILLING JOFRA LUGURU NGWATO TATOGA 
ASSINI DINKA JUKUN LUIMBE NKOLE TAWANA 
ATTA DIOLA JUR LUKOKWE NKOYA TAWARA 
ATTIE DIULA KABABISH LULUA NKUNDO TAZARAWA 
ATYUTI DOGON KABRE LUMBO NONO TEDA 
AULLIMINDEN DOROBO KABYLE LUNDA NSAW TEITA 
AUSHI DOROSIE KADARA LUNGU NSENGA TEKE 
AUYOKAWA DRAWA KAFA LUO NSUNGLI TEKNA 
AVATIME DUAISH KAGORO LUPOLO NUER TEM 
AVIKAM DUALA KAKA LUVALE NUKWE TEMAIN 
AWIYA DUI-MENIA KALAI LUWA NUNUMA TEMBU 
AZANDE DUMA KAM MAAZA NUPE TEMNE 
AZJER DURU KAMBA MABA NUSAN TENDA 
BABUKUR DURUMA KAMBATA MACHA NYAKYUSA TERA 
BABWA DZEM KAMBERI MADA NYAMWEZI TESO 
BACHAMA DZING KAMIR MADI NYANEKA TETELA 
BAGA EBRIE KAMUKU MAGUZAWA NYANGIYA THONGA 
BAGIRMI EDO KANEMBU MAGWANGARA NYANJA TIENGA 
BAHARIYA EGBA KANURI MAHAFALY NYARI TIGON 
BAJUN EGEDE KAONDE MAHAMID NYASA TIGRE 
BAKAKARI EGYPTIANS KAPSIKI MAKA NYIMA TIGRINYA 
BAKO EKITI KARA MAKERE NYORO TIKAR 
BAKWE EKOI KARABORO MAKONDE NZANKARA TIV 
BALANTE EKONDA KARAMOJONG MAKUA ODODOP TLHAPING 
BAMBARA ESA KARANGA MALINKE OGADEN TLHARU 
BAMILEKE EWE KARE MAMA OHEKWE TLOKWA 
BANDA FAJULU KAREKARE MAMBILA OKORO TOMA 
BANGANDU FALI KASONKE MAMPRUSI OMETO TONGA 
BANGBA FANG KATAB MAMVU ORRI TOPOKE 
BANGI FANTI KATLA MANALA PADANG TOPOTHA 
BANYUN FANYAN KAWAR MANDARA PANDE TORO 
BANZA FERTIT KEBU MANDJA PARE TOTELA 
BANZIRI FEZARA KELA MANGA PARI TRARZA 
BARA FEZZAN KEMANT MANGBETU PEDI TRIBU 
BARABRA FIA KENGA MANYIKA PEMBA TRIPOLITANIANS 
BARARETTA FIGIG KENTU MAO PENDE TSIMIHETY 
BAREA FILALA KEPERE MARGI PEPEL TUAT 
BARGU FIPA KERARISH MASA PIMBWE TUBURI 
BARI FON KEREWE MASAI PODOKWO TUKULOR 
BASA FOUTADJALON KEYU MASALIT POGORO TULAMA 
BASARI FOUTATORO KGALAGADI MASHASHA POKOMO TUMBUKA 
BASHI FUNGON KGATLA MASHI PONDO TUMTUM 
BASILA FUR KHARGA MASINA POPO TUNGUR 
184 
 
184 
 
BASSA FUT KIKUYU MASONGO POPOI TUNISIANS 
BATA GA KILINGA MATAKAM POTO TURKANA 
BATAHIN GAALIIN KIMBU MATENGO PUKU TURU 
BATI GABERI KIMBUNDU MATMATA RANGI TUSYAN 
BAUCHI GADAMES KIMR MATUMBI REGA UDALAN 
BAULE GAFSA KINDIGA MAURI REGEIBAT UNGA 
BAYA GAGU KINGA 
MAYOGO, 
BADJO (NE) RENDILE UREGU 
BEDE GALIM KIPSIGI MBAE RESHE VAGALA 
BEDERIA GAN KISAMA MBAGANI RESHIAT VAI 
BEMBA GANDA KISI MBALA RIF VENDA 
BENA GBANDE KISSI MBANGALA RIYAH VERE 
BENDE GBARI KITA MBEMBE ROLONG VILI 
BERABER GERAWA KOALIB MBERE RONGA WABA 
BERABISH GERI KOBA MBESA RUANDA WAKURA 
BERGDAMA GIBE KOKO MBOLE RUARHA WALLAGA 
BERIBERI GIL KOM MBUBULA RUFFA WALLO 
BERTA GILI KOMA MBUGU RUMBI WANGA 
BERTI GIMIRA KOMONO MBUGWE RUNDI WARA 
BETE GIMMA KONA MBUKUSHU RUNGA WARAIN 
BETSILEO GISIGA KONGO MBUM SAADI WARJAWA 
BETSIMISARAKA GISU KONJO MBUNDA SAB WIDEKUM 
BIAFADA GOBU KONKOMBA MBUNDU SABEI WOBE 
BIDEYAT GOGO KONO MBUNGA SAFWA WOLOF 
BIJOGO GOLA KONONGO MBWELA SAGARA WUM 
BINZA GOMANI KONSO MEBAN SAHEL WURKUM 
BIRA GOROA KONYANKE MEDJI SAHO WUTE 
BIRIFON GOSHA KORANA MEKYIBO SAKALAVA XAM 
BIRKED GREBO KORANKO MENASSER SAKATA XOSA 
BIROM GRUNSHI KOREKORE MENDE SALA YAHI 
BISA GUANG KORO MERARIT SAMBURU YAKA 
BISHARIN GUDE KOROCA MERINA SAMO YAKO 
BOBO GUIN KOSSI MERU SANDAWE YAKOMA 
BOFI GULA KOTA MESSIRIA SANGA YALUNKA 
BOGO GULE KOTOKO MIDOBI SANGU YANGERE 
BOKI GUMUZ KOTOPO MIJERTEIN SANUSI YANZI 
BOLEWA GUN KOYAM MIMI SANYE YAO 
BOMITABA GURAGE KPE MINIANKA SAPO YEKE 
BONDEI GURENSI KPELLE MITTU SEGEJU YERGUM 
BONDJO GURMA KRACHI MITUKU SEKE YESKWA 
BONGO GURO KRAN MOBA SELE YOMBE 
BONI GUSII KREDA MOBER SELIM YORUBA 
BORAN GWANDARA KREISH MOMBERA SENA YUNGUR 
BORROM GYRIAMA KRU MONDARI SENGA ZAGHAWA 
BOSAKA HA KUBA MONGO SENUFO ZARAMO 
BOZO HABBANIA KUFRA MOROCCANS SERER ZEKARA 
185 
 
185 
 
BRONG HADENDOWA KUKU MORU SHAIKIA ZENEGA 
BUA HADIMU KUKURUKU MOSSI SHAMBALA ZERMA 
BUBI HAMAMA KULANGO MPEZENI SHASHI ZEZURU 
BUDJA HAMAR KUMU MPONGWE SHAWIA ZIBAN 
BUDU HAMYAN KUN MUBI SHEBELLE ZIGULA 
BUDUMA HARARI KUNAMA MUM SHERBRO ZIMBA 
BUEM HASANIA KUNDA MUMUYE SHILA 
ZUANDE, BATU 
(E) 
BUILSA HAUSA KUNDU MUNDANG SHILLUK ZULU 
BULGEDA HAWIYA KUNG MUNDU SHLUH ZUMPER 
BULOM HAYA KUNTA MURLE SHOGO  
BUNDA HEHE KUNYI MUSGU SHUKRIA  
BUNU HEIKUM 
KURAMA, 
GURE (NE) MWERA SHUWA  
BURA HEMAT KURFEI MZAB SIA  
BURUNGI HERERO KUTSHU NAFANA SIDI  
BUSA HIECHWARE KWANGARE NAIL SIHANAKA   
Table AA – Appendix-Table 3.3: List of Sampled 227 Tribal Groups used in the Main 
Regression Analyses 
